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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three papers in which the research questions are related to the
double burden that accrues to Brazilian women. The first and second papers address this
issue by looking at expenditure decisions about home production. The first paper examines
whether the expenditure decisions about production goods, such as white appliances, rela-
tive to entertainment goods, such as TVs, are the outcome of a bargaining process between
husbands and wives. The second paper looks at the demand for maid services and for pro-
duction durable goods, examining the extent to which other household members substitute
for maid services and durable goods in home production. The third paper addresses the
effects of Brazilian women’s double burden on their labor market participation by exam-
ining whether the occupational choice of Brazilian women is affected by their gender roles
and whether entry into other occupations that are not identified as female occupations has
become easier since the introduction of anti-discrimination laws in the labor market.
The first paper combines two Brazilian data sets: a Brazilian household expenditure sur-
vey, Pesquisa de Orc¸amento Familiares (POF), and a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa
Nacional Por Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD). The results of the first paper indicate that
the decision about durable goods ownership is the outcome of a bargaining process between
husband and wife. The test on the coefficients of the marriage market variable and the indi-
cators of households in which only the wife and households in which only the husband makes
expenditure decisions corroborate the expectations about wives’ preferences for production
goods.
The same data sets as the first paper are used in the second paper. The finding of the
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second paper indicates that if the marriage market is favorable to women, that is if the
ratio of women to men goes from 1.07 to 0.96, the increment in the household probability
of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable goods is equivalent to 24% the impact of
moving a household up one income quintile. Moreover, the results indicate that daughters’
time substitutes for wives’ time and maid services in home production. Parents may want
daughters trained in home production to be able to perform their future role as wives. How-
ever, this training comes at a cost to daughters’ investment in formal education, narrowing
their future career options.
The data used in the third paper come from a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa
Nacional Por Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD). Gender roles are responsible for women to
choose female-dominated occupations, married women are 1.14 times more likely to work in
female-dominated occupations and having a child six years and older increases on average by
12% the probability that women work in female-dominated occupations instead of gender-
integrated occupations in 2001. However, it becomes easier for all types of women to enter
into male-dominated and gender-integrated occupations in 2001 compared to 1981.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Brazilian women’s participation in the labor market increased significantly since the second
half of the last century. In 1950, about 14 percent of them participated in the labor market
(Madalozzo (2009)). By 1981 the labor market participation of Brazilian women reached 31
percent (PNAD 2001). By 2001, their labor market participation rose to 52 percent (PNAD
2001). Looking at women of child bearing and child raising age (25 to 45 years), the labor
market participation in 2001 is higher than that of all women. About 68 percent of all the
women of child bearing and child raising age participate in the labor market (PNAD 2001).
Moreover, working wives with young children are the group with higher participation in
household work (Soares and Saboia (2007)).
Brazilian working women work about sixty hours a week while Brazilian work men work
about fifty hours a week. In reality, working women on average work five hours less than
men in the labor market (PNAD 2001). However, they undertake about fifteen hours more
of household work than working men do (PNAD 2001). Moreover, gender roles still have
a great influence in the intrahousehold allocation of time of Brazilian couples (Madalozzo
(2009)). Given the increasing participation of Brazilian women in the labor market and their
inability to engage their husbands in housework, the result is a double burden that often
presents them with difficult choices between their careers and families (Oliveira (2000)).
Not surprisingly, one of the concerns of Brazilian women is the unfair division of time in
housework (Oliveira (2000)).
This thesis is composed of three papers in which the research question is related to
this double burden that accrues to Brazilian women. The first and second papers address
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this issue looking at expenditure decisions about home production. In the first paper, it is
addressed whether the expenditure decisions on production goods, such as white appliances,
relative to entertainment goods, such as TVs, are the outcome of a bargaining process
between husbands and wives. In the second paper, it is addressed whether production goods
are not the only way available for wives to reduce their time on home production, looking
at other possible providers of home production than the wife: maid or teenaged daughter.
The third paper addresses Brazilian women’s double burden effects on their labor market
participation, looking at whether the occupational choice of Brazilian women is affected by
their gender role and whether entry into other occupations that are not identified as female
occupations has become easier since the introduction of anti-discrimination laws in the labor
market.
At first look, the research question of the third paper does not appear to be closely
related to the research questions in the first and second paper. However, maid is the most
common occupation among female occupations. Among the twenty most common female
occupations there are other occupations that are related with women’s roles as housekeeper
and care givers, such as cook, laundress, nurse and teacher. In this way, the topics of the
three papers relate to each other through addressing Brazilian wives’ double burden and
their historical role in the family.
Historically, the women’s role in the family was child bearing, child raising, and house-
keeping. As the population left the rural area and moved to cities, a movement that starts
in the 1950’s1, there was no need to have a large number of children to work on the farm.
Indeed, the fertility rate dropped from 6.15 births per woman in 1960 to 4 births per woman
in 1980, and 2.39 births per woman in 2000 (World Bank 2008). Since then, the fertility
rate has slowly decreased to 2.26 births per woman in 2006, approaching the replacement
1As reported in Baer (2008), the urban population had a fast growth during this period. Indeed, the
urban population increased from 31 percent in 1940 to 56 percent in 1970 and to 78 percent in 1996. In
2006, the urban population accounted for 85 percent of the country’s population.
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rate of 2.12.
Spending less time pregnant and with fewer children to care for and to clean up after,
wives could engage in labor market activities. In fact, with the growth of the industry
sector that started in the 1960’s and the economic growth brought by this new developed
sector (Baer (2008)), there were more employment opportunities for women, especially in
the services sector. Even until 2001, among the twenty most common women’s occupations
the majority are in the service sector. In 2001, the twenty most common female occupations
in descending order were maid, laborer or servant, street seller, teacher in primary school,
tailor or seamstress, cook, nurse (without degree), receptionist, teacher in middle school, hair
stylist, secretary, teacher in high school, manicure, bartender, cashier, assistant manager,
clerk, embroidery-maker, teacher in kindergarten, and laundress.
Maid is a traditional and important occupation in Brazil (de Melo (1998)). The share
of women in this occupation is about 99 percent, making it a female-dominated profession.
Maid is the largest female-dominated occupation, as shown by the 1981 and 2001 PNAD
(Brazilian Household Survey) data set. Laundress is another occupation that ranked among
the 20 most common female-dominated occupations in 2001. In both occupations, workers
have an average schooling of four years, which corresponds to elementary education (first to
fourth grade). Maids’ low educational levels results from women entering this profession at a
young age and, then, having to drop out school or from women not having the education to
enter another profession. The services provided by maids include cooking, doing the dishes,
doing the laundry, and help with the children (de Melo (1998)).
While in developed countries the double burden was eased by the introduction of durable
goods such as washing machines, dryers, and vacuum cleaners, in Brazil the double burden
was eased by maid services. Brazilian households tend to lack household-production durable
goods. Only half of the households living on less than two dollars a day per capita owns
a refrigerator (POF 2002-2003). Even among the five percent richest households in Brazil,
2Since 1993 the population has grown at 1.5% or lower (World Development Indicators Online).
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less than 20 percent of them own dish washers and dryers, 36 percent own vacuum cleaners,
60 percent own microwaves, and 78 percent own washing machines (POF 2002-2003). On
the other hand, Brazilian households appear to prioritize entertainment durable goods over
home-production durable goods in their purchasing decisions. Color TVs are the second
most frequently observed durable goods in Brazilian households, being more frequent than
refrigerators in lower income households.
Several studies have looked at the impact of home-production durable goods on freeing
women’s time to work in the labor market, but the results are not conclusive. Greenwood,
Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), using US household data, conclude that the durable goods
revolution was fundamental to free women’s time to work outside the household. Cavalcanti
and Tavares (2008) corroborate the result of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005),
analyzing data from seventeen OECD countries. They estimate that a decline in the relative
price of appliances accounts for a 10 to 15% increase in the labor force participation of women
in the United Kingdom. However, Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) argue that the
factor that matters the most in explaining increases in women’s labor force participation is
the reduction in the gender wage gap.
The focus of the papers in this thesis is not to determine whether maid services and
durable goods are a cause or consequence of Brazilian women participation in the labor
market. The papers in this thesis take as given women’s labor market participation and focus
on maid services and durable goods as ways to ease the double burden of Brazilian women.
Indeed, the gender wage gap has also decreased in Brazil. Leme and Wajnman (2000)
estimates that by 1997 the gender wage gap was 25%, an 82% reduction when comparing
with their baseline year, 1977. The gender wage gap for Brazilians aged 30 to 40 years old
went from 30 percent in 1981 (PNAD 1981) to 13 percent in 2001 (PNAD 2001).
The first paper is motivated by the welfare improvement that home-production durable
goods can bring to Brazilian wives, easing the double burden. The benefits of the time
saved due to home-production durable goods are potentially large to Brazilian wives given
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their inability to engage their husbands in housekeeping. The goal is to determine whether
decisions about durable goods ownership are the outcomes of a bargaining process between
husbands and wives, because they might have different preferences about the purchase of
durable goods.
In order to investigate whether decisions about durable goods ownership are the outcome
of a bargaining process between husbands and wives, the Brazilian household survey Pes-
quisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD) is used to construct the proportion of
marriageable women to marriageable men by cohort in the household’s state of residence.
The marriage market variable is used in this paper as a proxy for female bargaining power.
The assumptions behind this measure of bargaining power are that husbands and wives can
leave the current marriage and remarry; the marriage market is local; and the more scarce
women are, the more likely they are to find a better match and establishing a higher bar-
gaining power. Therefore, as the proportion of marriageable women to marriageable men
increases in a cohort and state, women’s bargaining power within a marriage would be likely
to decrease.
This information is combined with the Brazilian household expenditure survey, Pes-
quisa de Orc¸amento Familiares (POF). From the POF data set, the dependent variable, the
relative allocation of household-production durable goods to entertainment durable goods,
was constructed. This relative allocation is measured both as an expenditure ratio and
as a quantity ratio. Since the idea in this paper is to test whether wives prefer produc-
tion durable goods over entertainment durable goods, the dependent variable is a relative
measure of household-production to entertainment. If women prefer household production
durable goods over entertainment durable goods, and the marriage market variable is a good
measure of bargaining power, the marriage market variable coefficient should be negative.
Alternatively, other variables that capture bargaining power can be used as well, such as
husbands’ and wives’ unearned income, indicators of households in which only the husband
and households in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions, and indicators of which
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spouse has more schooling. By using these variables it is possible to test whether the pur-
chase of durable goods is the result of a household common preference or whether men and
women have different preferences over expenditures on durable goods.
The results indicate that the decision about durable goods ownership is the outcome of
a bargaining process between husband and wife. The test on the coefficients of the marriage
market variable and the indicators of households in which only the wife and households in
which only the husband makes expenditure decisions corroborate the expectations about
wives’ preferences for production goods. The husband’s and wife’s unearned income coef-
ficients are not significant. The indicators of the husband and the wife having unearned
income have the same impact on the allocation of production to entertainment durable
goods. The failure to reject the common preference of husband and wife using information
about unearned income may be driven by the inability of husband and wife to take from the
marriage the same amount of resources they control in the marriage. Under certain circum-
stances, pre-nuptial agreements exist, but in most cases husbands and wives are bound by
law to split their assets equally after marriage dissolution. Therefore, it is not possible to
draw any conclusion from the test of the coefficient of unearned income.
The second paper of this thesis is about how wives can reduce their time in home pro-
duction, alleviating the double burden, by making use of time-saving durable goods, by
substituting their time for maid services or the labor of other household members, or by
increasing the consumption of market goods such as carry out meals. The combination of
time-saving durable goods, maid services and consumption of market goods depends on their
relative prices as well as on household preferences and on the household members’ cost of
time.
Family composition is likely to affect home production. The presence of young children
increases the demand for time in home production, increasing the demand for time-saving
durable goods and maid services. However, the presence of teenagers or other relatives that
can offer time in home production reduces wives’ time in home production, decreasing the
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demand for time-saving durable goods and maid services. The empirical specification allows
for testing these hypotheses and also verifying if there are parental preferences for sons or
daughters.
Even when there is no difference in parental preferences for sons and daughters, the choice
of the optimal allocation of maid services and production durable goods can be affected by
the gender composition of the children living in the household. This occurs because daughters
and sons have different roles in home production. Parents may want their daughters to get
some training to be able to perform their future role as wives.
The finding of this paper is that the expenditure on home-production inputs is an outcome
of a bargaining process. The impact of the marriage market variable provides evidence of
wives’ preference for maid’s substitute durable goods. If the marriage market is favorable
to women, that is if the ratio of women to men goes from 1.07 to 0.96, the increment in the
household probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable goods is equivalent
to 24 percent the impact of moving a household up one income quintile.
The presence of children that are not of school age, and therefore demand more time-
intensive home production, 6 years or younger, increases the probability of having maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services equally for sons and daughters. Notwithstanding,
sons and daughters aged 13 to 16 years have different impacts on the probability of having
expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services. Daughters decrease
the relative probability of having maid services and sons increase the probability of having
expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services. For older children, aged
17 to 19 years, daughters decrease the relative probability of having expenditure on maid
services, while there is no difference in the impact of sons and daughters on the probability
of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods. This indicates that daughters’
time substitutes for wives’ time and maid services in home production.
The result described in the previous paragraph indicates that daughters are being trained
in home production to be able to perform their future role as wives. However, this training
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comes at a cost to daughters’ investment in formal education, narrowing their future career
options. Even though, home-production training does not prohibit daughters from attending
school, it does take them away from their after-school study time. With less study time and
more training in home production, these girls are trapped into choosing careers that make
use of their home-production training, for example, maids, corroborating the result found
by Alexopoulos and de V. Cavalcanti (2006) or into getting married and being a housewife.
Moreover, public policies based on cash transfers aim to keep children in school and away
from market work. Nevertheless, there is no public policy designed to regulate or prevent
children’s home production. Because daughters are more likely than sons to work in home
production and sons are more likely than daughters to perform market work, neglecting
children’s home-production work may lead to an increase in gender inequality in the labor
market.
In the third paper of this thesis, a version of the Roy (1951)’s model in which individuals
choose their occupation that best matches their gender roles considering possible discrimi-
nation and wage rates is adopted. To capture gender roles, variables are included that are
related to intrahousehold division of labor, such as marital status, children’s presence by
age group and spouses’ hourly wage. By doing that, it is possible to verify whether women
are selecting themselves into female-dominated occupations due to their roles as wives and
mothers.
Investigating whether gender roles influence females’ occupational decisions, resulting in
crowding into occupations that pay lower wages is important in terms of public policy. Take,
for example, the case of childcare. Children stay in school or daycare in Brazil about five
hours. Therefore, either mothers need to work fewer hours or have to find somebody to take
care of their children while they work. This issue is worse for those parents that are not able
to pay for childcare. An alternative to mitigate this issue is to extend hours children stay in
public school.
It would be easy to know whether women would be better off in terms of wage rates in
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occupations that are not female dominated, if it were possible to observe their wage rates
in every occupation. However, the only observed wage rate is for the selected occupation.
Therefore, selection correction terms are constructed from the occupational choice and added
to the wage regression. By doing that, it is possible to estimate the difference among wage
rates across occupations controlling by observed and unobserved individuals’ characteristics.
Of all the working women, 70 percent of them are crowded into a few occupations that are
less desired in terms of wage rates. It is possible in this model to verify whether women suffer
a penalty in terms of wage by working in female-dominated occupations. That is, whether
women working in female-dominated occupations have lower wage rates than women working
in other occupations, independently of their schooling, age, place of residence and selection
into occupations.
As shown by the results, gender roles have their share of responsibility for women being
crowded into female-dominated occupations. Married women are 1,14 times more likely
to work in female-dominated occupations than to work in gender-integrated occupations in
both years. Having a child six years and older increases on average by 12% the probability of
women working in female-dominated occupations instead of gender-integrated occupations
in 2001.
Indeed, being crowded into female-dominated occupations imposes a penalty in terms
of wage for women that does not depend on their schooling, age, place of residence, and
selection into occupations. If women could change from female-dominated occupations to
gender-integrated occupations, their log of hourly wages would increase by 0.81. However,
it becomes easier for all types of women to enter into male-dominated and gender-integrated
occupations in 2001 compared to 1981.
The fact that it becomes easier for all types of women to enter into gender-integrated and
male-dominated occupations shows that the anti-discrimination laws have worked to improve
women’s well being in the labor market. However, women are still being crowded into female-
dominated occupations due to their gender roles. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of
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the anti-discrimination laws, it is crucial to combine measures that can relieve the impact
of gender roles on women’s career choice.
However, measures to relieve the impact of women’s gender roles will not be fully effective
in promoting their entry into gender-integrated occupations if women continue to have lower
returns to schooling than men in these occupations. For women with college degrees, female-
dominated occupations give them higher returns to schooling than men with college degrees
in female-dominated occupations. In male-dominated occupations, men and women have
equal returns to schooling. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the reasons for women
having lower returns to schooling than men in gender-integrated occupations to be able to
mitigate this difference and to promote a more gender-integrated labor market.
10
Chapter 2
Durable Goods and Intrahousehold
Allocation in Brazil
2.1 Introduction
Frequently, women do most of the household work in Brazil, even though 67.5% of women
of childbearing and child rearing age (25 to 45 years old) participate in the labor force as
well. When comparing working men and women, women on average work 5 hours less than
men outside the household, as shown in Figure 2.1. However, they undertake about 15
hours more of household work than men. Consequently, Brazilian women tend to work 10
hours more than men. Not surprisingly, one of the concerns of Brazilian women is the unfair
division of time in housework (Oliveira (2000)1). Given their increasing participation in the
job market and their inability to engage their husbands in housework, the result is a double
burden that often presents them with difficult choices between their careers and families
(Oliveira (2000)).
Historically, the double burden was eased in developed countries by the introduction of
durable goods such as washing machines, dryers, and vacuum cleaners. Several studies have
looked at the impact of home-production durable goods, but the results are not conclusive.
Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), using US household data, conclude that the
durable goods revolution was fundamental to free women’s time to work outside the house-
hold. Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) corroborate the result of Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu (2005), analyzing data from seventeen OECD countries. They estimate that a
1Oliveira (2000) comments on the results of a study of 300 women in positions of responsibility in the
public sphere done by the Center for Women’s Leadership (CELIM) in Rio de Janeiro.
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decline in the relative price of appliances accounts for a 10 to 15% increase in the labor force
participation of women in the United Kingdom. However, Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003) argue that the factor that matters the most in explaining increases in women’s labor
force participation is the reduction in the gender wage gap. According to their model, a
reduction in men’s and women’s wage differential explains most of the change since 1950 in
the hours spent in market work by U.S. married women.
Whether or not the existence of home-production durable goods is crucial in freeing
women’s time to work outside the household, it is important to acknowledge the improvement
in welfare that these goods brought to our households. The spread of home-production
durable goods promoted an increase in efficiency, making it possible for clothes and houses
to be cleaned more often (Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003)), reducing time spent on
housework by 70% and reducing significantly the number of maids in the U.S. between 1900
and 1975 (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005)).
This paper is motivated by the welfare improvement that these home-production durable
goods bring. The benefits of the time saved due to home-production durable goods are poten-
tially large to Brazilian wives given their inability to engage their husbands in housekeeping.
Despite that, Brazilian households tend to lack household-production durable goods. Only
half of the households living on less than two dollars a day per capita owns a refrigerator.
Even among the five percent richest households in Brazil, less than 20% of them own dish
washers and dryers, 36% own vacuum cleaners, 60% own microwaves and 78% own washing
machines (Table 2.2).
Moreover, Brazilian households appear to prioritize entertainment durable goods over
home-production durable goods in their purchasing decisions. Color TVs are the second
most frequently observed durable goods in Brazilian households, being more frequent than
refrigerators in lower income households. The goal of this paper is to determine whether
decisions about durable goods ownership are the outcomes of a bargaining process between
husbands and wives. Some durable goods are time-savers in household production, such as
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washing machines, and their purchase reduces the burden on women and gives them time to
work outside the household. Other durable goods, such as televisions and satellite dishes,
are used in leisure time by both men and women. Husbands and wives might have different
preferences about the purchase of durable goods. Whereas husbands might prefer to spend
household income on entertainment durable goods, wives might prefer to spend household
income on household production time-saving durable goods because women do most of the
household production in Brazil. Therefore, investigating the factors that influence the rela-
tive allocation of durable goods is important.
Recent government policy in Brazil provides an example of the importance of households
purchasing behavior as regards durable goods. In April 17th 2009, the Brazilian government
lowered the taxes on the so-called “white appliances” (refrigerators, stove-ovens and washing
machines) aiming to reduce their price and to stimulate their sales. The policy was intended
to encourage poor households to replace old refrigerators with new, more energy-efficient
models and to increase access to washing machines. The tax reduction was combined with
an increase in stores’ credit lines.
As a result of this policy, the sales of “white appliances” increased, but the sales of the
most desired durable goods, such as LCD TVs and personal computers, also increased. Stores
have reported that advertising the price reductions on the “white appliances” brings con-
sumers to the store, but once consumers are there they end up buying entertainment durable
goods as well (Almeida and Casemiro (2009)). This unintended consequence of the tax re-
duction policy could be anticipated in the light of a bargaining process between husbands
and wives, where wives take their husbands to the store to convince them to buy “white
appliances” and couples end up compromising and taking home entertainment durable goods
as well. Therefore, investigating the decision process of acquiring production versus enter-
tainment durable goods for the household may help to determine the efficiency of the public
policies to boost production durable goods ownership and to forecast its consequences.
In order to investigate whether decisions about durable goods ownership are the outcome
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of a bargaining process between husbands and wives, the Brazilian household survey Pes-
quisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD) is used to construct the proportion of
marriageable women to marriageable men by cohort in the household’s state of residence.
The marriage market variable is used in this paper as a proxy for female bargaining power.
The assumptions behind this measure of bargaining power are that husbands and wives
can leave the current marriage and remarry; the marriage market is local; and the more
scarce women are, the more likely they are to find a better match. Therefore, as the propor-
tion of marriageable women to marriageable men increases in a cohort and state, women’s
bargaining power within a marriage would be likely to decrease.
This information is combined with the Brazilian household expenditure survey, Pes-
quisa de Orc¸amento Familiares (POF). From the POF data set, the dependent variable, the
relative allocation of household-production durable goods to entertainment durable goods,
was constructed. This relative allocation is measured both as an expenditure ratio and as
a quantity ratio. Since the idea in this paper is to test whether wives prefer production
durable goods over entertainment durable goods, the dependent variable is a relative mea-
sure of household-production to entertainment goods. If women prefer household production
durable goods over entertainment durable goods, and the marriage market variable is a good
measure of bargaining power, the marriage market variable coefficient should be negative.
Alternatively, other variables that capture bargaining power can be used as well, such as
husbands’ and wives’ unearned income, indicators of households in which only the husband
and households in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions, and indicators of which
spouse has more schooling. By using these variables it is possible to test whether the pur-
chase of durable goods is the result of a household common preference or whether men and
women have different preferences over expenditures on durable goods.
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2.2 Intrahousehold Allocation
Most of the recent studies in developing countries have refuted the unitary household model,
where the household is considered as a single decision maker. The studies have influenced
public policies, which are often now based on the premise that households bargain over
outcomes. In the unitary model, all members of the household are assumed to jointly
maximize the household welfare function, and income is allocated so that the marginal rate
of substitution between any two goods equates to any other pair of goods. The assumption
that the household can be treated as a single individual implies that all resources are pooled
and then reallocated following a common rule.
In modeling intrahousehold decisions as a bargaining process, heterogeneity in preferences
among household members is considered. In the presence of this heterogeneity and spouses’
bargaining power, there is no incentive for household members to pool their incomes, but
instead resources are allocated to goods that are preferable to each individual. If there
are gender preferences towards durable goods, in this alternative model, then these gender
preferences should be reflected in different resource allocations depending on the threat point,
that is, who controls the income, and who faces better marriage market situations. This
section continues by following Thomas (1990, 1997), which makes use of a Brazilian consumer
expenditure survey that precedes the POF data set used here. If household members have
the same preference for some goods, they would behave as a unitary household.
In the individual preference models, where there exists the bargaining within the house-
hold, households choose commodity demands, X, to maximize the product of the differences
between the utility level of each member, Um , and the threat point or reservation utility
level that each member could achieve outside the household, V m0 , which is different from
the welfare function in the common preferences model. In the bargaining model, households
follow a Nash equilibrium solution to the bargaining problem as described below.
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max
∏
m
[Um(X,Z)− V m0 (p, Im, Am)] (2.1)
where X is a vector of commodity demands including leisure, Z is a vector of home-produced
goods, p is a vector of price, Im is the unearned income of each individual, and Am repre-
sents situations that an individual would face if this individual decides to leave the house-
hold, which are not easily monetized, such as the marriage market. If there are N goods
then X has an NxM dimension, and its element, Xim, is the consumption of the ith good
by the mth member. This model assumes weak separability between the utility functions.
Household welfare is maximized subject to Becker (1965)’s full-time budget constraint and
home-production:
pX =
∑
m
wmT + Im (2.2)
Z = f(X, t) (2.3)
Where wm is the price of time for each individual in the household, and t is a vec-
tor of time of each household member or hired time. Home-produced goods are produced
with commodities, X, which includes the production and entertainment durable goods, and
time, t. There are substitutes for home-produced goods such as meals away from home
or, alternatively, a good can still be home-produced by substituting a household member’s
time for maid’s services. In the last case, maid’s services and household member’s time are
substitute factors in home production and, then, maid’s services and production goods are
complementary factors in home-production. On the other hand, maid’s services could be a
cheaper alternative to household-production durable goods and, then, maid’s services and
production good’s services are substitute factors in home-production.
In this case, the demand for good i, Xi, is given by:
16
Xi =
∑
m
Xim = g(p, I1, ..., IM , A1, ..., AM) (2.4)
Differently from the common preference model, each household member’s unearned in-
come enters the bargaining model demand function separately. Also, the bargaining model
demand function depends on the situation that each individual will face in the marriage
market.
If the unearned income of household members can be carried out of the household by
them without loss, then Im is equal to the amount that household member m controls
under marriage. In this case, the common preference hypothesis can be tested against the
bargaining hypothesis by testing whether couples pool their unearned income. However, if
the division of the unearned income between spouses is subject to pre-nuptial agreements,
then the unearned income of spouses is not a good measure of their bargaining power.
Therefore, the power of the test of income pooling is affected by the lack of accuracy of the
measure of bargaining power. The hypothesis of common preferences can still be tested using
this framework by checking the significance of the variables that capture the marriage market
situation. If spouses have different preferences for time-saving household-production durable
goods and entertainment durable goods and both spouses have bargaining power, then the
marriage market situation will impact the demand for durable goods, and the household is
not a unitary decision maker.
2.3 Data
This paper combines two Brazilian data sets: a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Na-
cional Por Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD), and a Brazilian household expenditure survey,
Pesquisa de Orc¸amento Familiares (POF). The PNAD data set offers highly detailed infor-
mation on labor force participation and some information about hours spent on household
work. Furthermore, PNAD is a large survey that covers almost all counties in Brazil. For
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these reasons, state- and region-level information is generated from the PNAD data set such
as number of men and women in each State by cohort, as well by cohort and education,
average income in a State, proportion of working women in a given cohort in a State and
price of an hour of maid’s services for both maids who reside in the household of employment
and those who reside in their own household in a State. More importantly, the marriage
market variable is constructed as the ratio of women to men by cohorts at the State using
the information collected in PNAD.
On the other hand, the POF data set, similar to the US Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX), contains detailed information on expenditure, income and the ownership of durable
goods. This data set is collected to construct the National Consumer Price Index (INPC).
The 2002/2003 survey is the first and only survey that contains information on the population
living outside the metropolitan regions and is therefore nationally representative. The income
information can be identified as belonging to the husband or wife. However, information on
durable goods expenditure and ownership is not available at the individual level. Therefore,
it is not possible to determine individual consumption of these goods and the services they
provide. They are also inherently types of household public goods.
The sample is composed of 19, 662 households in which both husband and wife are present.
One of the spouses is the head of the family. Families are reported as independent consump-
tion units2 and both spouses are 20 to 50 years old. In Table 2.1, the descriptive statistics
are reported. The average household per capita monthly income is R$418.003. Most of the
households are composed of only one family, but there are a few households with two or three
families sharing a house. The average household size is about four members. Husbands are
on average 3 years older than wives. In 42% of the households, the wife has at least one
more year of schooling than the husband and, in 31% of the households, the husband has at
least one more year of schooling than the wife, leaving 27% of households where spouses have
2This information is relevant when there are more than one family living in the same house but these
families make independent consumption decisions and do not share income.
3This value is about U$138.64 using the average exchange rate for 2002 and 2003.
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the same schooling. The dummies for educational level indicate that there are no strong
differences between the distributions of men and women’s education.
Unearned income includes income from government welfare programs; transfers from
other households, such as child support, parental transfer and inheritance; savings and other
financial assets; and exogenous income, such as money from gambling. About 16% of the
husbands and wives in the sample report receiving some unearned income, and 12% of the
wives and 6% of the husbands in the sample report receiving some transfers from other
households. The husband’s unearned income, R$664.00, is more than twice the wife’s un-
earned income, R$289.00. Transfers from other households received by husbands are equal
to about 70% of the transfers from other households received by wives, R$164.00.
At the time of interview, adults living in the household are asked if they make expenditure
decisions in order to determine their eligibility to participate in the personal expenditure
survey. This information does not allow the researcher to identify whether the husband or
the wife has the final decision over expenditures, nor whether the husband and the wife
disagree about who makes the family decision. However, this information can be used to
indicate who does not have any ability to decide about expenditures. For that reason, an
indicator of households in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions and an indicator
of households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions are constructed. In
about 82% of the households, both spouses make expenditure decisions. The households
in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions are 16% of the total, and in only
two percent of the households, only the wife makes expenditure decisions. These numbers
indicate that it is common for both spouses to report making decisions about personal
expenditure.
The household-production durable goods considered in this paper are goods that save
time and help in household production. They include the following: stove-oven, refriger-
ator, washing machine, microwave, freezer, vacuum cleaner, dishwasher and dryer. The
entertainment durable goods include the following: color TV, black and white TV, radio,
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sound system, VCR, CD player, DVD, computer, and satellite dish. On average, house-
holds spend 29% more on household-production durable goods compared to entertainment
durable goods. Also, they own on average 31% more household-production durable goods
than entertainment durable goods.
As shown in table 2.2 the three most frequent durable goods are, in order, stove-oven,
color TV and refrigerator. Almost all of the 20% richest households4 in the sample own these
three goods. However, only 80% of the 5% poorest households in the sample own a stove-
oven; the ownership increases to 83% and 88% for the 10% and 20% poorest households.
Only about half of the 20% poorest households own a color TV and a refrigerator. The
ownership of color TVS and refrigerators decreases to about 40% among the 5% poorest
households. Among the poorest households the fourth, fifth and sixth most owned durable
goods are radios, black and white TVS and satellite dishes, respectively. All of them are
entertainment durable goods. A washing machine is owned by less than 10% of the 20%
poorest households, and all other production goods are owned by less than 4% of them. For
the richest households, the fourth most owned durable good is a washing machine, followed
by VCRS, computers and microwaves.
In table 2.3, the percentage of the 20% poorest and richest households that own durable
goods conditional on having a stove-oven; stove-oven and color TV; stove-oven, color TV
and refrigerator is presented. This table shows the hierarchy of preference for these goods;
for example, once the 20% poorest households own a color TV, a radio and a black and white
TV are no longer the fourth and fifth most owned durable good, but instead the fourth most
owned good is a satellite dish, the fifth is a radio followed by a washing machine in sixth.
Regarding the order of preference for durable goods, there is no change for the 20% richest
households when ownership is conditional on the ownership of the three most owned goods.
In table 2.4, it is shown the ratio of the average price of the new durable goods and the
4The 5% and 10% poorest households live with less than U$1.00 daily per capita, the 20% poorest
households live with less than U$2.00 daily per capita, the 20%, 10% and 5% richest households live with
more than U$5.00, U$10.00 and U$15.00 daily per capita, respectively.
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average monthly expenditure for each income quintile. This information is useful to compare
the cost of production and entertainment durable goods. Overall, entertainment durable
goods cost at least as much as production durable goods. Take, for example, a satellite dish,
more frequently owned by the 20% poorest households than a washing machine, its costs
is 1.26 of the average monthly expenditure of the 20% poorest households, while a washing
machine costs 1.49 of the average monthly expenditure of the 20% poorest households .
The most expensive goods are PCS, freezers, refrigerators, color TVS, DVD players, sounds
systems, washing machines, dish washers and CD players, respectively. The cheapest goods
are radios, vacuum cleaners, black and white TVS, dryers, and stove-oven.
Defining the Dependent variable
The dependent variable is constructed from the POF data set. With the aim of exploring
the relative preferences of husbands and wives for production and entertainment durable
goods, the dependent variable is constructed as the expenditure ratio and the quantity ratio
of household production to entertainment durable goods. The problem in working with
durable goods is that purchase and consumption have different meaning and timing for
these goods. The purchase of a durable good can be seen as an investment made at a certain
point in time, for which the return is the stream of services provided by the durable good
during its life-time. Individuals derive utility from the services that these goods provide,
and that is the consumption of durable goods.
Moreover, durable goods purchases are infrequent, and the survey follows households’
purchases of durable goods for one year. To deal with these difficulties, two different measures
of relative allocation are constructed: the expenditure ratio, where the numerator is the
aggregated rental value of production durable goods, and the denominator is the aggregated
rental value of entertainment durable goods; and the quantity ratio, where the numerator is
the quantity of production durable goods owned by the household, and the denominator is
the quantity of entertainment durable goods owned by the household. These measures are
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described below.
Expenditure Ratio of Durable Goods, sharep/e
A common way to measure the services, i.e. the consumption, of durable goods is to calculate
their rental equivalent value. This is usually done by assuming that durable goods follow a
depreciation decay model. Here this rental equivalent measure is calculated using this model
as well as using the empirical guides provided by Deaton and Zaidi (2002) to aggregate the
values of production and entertainment categories. In the depreciation decay model, the
rental equivalent value, rv, is estimated as
rv =
p
2T
(r − pi + δ) (2.5)
where p is the average price of each durable good, (r − pi) is the real interest rate5, δ is the
depreciation rate, and 2T is the average service life of these durable goods6.
There are no official estimates of the depreciation rate in Brazil. Some papers working
with durable goods in Brazil7 argue that there is no reason to believe that the depreciation
rate in Brazil is different from the US estimates. Usually, these papers use the US depreci-
ation rate to deal with Brazilian aggregated durable goods data. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) estimates that the US depreciation rate for household appliances is 16.5%
(BEA (2008)).
From the purchases of durable goods, there is information on the price households pay
for each durable good. From the stock of capital, it is possible to get the average time since
last purchase of each durable good. By combining the information on purchase and stock of
durable goods, the nominal depreciation rate is estimated by regressing the log of the average
5The real interest rate used is the average of the ‘selic’ interest rate over 1979 to 2003 discounted by the
average inflation rate during the same period. Both data come from IPEA, www.ipeadata.com. The average
real interest rate is 5.6%.
6Since the average service life is not observed in the sample, it is assumed that the life-time of durable
goods is normally distributed. Therefore, the average service life is calculated as two times the time since
last purchase.
7For example: and Kanczuk and Faria Jr. (2000)
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purchase price of each durable good in each State on the average time since last purchase in
each State and a constant. The estimated nominal depreciation rate is about 10%8, resulting
in a real depreciation rate of approximately 15.6%, similar to the BEA estimates for the US.
This is the number used to calculate the rental equivalent value of the durable goods.
Finally, the rental value is summed over all of the household-production durable goods
owned by the household, as well as for the entertainment durable goods owned by the house-
hold. Then a ratio of aggregated household-production expenditure to aggregated entertain-
ment expenditure is generated. The relative expenditure on production to entertainment
goods, sharep/e, is distributed as follows:
sharep/e =

y = 0 : no production and at least one entertainment good
0 < y < 1 : more entertainment than production goods
y = 1 : same amount of production and entertainment goods
1 < y ≤ PDG : more production than entertainment goods
(2.6)
where PDG is the total number of production durable goods owned by the household. A
household is assumed to have sharep/e = PDG if has at least one production good and no
entertainment good. This ratio is equal to zero if a household has no production good but
has at least one entertainment good. The distribution of the expenditure ratio is censored
at zero.
Quantity Ratio of Durable Goods Indicator, ownp/e
Each household owns a certain number of production and entertainment goods. There are
eight different types of production durable goods and nine types of entertainment durable
goods. However, one household may have more than one unity of a specific durable good
8See Table 2.5 for estimates.
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(e.g. two color TVs), therefore, when calculating the number of production and entertain-
ment durable goods we count all the production and entertainment durable goods. This
way, the quantity of production durable goods can be higher than eight and the quantity
of entertainment durable goods can be higher than nine. Based on that, the quantity ra-
tio of production to entertainment durable goods is calculated by dividing the number of
all production durable goods owned by the household by the number of all entertainment
durable goods. This relative allocation of production to entertainment durable good, ownp/e,
is distributed as follows:
ownp/e =

y = 0 : no production and at least one entertainment good
0 ≤ y < 1 : more entertainment than production goods
y = 1 : same amount of production and entertainment goods
1 < y ≤ PDG : more production than entertainment goods
(2.7)
As in the sharep/e, household is assumed to have ownp/e = PDG if it has at least one pro-
duction good and no entertainment good and ownp/e = 0 if a household owns no production
good but owns at least one entertainment good. This variable orders the relative ownership
of durable goods from relatively less to relatively more production goods. Notice that a
household that owns a refrigerator and a TV is similar to a household who owns all of the
production and entertainment durable goods. Notice, as well, that the distribution of the
quantity ratio is censored at zero. While this variable is a measure of quantity, the relative
expenditure on production to entertainment goods, sharep/e, is an expenditure measure.
State-Level Variables
To construct the marriage market variable there are important considerations that must
be done to guarantee that the variable is capturing the right information; for a complete
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discussion, see Fossett and Kiecolt (1991). The first decision to be made in constructing
this variable is the relevant geographic units that indicate a distinct marriage market. In
the data sets used in this paper (POF and PNAD), State is the smallest region that can
be identified and therefore these are the geographic units used to construct this variable.
Another, relevant decision for constructing the marriage market variable is regarding the age
limit and the age differences between husbands and wives. In table 2.6, the proportion of
married women and men by cohort is presented. The biggest increase in the proportion of
married women occurs at the 20 to 24 age range, whereas for men the same happens at the
25 to 29 age range. In table 2.7, the mean and standard deviation of the wife’s age in each
man’s cohort is presented. For most of the men’s cohorts, the wife’s average age is close to
the average age in that cohort, but when the wives’ age is lower than the husband’s cohort
age, that difference is well within the standard deviation, about 5.5 years. for most cohorts,
the wives’ age is less. However, that difference is well within the standard deviation. Based
on that information, it was assumed that husband and wife are in the same age cohort.
Alternatively, a version of the marriage market variable is used where it is assumed that
wives belong to a younger cohort than husbands.
In the construction of the marriage market variable the assumption that wife and husband
can leave the actual marriage and remarry is made. Therefore, the marriage market variable
is constructed as the ratio of women to men in a given cohort and State of residence in
2001. This variable is used in the regressions as a measure of women’s bargaining power.
According to the literature on marriage markets, bargaining power is established at the time
of the union, and the more scarce women are, the more likely they are to find a better match if
the marriage breaks up, which gives women higher bargaining power. The marriage market
variable used here is negatively associated with women’s bargaining power. Therefore, if
women prefer time-saving in household production durable goods over entertainment durable
goods, the marriage market variable should have a negative effect on the dependent variable.
Besides the marriage market variable, there are other State-level variables constructed
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using PNAD 2001 including the state average income, the proportion of working women by
cohort and the average price of maid’s services. The price of durable goods and electricity
are not available in the PNAD or available at the State-level from another source. Instead,
information on the expenditure of durable goods from the POF data set described in sec-
tion 2.3 is used to calculate the prices of the services of durable goods, that is, the average
rental value of production and entertainment goods by regions 9. The average was weighted
by the households’ ownership of these durable goods in the region. The price of electricity is
the average price for 2002 and 2003 from the Ageˆncia Nacional de Enegia Ele´trica (ANEEL).
These variables are used in the regressions to capture other factors that differ across States
and affect durable goods allocation such as differences in living standards, price differences
and women’s labor market participation. Because the marriage market variable is a state-
level variable and there exist differences among States in Brazil regarding development stage
and wealth, the regression must have these control variables to capture these differences.
Otherwise, the marriage market variable would be capturing these differences as well.
2.4 Econometric Model
The specification used to estimate the relative allocation of household-production to enter-
tainment durable goods and to test the impact of bargaining power on this allocation is
presented below. This specification is consistent with the previous work that has tested
the common preference models using cross-sectional data, such as Lundberg, Pollak, and
Wales (1997) where the expenditure ratio of two goods is used to allow for a single equation
estimation. It is possible to avoid bias due to measurement errors by using the dependent
variable as a ratio instead of estimating two equations. If the bargaining power variables
have measurement errors, then their impact will bias the coefficient in the same direction on
both equations. By doing the ratio of the dependent variable, this bias will cancel out.
9Because of the small number of observations on the purchase of certain durable goods in some states,
especially the goods that have been recently introduced, the rental value was calculated by regions of Brazil.
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However, the specification is not a conventional demand analysis because the dependent
variable is not a measure of purchase (flow) but instead it is proportional to the stock of
durable goods owned by the household. As pointed out by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980),
in a cross-section analysis, the stock of durable goods is a better measure than the purchase
because the relevant outcome is the choice between the ownership and nonownership of a
durable good. The two dependent variables, Y , estimated in this paper are the expenditure
ratio of production to entertainment durable goods, sharep/e, that is, a relative expenditure
measure, and the quantity ratio of durable goods , ownp/e, i. e., a relative quantity measure.
Y = γMMcs + βwDEw + βhDEh + δwUIw + δhUIh + θ1D + θ2Is + θ3WWcs
+ α1P
s
maid + α2P
s
prod + α3P
s
ent + α4P
s
elect + α5M
(2.8)
Where MMcs is the ratio of women to men in a given cohort, c, and State, s, a variable that
captures if the marriage market is more favorable to husband or wife. DEw and DEh are,
respectively, an indicator of households in which only the wife and households in which only
the husband reports making decisions about purchases. UIw and UIh are, respectively, the
wife’s and husband’s unearned income. Because the marriage market variable is constructed
for a given cohort in a given State, its variation may be correlated with cohort and State
characteristics.
To guarantee the identification of the marriage market effect on the relative allocation
of production to entertainment goods, a set of State- and regional-level10 variables is used
as controls. These control variables are the average income in State s, Is, the proportion of
working women in cohort c and State s, WWcs, the prices of maid’s services, P
s
maid, prices
of production, P sprod, and entertainment, P
s
ent, durable goods and price of electricity, P
s
elect.
A set of household variables are used including the per capita income of the household,
10The prices of electricity, production and entertainment goods are not available at State level, but they
are at regional level.
27
M , and a set of demographic variables, D, such as the number of people in the household
(broken down by gender and age), the number of families in the household, the wife’s age
and the difference between the husband’s and the wife’s age, a set of dummy variables for
wife’s primary education, middle school, high school, and at least some college, and indica-
tors of whether the wife has more schooling, less schooling, or equal amounts of schooling
compared to the husband11. However, the last two variables can also be considered measures
of bargaining power.
Testing The Common Preferences Model Against The Individual
Preference Model
To determine whether the decision about durable goods ownership is the outcome of a bar-
gaining process between wife and husband, and whether wives prefer household production
durable goods over entertainment durable goods, two hypothesis tests of common prefer-
ences against individual preferences and bargaining are performed. The first test is related
to the significance of the marriage market variable and the second test is the difference in
the impact of unearned income in the hands of husband and wife.
Testing: Marriage Market
The higher is the ratio of women in a given cohort to men in a given cohort, the lower is
the probability of a wife to find a better match outside the marriage, lowering the wife’s
bargaining power. Therefore, if women prefer household production durable goods over
entertainment durable goods and individuals in the household do not share common prefer-
ences, the coefficient of the marriage market variable is negative and significant.
11We choose to use an indicator of whether the husband has more schooling than the wife instead of a
specification that allows for a linear impact of the schooling difference between husbands and wives because
little variation exists between husbands’ and wives’ schooling. The percentage of couples with equal years
of schooling is 26 percent, and in 31 percent of the couples, the husband or the wife has one or two more
years of schooling than his or her partner. Only in 17 percent of the couples does the husband have three
or more years of schooling than the wife.
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H0 : γ = 0
Ha : γ < 0
Under the null hypothesis, H0, the marriage market variable does not affect the relative
allocation of production to entertainment goods and, therefore, the household behaves as
a unitary decision-maker. But under the alternative hypothesis, Ha, husbands’ and wives’
preferences differ, and the marriage market impacts the demand for durable goods. More-
over, if wives prefer production to entertainment goods, the impact of the marriage market
variable is negative. This happens because the opportunities outside the family affect the
intrahousehold distribution of resources through the threat point.
Testing: Unearned Income
A post-estimation test of the equality of the coefficients of husband and wife’s unearned
income is performed. Under the null hypothesis, H0, unearned income in the hands of
the wife or the husband have the same impact on the relative allocation of production to
entertainment durable goods, and the household behaves as a unitary decision-maker.
H0 : δw = δh
Ha : δw 6= δh
However, under the alternative hypothesis, Ha, the control of resources affects the relative
allocation of durable goods differently for husbands and wives, then the common preferences
model is rejected. Therefore, husbands and wives have different preferences over household-
production and entertainment durable goods. Moreover, if the impact of wife’s resources is
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higher than the impact of the husband’s resources on the ratio of production to entertainment
durable goods, then wives prefer production to entertainment durable goods. Notice that
if control over unearned income in the marriage differs from the control after divorce, the
test fails to reject the null hypothesis even if the true decision is a bargaining process. This
happens because the threat point is the payoff of choosing divorce and if there are imposed
sharing-rules regarding the assets division upon marriage dissolution, the threat point will
depend on that rule, not on the assets controlled under marriage.
Price and Income Effects
Because the dependent variable is a ratio, and both the numerator and denominator depend
on prices and income, the effects of prices and income are not straightforward to interpret
looking only at the coefficients of these prices and income variables. To overcome this
problem, the response of the dependent variable to prices and income is derived. In most
cases, the coefficients of these prices and income variables are proportional to the difference
of the elasticity of production and elasticity of entertainment with respect to the specific
variable. In this subsection, the hypothesis used and problems of identification are addressed.
Dependent Variable: Expenditure Ratio, sharep/e
The effect of the price of maids is easier to interpret if it is assumed that maids and entertain-
ment goods are independent, i.e., the price of maids affects the expenditure on production
goods but does not affect the expenditure on entertainment goods. The price elasticity of
production goods with respect to price of maids is presented in equation (2.9), and depends
on the coefficient of the price of maids, α1, the price of maids, Pmaid, and the relative expen-
diture of production to entertainment goods, sharep/e. The coefficient of the price of maids
indicates whether maids and production goods are substitutes, α1 > 0, or complements,
α1 < 0. Notice also that the higher is α1 and Pmaid, the more elastic is the expenditure
on production goods relative to the price of maids. As well, the lower is the expenditure
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on production goods relative to entertainment goods, the more elastic is the expenditure on
production goods relative to the price of maids.
εproduction,Pmaids = α1
Pmaid
sharep/e
(2.9)
The own-price elasticity of production goods, εproduction,Pprod , and the price elasticity
of entertainment goods with respect to price of production goods, εentertainment,Pprod , are
not identified in equation (2.10). The same problem occurs with own-price elasticity of
entertainment goods, εentertainment,Pent , and the price elasticity of production goods with
respect to price of entertainment goods, εproduction,Pent , as shown in equation (2.11).
[εproduction,Pprod − εentertainment,Pprod ] = α2
PentQent
Qprod
− 1 (2.10)
[εproduction,Pent − εentertainment,Pent
Qprod
PentQent
] = α3
Pent
Pprod
+
Qprod
PentQent
(2.11)
Equation (2.12) is derived by differentiating the estimation equation with respect to the
price of electricity. The price elasticity of production and entertainment goods with respect
the price of electricity is not identified either. However, assuming that both goods are
complements to electricity, since their services are only provided if electricity is available, it
is possible to determine which good is more elastic depending on the coefficient of price of
electricity, α4.
[εproduction,Pelect − εentertainment,Pelect ] = α4
Pelect
sharep/e
(2.12)
Regarding the income elasticity of production and entertainment goods, equation (2.13),
the identification of which good is more income elastic depends on the coefficient of per
capita monthly income, α5, as well as, on assumptions on the inferiority and normality of
these goods.
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[εproduction,M − εentertainment,M ] = α5 M
sharep/e
(2.13)
Dependent Variable: Quantity Ratio, ownp/e
The following set of equations is the equivalent of the set discussed above when the dependent
variable is the quantity ratio of production to entertainment goods, ownp/e =
Qprod
Qent
. The
difference between this set of equations and the one in the previous section appears in the
effect of the prices of production and entertainment goods, equations (2.15) and (2.16).
These differences are the results of the absence of prices of these goods in the quantity ratio.
For the other equations, everything else is the same except for the sharep/e being replaced
by ownp/e, and all the identification problems discussed in the previous section hold.
εproduction,Pmaids = α1Pmaid
Qent
Qprod
(2.14)
[εproduction,Pprod − εentertainment,Pprod ] = α2Pprod
Qent
Qprod
(2.15)
[εproduction,Pent − εentertainment,Pent ] = α3Pent
Qent
Qprod
(2.16)
[εproduction,Pelect − εentertainment,Pelect ] = α4Pelect
Qent
Qprod
(2.17)
[εproduction,M − εentertainment,M ] = α5M Qent
Qprod
(2.18)
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2.5 Results
The main results are presented in table 2.8 and table 2.9, where in table 2.8 the dependent
variable is the expenditure ratio of production to entertainment durable goods, sharep/e, and
the dependent variable in table 2.9 is the ratio of the quantity of production to entertainment
durable goods, ownsp/e. In column one, the results are the outcome of OLS estimation and,
in column two, the Tobit estimation is used to deal with censoring of the dependent variable
at zero. The results are quite similar between OLS and Tobit estimation with changes in
the significance of few demographic variables. In column three, the husband’s and the wife’s
unearned income variables are replaced by indicators of whether the husband and the wife
have unearned income, given that only 15% and 16% of the husbands and wives report some
unearned income.
The results from both tables are grouped into bargaining variables, demographic vari-
ables such as wife and husband’s characteristics, and household variables, followed by the
interpretation of the income and price coefficients. The section continues with a discussion
of alternative measures of the marriage market variable, presented in table 2.10. The final
subsection presents a discussion of the different impacts of the bargaining power variables
across income groups, presented in table 2.11 and 2.12.
Bargaining Power Variables
In both tables 2.8 and 2.9, the marriage market variable indicates that the allocation of
production and entertainment goods is an outcome of a bargaining process between hus-
band and wife, that is, this variable is significant at 1%. In a common preference decision
process, this variable would not be significant because it does not affect preferences, but un-
der a bargaining process this variable is significant because it affects the allocation through
the threat point12. Moreover, the negative impact of the marriage market variable indi-
12Even after controlling for State average income and proportion of working women in a given cohort and
State, someone may still wonder if the marriage market variable is capturing the bargaining power of wives
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cates that cohorts and States where an excess of women exists, lowering a wife’s bargaining
power, have lower expenditure on production relative to entertainment durable goods. This
result confirms that wives prefer production to entertainment goods and husbands prefer
entertainment to production goods.
The indicators of households in which only the wife and only the husband makes expen-
diture decisions indicate that these households have higher allocation of production relative
to entertainment goods, in expenditure, table 2.8, and quantity, table 2.9, than households
in which both spouses report making expenditure decisions. That is, the coefficients of these
two indicators are positively significant in tables 2.8 and 2.9. These results are consistent
with the presence of a bargaining process between husbands and wives over production and
entertainment goods in households in which husbands and wives make expenditure decisions.
Under a bargaining process the outcome may not to be Pareto efficient, leading to a under-
supply of public goods and services. However, when only one spouse makes the expenditure
decision, an efficient allocation rises once households behave as an unitary decision model
and in unitary household models always result in an efficient allocation by assumption.
Even though, in table 2.8, the coefficient of the indicator of households in which only
husband makes expenditure decisions, βh, is higher than the coefficient of the indicator of
households in which only wife makes expenditure decisions, βw, the hypothesis of equality
of the coefficients of these two indicators is not rejected when the dependent variable is the
relative expenditure, table 2.8. However, the hypothesis of equality of βh and βw is rejected
at 10% when the dependent variable is the ratio of quantity of production to entertainment
durable goods and Tobit estimation is considered (second and third column of table 2.9).
In this case, households in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions have a higher
number of production to entertainment goods than households in which only the husband
or some other state effect. In reality, the correlation of the marriage market and the state income is around
-0.12 and the correlation of the marriage market and the proportion of working women was around 0.07.
Moreover, the test of variance inflation was rejected for all variables in the regression. These results indicate
that the marriage market variable is likely capturing females’ bargaining power for a given cohort in a given
State.
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makes expenditure decisions, indicating that the wife prefers production goods.
In summary, households in which only the husband or only the wife makes expenditure
decisions have higher allocation of production to entertainment goods than households in
which both spouses make expenditure decisions, as shown by the coefficients on these two
indicators and the F-statistic on the bottom of table 2.9. Moreover, households in which only
the husbands make expenditure decisions have the same relative expenditure as households
in which only the wives make expenditure decisions, as shown by the F-statistic in the
bottom of table 2.8. The non-rejection of the hypothesis of equality of these two coefficients
in the relative expenditure, but the rejection of the same hypothesis in the relative quantity
suggest that households in which only the wife makes decisions consume cheaper production
goods.
Compared to households in which the husband and the wife have the same level of
education, households in which the wife has more schooling than the husband have higher
allocation to household-production goods than to entertainment goods. While this impact
is highly significant for relative expenditure, table 2.8, it is only significant at 10% for the
relative quantity of production and entertainment goods, table 2.9. Indeed, households in
which the wife has at least one more year of schooling than the husband spend 0.13 more
on production goods relative to entertainment goods. On the other hand, households in
which the husband has more schooling than the wife have the same allocation of production
to entertainment goods compared to households in which spouses have the same education
level. Furthermore, these results are also evidence that production goods are preferred by
wives and, especially, by those wives that could benefit the most from their ownership, i.e.,
the ones with higher relative human capital.
The coefficients of husband and wife’s unearned income are not significant, but the coeffi-
cients of the indicators of husband and wife having unearned income are negatively significant
in both tables 2.8 and 2.9. If the husband or the wife have some unearned income the expen-
diture on entertainment goods is eight percent higher than the expenditure on production
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goods, but the quantity of entertainment goods is only four percent higher than the quantity
of production goods. These results indicate that households in which the husband or the wife
have some unearned income, consume more expensive entertainment goods than households
where neither husband nor wife have any unearned income.
In both tables, the coefficients for the indicators of husband and wife having unearned
income are close in magnitude. Furthermore, the hypothesis of equality of effects between
these indicators is not rejected, as showed by the first F-statistic at the bottom of tables 2.8
and 2.9. This result is consistent with Thomas (1997) findings, using aggregate household
goods expenditures in Brazil, which indicated that rearranging the distribution of unearned
income within the household will not have any impact on the household goods expenditure.
However, as discussed before, this test is not reliable if this income cannot be carried out
of marriage by spouses if divorce occurs. Part of the unearned income, such as inheritance
and financial assets is required to be divided in equal parts if divorce occurs under common
pre-nuptial agreement. The other components of unearned income such as transfers and
government welfare programs may increase after divorce for one spouse and decrease to
another. Therefore, unearned income under marriage is not an accurate measure of unearned
income under divorce and the test of income pooling is not appropriate to test the common
preference model in the case studied here.
For that reason, we focus on the results of the tests provided by the marriage market
variable, the indicators of households in which only the husband or only the wife makes
expenditure decisions and the differences in husbands’ and wives’ schooling. In these cases,
the common preference model is rejected in favor of a bargaining model. Moreover, there is
evidence that wives prefer household-production durable goods and husbands prefer enter-
tainment durable goods.
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Demographic Variables
Wife’s age and the difference between the husband’s and the wife’s age do not affect relative
expenditure, table 2.8, but they affect the relative quantity of production to entertainment
goods, table 2.9, lowering the quantity of production to entertainment goods. That is, as
the wife gets older the number of entertainment goods relative to the number of produc-
tion goods increases by 0.35%; and for each additional year in the husband’s age keeping
the wife’s age constant, the number of entertainment goods increases 0.2% more than the
number of production goods. The fact that age and age difference do not affect the rela-
tive expenditure but affect the relative quantity is evidence that this increase in quantity
of entertainment goods is due to the consumption of cheaper entertainment goods or more
expensive production goods. Therefore the quantity of entertainment goods is lager, but the
rental value is the same.
Households where the wife has middle school or more have higher expenditure on en-
tertainment relative to production durable goods compared to households where the wife
has no education, table 2.8. Households where the wife has some education, i.e. primary
and middle school, have more production relative to entertainment goods compared to those
households where the wife has no education, table 2.9. Except for households where the wife
has high school, the relative number of production to entertainment goods is not significantly
different from those households where the wife has no schooling. Moreover, households where
the wife has college or more have a lower ratio of production to entertainment goods than
households where the wife has no schooling. These results are consistent with a story that
as the opportunity cost of the wives staying at home increases, they prefer to hire someone
to replace their time in home-production, lowering their needs for production durable goods.
This finding may also be consistent with an income effect story, once education is a measure
of permanent income. As wives permanent income increases, there is a stronger income
effects for entertainment goods.
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The presence of children three years old and younger increases the allocation of produc-
tion to entertainment goods, as showed by the coefficients of number of daughter and sons
three years and younger on table 2.8 and by the coefficient of the number of sons three years
and younger on table 2.9. The presence of daughters four to six and thirteen to sixteen years
old decreases the allocation of household-production to entertainment durable goods. The
presence of sons seven to twelve years old decreases the relative quantity of production to
entertainment goods, table 2.9. The presence of women 61 to 70 years old decreases the rel-
ative quantity of production to entertainment goods, table 2.9. This result is also consistent
with a story of wives replacing their time in home-production with somebody else’s time
instead of using production durable goods, in this case wives’ time is substituted by other
women living in the household such as daughters or relatives. This kind of substitution
occurs when a maid’s time is not feasible or not seeing as perfect substitute to a family
member’s time.
Prices and Income Variables
All the prices and income variables have a significant at 1% or 5% impact on the relative
allocation of production to entertainment durable goods in both tables 2.8 and 2.9. The coef-
ficient of the price of maids is positively significant, around 0.4. Based on equations (2.9) and
(2.14), it is concluded that production goods and maids are substitute factors in household
production. For the country as a whole, the estimated cross-price elasticity of production
goods and maids’ services range from 0.5 to 0.64 depending on whether maids reside in the
household of employment or not.
The price of electricity has a positively significant effect, around four, on the relative
allocation of production to entertainment goods. Interpreting this result in the lights of
equation (2.12) and (2.17) and the complementarity of the durable goods with respect to
electricity, implies that entertainment goods are more sensitive to changes in the price of
electricity than production goods.
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The effect of the price of production goods is positively significant, around 0.55 on ta-
bles 2.8 and 2.9. Plugging the values presented on the descriptive statistic table on the right
hand side of equation (2.10), it is found that εproduction,Pprod−εentertainment,Pprod = 2.9 > 0. As-
suming that production goods are neither Giffen nor Veblen goods, then own-price elasticity
is negative. This implies that the cross-price elasticity of entertainment goods with respect
to the price of production goods is negative, and therefore production and entertainment
goods are complements. The same conclusions hold true if the results are analyzed using
equation (2.15).
The effect of the price of entertainment goods is negatively significant, around 0.2 in
tables 2.8 and 2.9. Plugging the values presented in the descriptive statistic table into
equation (2.11), it is found that εproduction,Pent − 0.15εentertainment,Pent = 0.55 > 0. For the
complementarity of the production and entertainment goods to hold, the entertainment
goods must be more sensitive to changes in price of entertainment goods than production
goods. The same conclusions hold true if the results are analyzed using equation (2.16).
For the income effect, equations (2.13) and (2.18), together with the negatively significant
monthly per capita income coefficient, around 0.09 on table 2.8 and 0.03 on table 2.9, and
the assumption that production and entertainment goods are not inferior goods, imply that
entertainment goods are more sensitive to changes in income than production goods.
Alternative Measures of Marriage Market
In this section, the robustness of the marriage market results to the assumption that both
spouses belong to the same cohort and to the assumption that educational level does not
matter are discussed. To avoid small sample problems, the education groups used are having
less than high school (less education) and having at least some high school (more education).
There are still some State and cohort cells where the number of observations is very small
for those who have more education, causing a higher variation in the range of the marriage
market variable. While the main specification of the marriage market varies from 0.65 to
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1.35, the marriage market by education varies from 0.5 to 3.2.
The impact of the marriage market variable assuming potential wives are from a younger
cohort than husbands is smaller than the impact of marriage market variable defined as
husband and wife in the same cohort. The result is still negative but significant only when
the dependent variable is the quantity ratio, column five on table 2.10. The marriage market
variable has a negatively significant effect assuming that husband and wife have the same
educational level and the husband’s education is used to construct the marriage market
variable. The results flip to positive and insignificant when wife’s education is used to
construct the marriage market variable. When the results are significant, they indicate
that the wife prefers household-production durable goods relative to entertainment durable
goods.
Results By Income Groups.
Table 2.11 shows the results by income group when the dependent variable is the expenditure
ratio of production to entertainment durable goods, sharep/e, while table 2.12 shows the
results by income group when the dependent variable is the ratio of the quantity of production
to entertainment durable goods, ownsp/e. When the dependent variable is the quantity ratio,
the marriage market variable is negative and significant at 1% to all income groups, implying
that independent of the income group the allocation of production to entertainment goods is
a result of a bargaining process between husbands and wives, where wives prefer production
durable goods over entertainment durable goods. Among all income groups, the middle
income group has the highest impact of the marriage market variable, whereas the low
income group has the lowest impact of the marriage market variable.
When the dependent variable is the expenditure ratio of production to entertainment
durable goods, the marriage market variable is negative and significant only for the low and
high income groups. While the marriage market is significant at 1% for the high income
group, it is significant at 10% for the low income group. However, the result still implies
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that the allocation of production to entertainment goods is a result of a bargaining process
between husbands and wives and wives prefer production durable goods over entertainment
durable goods, it indicates that in expenditure share this trade-off between production to
entertainment goods matters only for the low and high income group.
The indicator of households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions
shows that these households have higher allocation of production relative to entertainment
goods, in expenditure, table 2.11, and quantity for the lower middle and high income groups,
table 2.12, than households in which both spouses report making expenditure decisions.
That is, the coefficient of this indicator is positively significant in table 2.11 and for lower
middle and high income groups in table 2.12. The indicator of households in which only
the wife makes expenditure decisions implies that these households have higher allocation
of production relative to entertainment goods only in quantity for the lower middle and
middle income groups, table 2.12, than households in which both spouses report making
expenditure decisions. That is, the coefficient of this indicator is positively significant for
lower middle and middle income groups in table 2.12.
Even though, in table 2.11, the coefficient of the indicator of households in which only
the husband makes expenditure decisions, βh, is higher than the coefficient of the indicator
of households in which only wife makes expenditure decisions, βw, the hypothesis of equality
of the coefficients of these two indicators is not rejected when the dependent variable is
the relative expenditure, table 2.11. In the same way, in table 2.12, the coefficient of the
indicator of households in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions, βw, is higher than
the coefficient of the indicator of households in which only the husband makes expenditure
decisions, βh, the hypothesis of equality of the coefficients of these two indicators is not
rejected when the dependent variable is the quantity ratio, (table 2.12).
The coefficients of husbands’ and wives’ unearned income are not significant for all income
groups when the dependent variable is the relative expenditure of production to entertain-
ment good, table 2.11, and the F-statistic on the bottom of table 2.11 does not reject the
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null hypothesis of equality of husbands’ and wives’ unearned income coefficients. When the
dependent variable is the quantity ratio of production to entertainment goods, table 2.12, the
only significant coefficient is the husbands’ unearned income coefficient for the high income
group. However, the F-statistic on the bottom of table 2.12 does not reject the null hypoth-
esis of equality of husbands’ and wives’ unearned income coefficients. In the high income
group, husbands’ unearned income increases the quantity of entertainment to production
durable goods.
For each additional year the husband is older than his wife, the expenditure on production
durable goods relative to the expenditure on entertainment durable goods increases for the
low income group and decreases for the higher middle and high income group, as shown
by the coefficient of husbands and wives age on table 2.11. For the high income group, the
coefficient of husbands and wives age on table 2.12 shows that for each year that the husband
is older than his wife, the quantity of production durable goods relative to the quantity of
entertainment durable goods decreases.
In upper middle income households, if the husband has more schooling than the wife or
the wife has more schooling than the husband, the household spends more on production
than on entertainment durable goods. However, in high income groups, households in which
the wife has more schooling than the husband spend more on production durable goods than
households in which the husband and the wife have the same schooling and than households
in which the husband has more schooling than the wife. This conclusion is based on the
F-statistic at the bottom of table 2.11, which rejects the hypothesis that households in which
the husbands have more schooling than wives have the same spending behavior as households
in which the wives have more schooling than the husbands.
When the dependent variable is the quantity ratio of production to entertainment durable
goods, table 2.12, the test of equality of the indicators of households in which the husband
has more schooling than the wife and the wife has more schooling than the husband rejects
the equality of these coefficients, except for the middle income group. In low income house-
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holds, if the wife has more schooling than the husband the quantity ratio of production to
entertainment durable goods decreases. In lower middle income households, if the husband
has more schooling than the wife the quantity ratio of production to entertainment durable
goods increases. In high income households, if the husband has more schooling than the wife
the quantity ratio of production to entertainment durable goods decreases.
Therefore, as the marriage market improves for wives, the relative quantity of production
to entertainment goods increases, however, the expenditure share of production to entertain-
ment goods increases only for the low and high income groups. This implies that increasing
wives’ bargaining power increases the quantity of cheaper production goods, except for low
and high income households. Moreover, low income households in which wives have more
schooling than the husband spend on production goods as much as households in which both
spouses have the same schooling, but have less quantity of production goods. High income
households in which wives have more schooling than the husband spend more on produc-
tion goods than households in which both spouses have the same schooling but have equal
quantity of production goods. This, also, implies that increasing wives schooling relative to
their husbands increases the relative ownership of more expensive production goods for low
and high income households.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper intends to determine whether decisions about durable goods allocation are the
outcome of a bargaining process between husbands and wives. In order to do that, sev-
eral measures of female bargaining power commonly used in the intrahousehold allocation
literature are used. These variables are a measure of the marriage market, the sex ratio,
the husband’s and the wife’s unearned income, indicators of households in which only the
husband and households in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions, and indicators
of which spouse has more schooling. The idea is that if decisions about the allocation of
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durable goods are the result of a common preference of husbands and wives over durable
goods allocation, then the relative allocation of household-production and entertainment
durable goods will not be correlated with any of these variables.
The results indicate that the decision about durable goods ownership is the outcome of
a bargaining process between husband and wife. The test on the coefficients of the marriage
market variable and the indicators of households in which only the wife and households in
which only the husband makes expenditure decisions corroborate the expectations about
wives’ preferences for production goods. The husband’s and wife’s unearned income coef-
ficients are not significant. The indicators of the husband and the wife having unearned
income have the same impact on the allocation of production to entertainment durable
goods. The failure to reject the common preference of husband and wife using information
about unearned income may be driven by the inability of husband and wife to take from the
marriage the same amount of resources they control in the marriage. Under certain circum-
stances, pre-nuptial agreements exist, but in most cases husbands and wives are bound by
law to split their assets equally after marriage dissolution. Therefore, it is not possible to
draw any conclusion from the test of the coefficient of unearned income.
These results increase the understanding of consumer durable purchasing behavior in
Brazil, identifying the reasons for the lack of household-production durable goods in Brazil-
ian households and for the priority given to entertainment durable goods. Given the ex-
istence of a bargaining process between husbands and wives over decisions about durable
goods ownership, wives’ relative preferences for production durable goods, husbands’ relative
preferences for entertainment durable goods, and husbands’ higher bargaining power, it is
natural that there exist missing production durable goods in Brazilian households. Under
these circumstances, a policy to stimulate the sales of “white appliances” combined with
more stores’ credit lines available for durable goods purchases also stimulates the purchase
of entertainment goods, as was observed in 2009 in Brazil.
Increasing women’s bargaining power will lead to reducing the gap between production
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and entertainment goods ownership in Brazilian households. Demographic trends will tend
to improve women’s bargaining power, but at a slow pace (Oliveira, Albuquerque, and
Lins (2004)). Because men marry younger women, as population growth slows, there are
fewer women in the younger cohort, increasing women’s bargaining power. Improvements
in women’s level of education will be the most important channel to increase the ownership
of household-production durable goods, especially the more expensive ones. Moreover, as
the Brazilian population keeps ageing, there will be the need to increase female labor force
participation to financially support the growth of the dependency ratio, as well as the need
to increase the time spent on elderly care. Because women do most of the household work,
there will be the need to increase the ownership of household-production durable goods to
free up women’s time.
45
2.7 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics, Brazil, 2002-2003.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
Relative Ownership Indicator 1.31 (1.42)
Difference in Ownership -0.26 (1.57)
Rental Value Share 1.29 (2.05)
Bargaining Power Variables
Marriage Market, same cohort 1.07 (0.10)
Marriage Market, wife in younger cohort 1.21 (0.13)
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.29 (4.38)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.66 (6.33)
Transfers wife receives from other HH (in 1000) 0.16 (3.93)
Transfers Husband receive from other HH (in 1000) 0.12 (2.93)
Both make expenditure decisions 0.82 (0.39)
Only wife makes expenditure decisions 0.02 (0.14)
Only husband makes expenditure decisions 0.16 (0.37)
Wife has more education 0.42 (0.49)
Husband has more education 0.31 (0.46)
Wife’s Age 33.45 (7.59)
Wife has no schooling 0.07 (0.26)
Wife has primary education 0.32 (0.47)
Wife has secondary education 0.29 (0.45)
Wife has high school 0.25 (0.43)
Wife has college or more 0.07 (0.26)
Husband’s Age 36.53 (7.55)
Husband has no schooling 0.10 (0.31)
Husband has primary education 0.35 (0.48)
Husband has secondary education 0.27 (0.44)
Husband has high school 0.21 (0.41)
Husband has college or more 0.07 (0.25)
Household Variables
Number of Families in HH 1.00 (0.06)
Number of People in Household 4.23 (1.56)
Per capita total monthly income 418.01 (781.53)
Average State Income (in 1000) 0.89 (0.28)
Prices
Rental Value of Entertainment Durable Goods 9.31 (1.02)
Rental Value of Production Durable Goods 4.59 (0.42)
Price of a hour of maid’s services 0.93 (0.25)
Price of electricity (kwatts) 0.21 (0.02)
Number of Observations 19662
Source: POF 2002-2003 and PNAD 2001.
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Table 2.4. Durable Goods Costs as Forgone Households Monthly Expenditures, Brazil 2002-
2003.
lower lower-Middle middle upper-middle higher
Microwave 1.38 0.75 0.49 0.30 0.10
Dryer 0.91 0.54 0.37 0.23 0.08
Washing Machine 1.49 0.78 0.50 0.31 0.10
Vacuum Cleaner 0.52 0.29 0.20 0.12 0.04
Dish Washer 1.47 0.88 0.61 0.37 0.12
Refrigerator 2.56 1.39 0.91 0.55 0.18
Freezer 2.82 1.45 0.91 0.55 0.17
Stoven/Oven 0.96 0.54 0.37 0.23 0.07
TV 2.05 1.13 0.74 0.46 0.15
Black-White TV 0.54 0.29 0.18 0.12 0.04
Sound System 1.64 0.89 0.58 0.35 0.11
Radio 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.02
PC 7.09 3.76 2.41 1.46 0.47
VCR 1.30 0.70 0.46 0.28 0.09
Satellite 1.26 0.68 0.44 0.27 0.09
CD player 1.44 0.77 0.49 0.30 0.10
DVD player 1.84 1.00 0.65 0.40 0.13
Source: POF 2002-2003
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Table 2.5. Estimation of the Depreciation Rate for Consumer Durables, Brazil, 2002-2003
(Dependent Variable: Log of Average Price Per State).
(1) (2) (3)
Average Age -0.1087** -0.1007** -0.1165**
(0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0066)
Bought Used -1.1667** -1.1547** -1.1547**
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Unknown (Used or New) -0.7191 -0.8446* -1.3161**
(0.4124) (0.3593) (0.4268)
Constant 5.9182** 5.8989** 5.8989**
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Observations 1508 1519 1506
R-squared 0.3192 0.315 0.2997
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Specification (1) includes the following: refrigerator, freezer,
oven, washing machine, dryer, microwave, dishwasher, vacuum cleaner,
TV, radio,sound system, VCR, CD player, DVD player, computer
and satellite dish.
Specification (2) includes the durable goods in (1) plus new goods
such as ‘taquinho ele´trico’.
Specification (3) includes the durable goods in (2) and more detailed
categories of entertainment goods, such as: type of radio,
sound system, DVD recorder.
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Table 2.6. Proportion of Married People, Brazil, 2001.
Men Women
cohort Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
15 to 19 0.03 (0.16) 0.14 (0.34)
20 to 24 0.26 (0.44) 0.42 (0.49)
25 to 29 0.56 (0.50) 0.63 (0.48)
30 to 34 0.73 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45)
35 to 39 0.79 (0.41) 0.74 (0.44)
40 to 44 0.82 (0.38) 0.72 (0.45)
45 to 49 0.84 (0.37) 0.69 (0.46)
50 to 54 0.85 (0.36) 0.66 (0.47)
55 to 59 0.84 (0.37) 0.61 (0.49)
60 or more 0.78 (0.42) 0.40 (0.49)
Source: PNAD 2001.
Table 2.7. Wife’s Average Age by Husband’s Cohort, Brazil, 2001.
Husband’s Cohort Wife’s Age
Mean Std. Dev.
15 to 19 19.41 (5.41)
20 to 24 22.14 (4.96)
25 to 29 25.77 (5.50)
30 to 34 29.72 (5.62)
35 to 39 33.86 (5.91)
40 to 44 38.08 (6.06)
45 to 49 42.68 (6.50)
Source: PNAD 2001.
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Table 2.8. Main Results. Dependent Variable: Share of Rental Value of Production to
Entertainment Durable Goods, sharep/e, Brazil, 2002-2003
OLS Tobit Tobit
Bargaining Power Variables
OLS Tobit Tobit
Marriage Market -0.5072 -0.505 -0.5035
(0.1491)*** (0.1516)*** (0.1516)***
Only wife makes decision over expenditures 0.1837 0.1891 0.1881
(0.1007)* (0.1024)* (0.1024)*
Only husband makes decision over expenditures 0.3076 0.2955 0.2861
(0.0408)*** (0.0416)*** (0.0421)***
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0034) (0.0035)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0024) (0.0025)
Wife Has Unearned Income -0.0852
(0.0421)**
Husband Has Unearned Income -0.084
(0.0410)**
Wife’s Age -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0037
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Husband’s age - wife’s age -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0023
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Wife has more schooling 0.1296 0.1315 0.133
(0.0373)*** (0.0379)*** (0.0379)***
Husband has more schooling -0.0259 -0.0032 -0.0042
(0.0388) (0.0395) (0.0395)
Wife has primary education -0.0547 0.0032 0.0018
(0.0612) (0.0626) (0.0627)
Wife has middle school -0.2074 -0.1174 -0.1226
(0.0642)*** (0.0657)* (0.0658)*
Wife has high school -0.3313 -0.2313 -0.2356
(0.0665)*** (0.0680)*** (0.0681)***
Wife has college -0.6116 -0.5151 -0.5138
(0.0859)*** (0.0876)*** (0.0876)***
Household Variables
Number of women 0-3 years old in HH 0.0785 0.0526 0.0524
(0.0339)** (0.0346) (0.0346)
Number of women 4-6 years old in HH -0.0819 -0.094 -0.0916
(0.0367)** (0.0374)** (0.0374)**
Number of women 7-12 years old in HH 0.0065 -0.0005 0.0076
(0.0252) (0.0257) (0.0259)
Number of women 13-16 years old in HH -0.0346 -0.0442 -0.04
(0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0347)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – continued from previous page
OLS Tobit Tobit
Number of women 17-19 years old in HH -0.0754 -0.0755 -0.0761
(0.0494) (0.0503) (0.0503)
Number of women 51-60 years old in HH -0.0239 -0.0105 -0.0201
(0.1897) (0.1927) (0.1927)
Number of women 61-70 years old in HH -0.1985 -0.2129 -0.2192
(0.1677) (0.1708) (0.1707)
Number of women older than 70 years in HH 0.0322 0.0331 0.0323
(0.1412) (0.1436) (0.1436)
Number of men 0-3 years old in HH 0.1698 0.1531 0.1524
(0.0335)*** (0.0341)*** (0.0341)***
Number of men 4-6 years old in HH 0.0284 0.0147 0.0175
(0.0359) (0.0367) (0.0367)
Number of men 7-12 years old in HH -0.0011 -0.007 0.001
(0.0246) (0.0251) (0.0253)
Number of men 13-16 years old in HH -0.0242 -0.03 -0.0248
(0.0326) (0.0332) (0.0333)
Number of men 17-19 years old in HH -0.0099 -0.0094 -0.0094
(0.0443) (0.0451) (0.0450)
Number of men 51-60 years old in HH -0.1942 -0.2193 -0.2211
(0.3036) (0.3098) (0.3098)
Number of men 61-70 years old in HH -0.1763 -0.1536 -0.1542
(0.2469) (0.2506) (0.2505)
Number of men older than 70 years in HH -0.1129 -0.1312 -0.1315
(0.1973) (0.2011) (0.2011)
Number of Families in HH -0.1607 -0.2252 -0.2236
(0.2379) (0.2435) (0.2435)
Per Capita Income (in 1000) -0.0919 -0.0937 -0.0871
(0.0233)*** (0.0236)*** (0.0221)***
State Level Variables
Proportion of Working Women by State and Cohort 0.1207 0.0862 0.098
(0.2088) (0.2125) (0.2125)
Average State Income (in 1000) -0.1258 -0.1514 -0.1462
(0.1314) (0.1336) (0.1336)
Price of maids 0.3698 0.417 0.4031
(0.1460)** (0.1485)*** (0.1486)***
Region Level Variables
Price of production goods 0.5876 0.6302 0.616
(0.0839)*** (0.0852)*** (0.0854)***
Price of entertainment goods -0.1531 -0.1707 -0.17
(0.0405)*** (0.0411)*** (0.0411)***
Price of electricity (in kwatts) 3.2103 3.8472 3.7058
(1.6138)** (1.6405)** (1.6426)**
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – continued from previous page
OLS Tobit Tobit
Constant 0.0101 -0.1874 -0.0789
(0.5339) (0.5439) (0.5457)
Observations 19662 19662 19662
R-squared 0.0251
Testing Income Pooling
F-statistic 0.02 0.02 0
Probability 0.8847 0.8904 0.9839
Testing βw = βh
F-statistic 1.36 0.97 0.82
Probability 0.2431 0.3240 0.3655
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.9. Main Results. Dependent Variable: Ratio of Production to Entertainment
Durable Goods, ownp/e, Brazil, 2002-2003.
OLS Tobit Tobit
Bargaining Power Variables
Marriage Market -0.4152 -0.415 -0.4147
(0.0454)*** (0.0462)*** (0.0462)***
Only wife makes decision over expenditures 0.0966 0.0979 0.0969
(0.0307)*** (0.0312)*** (0.0312)***
Only husband makes decision over expenditures 0.0448 0.0419 0.0381
(0.0124)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0128)***
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0011)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.001 -0.001
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Wife Has Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.0351
(0.0128)***
Husband Has Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.0404
(0.0125)***
Wife’s Age -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0036
(0.0008)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0008)***
Husband’s age - wife’s age -0.002 -0.0019 -0.002
(0.0009)** (0.0009)** (0.0009)**
Wife has more schooling 0.0202 0.0207 0.0212
(0.0113)* (0.0116)* (0.0116)*
Husband has more schooling 0.0033 0.0085 0.0081
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Wife has primary education 0.0371 0.0507 0.0502
(0.0186)** (0.0191)*** (0.0191)***
Wife has middle school 0.0768 0.0974 0.0956
(0.0195)*** (0.0200)*** (0.0200)***
Wife has high school -0.0014 0.0213 0.0202
(0.0202) (0.0207) (0.0207)
Wife has college -0.1676 -0.1457 -0.1444
(0.0261)*** (0.0267)*** (0.0267)***
Household Variables
Number of women 0-3 years old in HH 0.0048 -0.0011 -0.0014
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0105)
Number of women 4-6 years old in HH -0.0233 -0.026 -0.0252
(0.0112)** (0.0114)** (0.0114)**
Number of women 7-12 years old in HH -0.0114 -0.0131 -0.0097
(0.0077) (0.0078)* (0.0079)
Number of women 13-16 years old in HH -0.0201 -0.0223 -0.0208
(0.0104)* (0.0106)** (0.0106)**
Continued on next page
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Table 2.9 – continued from previous page
OLS Tobit Tobit
Number of women 17-19 years old in HH -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0117
(0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0153)
Number of women 51-60 years old in HH -0.0114 -0.0085 -0.0125
(0.0577) (0.0588) (0.0588)
Number of women 61-70 years old in HH -0.1188 -0.122 -0.1249
(0.0510)** (0.0520)** (0.0520)**
Number of women older than 70 years in HH 0.0084 0.0086 0.0085
(0.0430) (0.0438) (0.0438)
Number of men 0-3 years old in HH 0.0248 0.0209 0.0202
(0.0102)** (0.0104)** (0.0104)*
Number of men 4-6 years old in HH -0.0097 -0.013 -0.012
(0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Number of men 7-12 years old in HH -0.0149 -0.0163 -0.013
(0.0075)** (0.0077)** (0.0077)*
Number of men 13-16 years old in HH -0.0157 -0.017 -0.0149
(0.0099) (0.0101)* (0.0101)
Number of men 17-19 years old in HH -0.0107 -0.0107 -0.0107
(0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Number of men 51-60 years old in HH -0.0664 -0.0721 -0.0729
(0.0924) (0.0943) (0.0943)
Number of men 61-70 years old in HH 0.0355 0.0405 0.0399
(0.0751) (0.0765) (0.0764)
Number of men older than 70 years in HH -0.0234 -0.0274 -0.0277
(0.0600) (0.0613) (0.0612)
Number of Families in HH 0.0108 -0.0023 -0.0016
(0.0724) (0.0740) (0.0740)
Per Capita Income (in 1000) -0.0389 -0.0394 -0.0394
(0.0071)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0067)***
State Level Variables
Proportion of Working Women by State and Cohort 0.1204 0.1124 0.118
(0.0635)* (0.0648)* (0.0648)*
Average State Income (in 1000) -0.0864 -0.0923 -0.0894
(0.0400)** (0.0407)** (0.0407)**
Price of maids 0.4129 0.4237 0.4169
(0.0444)*** (0.0453)*** (0.0453)***
Region Level Variables
Price of production goods 0.5217 0.5313 0.5253
(0.0255)*** (0.0260)*** (0.0260)***
price of entertainment goods -0.1996 -0.2035 -0.2031
(0.0123)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0125)***
price of electricity (in kwatts) 4.1392 4.2847 4.2284
(0.4910)*** (0.5002)*** (0.5007)***
Continued on next page
56
Table 2.9 – continued from previous page
OLS Tobit Tobit
Constant -0.1511 -0.1977 -0.1517
(0.1624) (0.1657) (0.1662)
Observations 19662 19662 19662
R-squared 0.0869
Testing Income Pooling
F-statistic 0.4 0.38 0.09
Probability 0.5287 0.5381 0.7671
Testing βw = βh
F-statistic 2.58 2.89 3.18
Probability 0.1085 0.0889 0.0747
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.10. Results Using Alternatives Measures of Marriage Market, Brazil, 2002-2003.
Dependent Variable: sharep/e Dependent Variable: ownp/e
Marriage Market Variables:
Women in younger cohort -0.1449 -0.2655
(0.1249) (0.0380)***
By education level:
Merged by wife’s education 0.0842 0.0248
(0.0864) (0.0263)
Merged by husband’s education -0.1663 -0.1155
(0.0754)** (0.0230)***
Other Bargaining Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
State Level Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Level Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 19662 19662 19662 19662 19662 19662
R-squared 0.025 0.025 0.0252 0.086 0.0838 0.0849
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.11. Dependent Variable: Share of Rental Value of Production to Entertainment
Durable Goods by Income Group, sharep/e, Brazil, 2002-2003.
low lower middle middle upper middle high
Bargaining Power Variables
Marriage Market -0.6622 -0.4923 -0.6109 -0.3695 -0.3984
(0.3716)* (0.3893) (0.3724) (0.2997) (0.1917)**
Only wife makes decision over expenditures -0.0274 0.2791 0.1332 0.2661 0.1041
(0.2378) (0.2472) (0.2243) (0.2078) (0.1819)
Only husband makes decision over expenditures 0.3396 0.2499 0.3234 0.1985 0.2247
(0.0873)*** (0.0969)*** (0.1053)*** (0.0939)** (0.0731)***
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.0651 -0.1265 -0.0478 0.0269 -0.0013
(0.1636) (0.1108) (0.0544) (0.0401) (0.0019)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.1697 0.0086 0.0565 -0.02 -0.0009
(0.1159) (0.0430) (0.0407) (0.0177) (0.0014)
Wife’s Age 0.0162 0.0093 -0.0121 -0.0052 -0.0083
(0.0076)** (0.0070) (0.0065)* (0.0048) (0.0031)***
Husband’s age - wife’s age 0.0132 0.0045 -0.0042 -0.0117 -0.0066
(0.0075)* (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0060)* (0.0038)*
Wife has more schooling -0.069 0.0002 0.1266 0.1856 0.1568
(0.1033) (0.1010) (0.0944) (0.0720)*** (0.0456)***
Husband has more schooling -0.1481 -0.1211 -0.0115 0.1782 -0.0638
(0.1031) (0.1055) (0.0995) (0.0757)** (0.0460)
Wife has primary education 0.0696 -0.0839 0.0526 0.0129 -0.4894
(0.1146) (0.1414) (0.1689) (0.1800) (0.1761)***
Wife has secondary education 0.103 -0.1837 -0.2169 -0.1339 -0.606
(0.1406) (0.1527) (0.1735) (0.1799) (0.1705)***
Wife has high school 0.2813 -0.2316 -0.1207 -0.2431 -0.7788
(0.1906) (0.1724) (0.1830) (0.1828) (0.1683)***
Wife has college -0.1506 0.1197 -0.2738 -0.5069 -0.9701
(0.7602) (0.5958) (0.3071) (0.2152)** (0.1715)***
Household Variables
Number of women 0-3 years old in HH 0.0418 0.0429 0.1535 0.104 0.0155
(0.0690) (0.0852) (0.0958) (0.0807) (0.0555)
Number of women 4-6 years old in HH -0.1629 -0.0822 -0.0869 0.0014 -0.0675
(0.0745)** (0.0886) (0.1001) (0.0884) (0.0642)
Number of women 7-12 years old in HH 0.0054 -0.0384 -0.0325 0.0385 -0.001
(0.0538) (0.0640) (0.0672) (0.0590) (0.0408)
Number of women 13-16 years old in HH -0.0467 -0.141 0.0892 -0.0915 -0.117
(0.0788) (0.0849)* (0.0860) (0.0728) (0.0508)**
Number of women 17-19 years old in HH -0.1971 -0.1782 0.1203 -0.1872 -0.0645
(0.1242) (0.1284) (0.1262) (0.0969)* (0.0639)
Number of women 51-60 years old in HH -0.398 -0.2323 -0.0685 0.3547 -0.04
(0.6093) (0.4158) (0.4613) (0.3594) (0.2701)
Number of women 61-70 years old in HH -0.9889 0.6251 -0.6221 -0.2139 -0.0498
(0.5436)* (0.4443) (0.3631)* (0.3148) (0.2138)
Number of women older than 70 years in HH 0.2167 -0.5445 0.1144 0.2367 0.1577
(0.4473) (0.3616) (0.3233) (0.2549) (0.1846)
Number of men 0-3 years old in HH 0.1845 0.2148 0.1899 0.056 0.0495
(0.0674)*** (0.0841)** (0.0922)** (0.0819) (0.0576)
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low lower middle middle upper middle high
Number of men 4-6 years old in HH -0.1009 0.1675 0.041 -0.017 0.0333
(0.0729) (0.0894)* (0.0978) (0.0871) (0.0592)
Number of men 7-12 years old in HH -0.0307 -0.0039 -0.0265 -0.0385 -0.0091
(0.0524) (0.0619) (0.0681) (0.0570) (0.0392)
Number of men 13-16 years old in HH -0.0272 -0.0186 -0.0518 -0.1157 -0.0506
(0.0755) (0.0813) (0.0827) (0.0712) (0.0479)
Number of men 17-19 years old in HH 0.0546 -0.053 0.0609 -0.1376 -0.0661
(0.1110) (0.1133) (0.1106) (0.0870) (0.0595)
Number of men 51-60 years old in HH -0.3339 -0.0903 -0.1307 0.1456 -0.8466
(0.7455) (0.7930) (0.6156) (0.6771) (0.5060)*
Number of men 61-70 years old in HH -0.4489 -0.5288 0.3504 -0.2696 -0.0035
(0.8409) (0.6610) (0.5730) (0.4574) (0.2864)
Number of men older than 70 years in HH -0.4324 -0.0205 -0.1699 -0.1369 0.0115
(0.6312) (0.5095) (0.4382) (0.3359) (0.2926)
Number of Families in HH -0.5779 -0.128 -0.4391 -0.0986 1.4715
(0.5272) (0.5324) (0.6552) (0.4577) (0.4604)***
Per Capita Income (in 1000) 2.647 0.7573 -1.1914 -0.7101 -0.0112
(1.9109) (1.8114) (1.1282) (0.4038)* (0.0145)
State Level Variables
Proportion of Working Women by State and Cohort -0.1324 -0.0986 0.4892 0.2597 0.0304
(0.5254) (0.5350) (0.5441) (0.4242) (0.2747)
Average State Income (in 1000) 0.7421 0.13 0.031 -0.4674 -0.2628
(0.4617) (0.3797) (0.3324) (0.2616)* (0.1348)*
Price of maids -0.2009 0.2335 0.46 0.5769 0.5666
(0.4088) (0.3970) (0.3736) (0.2822)** (0.1705)***
Region Level Variables
Price of production goods 0.8697 0.749 0.6155 0.5997 0.1663
(0.3163)*** (0.2271)*** (0.2012)*** (0.1577)*** (0.1005)*
price of entertainment goods -0.2595 -0.2644 -0.1653 -0.2039 -0.0168
(0.1479)* (0.1102)** (0.0982)* (0.0742)*** (0.0463)
price of electricity (in kwatts) 2.3705 2.7544 2.6957 4.5537 -1.1488
(5.6553) (4.4127) (3.9539) (3.1131) (1.9372)
Constant -0.3626 0.048 0.4734 0.1075 0.2367
(1.4373) (1.3548) (1.4064) (1.1225) (0.8108)
Observations 3933 3932 3933 3932 3932
R-squared 0.0280 0.0184 0.0215 0.0251 0.0471
Testing Income Pooling
F-statistic 0.28 1.3 2.31 1.14 0.03
Probability 0.5993 0.2538 0.129 0.2857 0.8595
Testing βw = βh
F-statistic 2.23 0.01 0.6 0.09 0.39
Probability 0.1352 0.91 0.4302 0.7633 0.5338
Education Differences
F-statistic 0.66 1.58 2.3 0.01 22.33
Probability 0.4159 0.2083 0.1291 0.919 0.0001
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.12. Dependent Variable: Ratio of Production to Entertainment Durable Goods by
Income Group, ownp/e, Brazil, 2002-2003.
low lower middle middle upper middle high
Bargaining Power Variables
Marriage Market -0.3083 -0.3641 -0.6024 -0.3976 -0.3357
(0.0962)*** (0.1034)*** (0.1044)*** (0.1089)*** (0.0915)***
Only wife makes decision over expenditures 0.0457 0.1735 0.1054 0.0159 0.0852
(0.0616) (0.0656)*** (0.0629)* (0.0755) (0.0868)
Only husband makes decision over expenditures 0.0318 0.0653 0.0366 0.0255 0.101
(0.0226) (0.0257)** (0.0295) (0.0341) (0.0349)***
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.0236 -0.0172 -0.0107 -0.0001 -0.0007
(0.0423) (0.0294) (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0009)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) -0.0319 -0.001 0.0039 -0.0034 -0.0011
(0.0300) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0064) (0.0007)*
Wife’s Age 0.0027 0.0005 -0.0034 -0.0055 -0.0058
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0018)* (0.0018)*** (0.0015)***
Husband’s age - wife’s age 0.0027 -0.0016 0.001 -0.002 -0.0061
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0018)***
Wife has more schooling -0.0529 -0.0099 0.0105 0.026 0.0334
(0.0267)** (0.0268) (0.0265) (0.0262) (0.0218)
Husband has more schooling 0.0283 0.0481 -0.0086 -0.0333 -0.0519
(0.0267) (0.0280)* (0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0219)**
Wife has primary education 0.0979 0.0204 0.0124 -0.0162 -0.0679
(0.0297)*** (0.0375) (0.0474) (0.0654) (0.0841)
Wife has secondary education 0.2758 0.1014 0.0073 -0.0558 -0.1554
(0.0364)*** (0.0405)** (0.0486) (0.0654) (0.0814)*
Wife has high school 0.2562 0.1297 -0.0063 -0.1282 -0.2754
(0.0494)*** (0.0458)*** (0.0513) (0.0664)* (0.0804)***
Wife has college 0.3157 0.105 -0.106 -0.2419 -0.3986
(0.1968) (0.1582) (0.0861) (0.0782)*** (0.0819)***
Household Variables
Number of women 0-3 years old in HH -0.003 0.0099 0.0231 0.0483 -0.0202
(0.0179) (0.0226) (0.0268) (0.0293)* (0.0265)
Number of women 4-6 years old in HH 0.0061 0.0051 -0.0569 -0.0447 -0.0195
(0.0193) (0.0235) (0.0281)** (0.0321) (0.0306)
Number of women 7-12 years old in HH 0.0038 -0.0201 -0.0288 0.0172 -0.0336
(0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0188) (0.0214) (0.0195)*
Number of women 13-16 years old in HH -0.0129 -0.0326 0.0101 -0.0454 -0.0672
(0.0204) (0.0225) (0.0241) (0.0265)* (0.0242)***
Number of women 17-19 years old in HH 0.0515 -0.0154 0.0122 -0.1178 -0.0328
(0.0322) (0.0341) (0.0354) (0.0352)*** (0.0305)
Number of women 51-60 years old in HH -0.0056 -0.128 0.0989 -0.0423 -0.0734
(0.1578) (0.1104) (0.1293) (0.1306) (0.1289)
Number of women 61-70 years old in HH -0.3344 0.03 -0.2005 -0.0825 -0.1005
(0.1408)** (0.1179) (0.1018)** (0.1144) (0.1020)
Number of women older than 70 years in HH 0.1909 -0.1635 -0.129 0.0889 0.1047
(0.1158)* (0.0960)* (0.0907) (0.0926) (0.0881)
Number of men 0-3 years old in HH 0.0068 0.0463 0.0785 0.013 0.0406
(0.0175) (0.0223)** (0.0259)*** (0.0298) (0.0275)
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low lower middle middle upper middle high
Number of men 4-6 years old in HH -0.0395 0.0259 0.0203 0.0288 0.0209
(0.0189)** (0.0237) (0.0274) (0.0317) (0.0283)
Number of men 7-12 years old in HH -0.0026 -0.0047 0.001 -0.0683 -0.0334
(0.0136) (0.0164) (0.0191) (0.0207)*** (0.0187)*
Number of men 13-16 years old in HH 0.0277 0.0051 -0.0218 -0.088 -0.0659
(0.0196) (0.0216) (0.0232) (0.0259)*** (0.0229)***
Number of men 17-19 years old in HH -0.0087 -0.0118 0.0164 -0.0251 -0.0523
(0.0287) (0.0301) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0284)*
Number of men 51-60 years old in HH -0.2291 0.1952 -0.2011 0.4235 -0.6289
(0.1930) (0.2105) (0.1726) (0.2461)* (0.2416)***
Number of men 61-70 years old in HH 0.1737 -0.1273 0.2544 0.1009 -0.1034
(0.2177) (0.1755) (0.1606) (0.1662) (0.1367)
Number of men older than 70 years in HH -0.1465 -0.0551 0.0424 -0.0192 -0.0598
(0.1634) (0.1353) (0.1229) (0.1221) (0.1397)
Number of Families in HH -0.1465 -0.1411 -0.0946 0.4179 0.3177
(0.1365) (0.1413) (0.1837) (0.1663)** (0.2198)
Per Capita Income (in 1000) 1.4694 0.5516 -0.35 0.0203 -0.0037
(0.4948)*** (0.4809) (0.3163) (0.1467) (0.0069)
State Level Variables
Proportion of Working Women by State and Cohort -0.2485 0.1818 0.2653 0.2532 0.1904
(0.1360)* (0.1420) (0.1525)* (0.1542) (0.1311)
Average State Income (in 1000) 0.2317 0.191 -0.0328 -0.1057 -0.2281
(0.1196)* (0.1008)* (0.0932) (0.0951) (0.0643)***
Price of maids 0.292 0.159 0.4981 0.4788 0.4754
(0.1058)*** (0.1054) (0.1048)*** (0.1025)*** (0.0814)***
Region Level Variables
Price of production goods 0.5957 0.5193 0.3891 0.5239 0.4024
(0.0819)*** (0.0603)*** (0.0564)*** (0.0573)*** (0.0480)***
price of entertainment goods -0.2534 -0.2364 -0.1447 -0.2209 -0.136
(0.0383)*** (0.0293)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0270)*** (0.0221)***
price of electricity (in kwatts) 4.5027 2.9567 1.5059 3.3998 3.4028
(1.4643)*** (1.1714)** (1.1085) (1.1313)*** (0.9248)***
Constant -0.3671 0.2942 0.7064 -0.1948 -0.1261
(0.3722) (0.3596) (0.3943)* (0.4079) (0.3871)
Observations 3933 3932 3933 3932 3932
R-squared 0.1233 0.0824 0.0774 0.1038 0.1144
Testing Income Pooling
F-statistic 0.03 0.27 0.57 0.04 0.19
Probability 0.8723 0.6056 0.4487 0.8367 0.6665
Testing βw = βh
F-statistic 0.05 2.49 1.03 0.01 0.03
Probability 0.8267 0.1147 0.3091 0.9066 0.8643
Education Differences
F-statistic 10.42 5.13 0.56 4.98 14.64
Probability 0.0013 0.0235 0.4556 0.0258 0.0001
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 2.1. Number of Hours Worked Per Week (Only Employed Individuals).
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Source: PNAD 2001.
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Chapter 3
Maid Services as a Substitute Factor
in Home Production.
3.1 Introduction
Maid services are a significant sector in developing countries, but few studies have looked at
the importance of the availability of cheap maid services for household decisions. A trade
off might exist between maid services and durable goods in home production. Even among
the 5 percent richest households in Brazil, less than 20 percent own dishwashers and clothes
dryers, 36 percent own vacuum cleaners, 60 percent own microwave ovens and 78 percent
own washing machines, see Table 3.1. In contrast, 53 percent of these households hire maids
and 20 percent hire cleaning services, see Table 3.1.
Maid is a traditional and important occupation in Brazil (de Melo (1998)). The share of
women in this occupation is higher than 50 percent, making it a female-dominated profession.
Maid is the largest female-dominated occupation, as shown by the 1981 and 2001 PNAD
(Brazilian Household Survey) data set. Laundress is another occupation that ranked among
the 20 most common female-dominated occupations in 2001. In both occupations, workers
have an average schooling of four years, which corresponds to elementary education (first to
fourth grade). Maids’ low educational levels results from women entering this profession at a
young age and, then, having to drop out school or from women not having the education to
enter another profession. The services provided by maids include cooking, doing the dishes
and doing the laundry (de Melo (1998)).
As usual, wives are responsible for most of the housework. In Brazil, the number of
weekly hours spent on housework by working women is four times the number of working
64
men’s hours (PNAD 2001). One of the biggest concerns of Brazilian women is the unfair
division of time in housework (Oliveira (2000)1). Given their increasing participation in
the job market, the result is a double burden that many times presents them with difficult
choices between their careers and families (Oliveira (2000)). To alleviate this double burden
wives can reduce their time in home production by making use of time-saving durable goods,
by substituting their time for maid services or the labor of other household members, or by
increasing the consumption of market goods such as carry out meals.
The combination of time-saving durable goods, maid services and consumption of mar-
ket goods depends on their relative prices as well as on household preferences and on the
household members’ cost of time. Home production can be more time-intensive (or labor-
intensive) than goods-intensive (or capital-intensive) in developing countries with a large
supply of unskilled workers2 because the availability of cheap maid service makes not worth-
while to buy time-saving durable goods to combine with wives’ time in home-production.
For instance, one month of maid services costs less than a vacuum cleaner (half a month
of the monthly expenditures of a household living on at most one dollar a day per capita).
For a family living on more than U$176.00 per capita a day (20 percent of the households
with the highest income), one month of maid services costs four percent of their monthly
expenditures3.
By hypothesis, wives with higher value of time are more likely to replace their time in
home production with time-saving durable goods, maid services and market goods. The
wives’ shadow value of time in home production is measured by a proxy variable of their
opportunity cost in home production, which is a set of indicators of a wife’s educational
level. The assumption is that the higher their educational level, the higher their skill in
1Oliveira (2000) comments on the results of a study of 300 women in positions of responsibility in the
public sphere by the Center for Women’s Leadership (CELIM) in Rio de Janeiro.
2See Alexopoulos and de V. Cavalcanti (2006) for a discussion on the relationship between inequality and
cheap home goods.
3However, a durable good provides a stream of services, but maid’s service costs are recurring every
month.
65
the labor force, and, therefore, the higher their wages and opportunity costs to work on
home production. Therefore, wives with higher educational levels replace their time in home
production with time-saving durable goods, maid services or market goods.
Family composition is likely to affect home production. The presence of young children
increases the demand for time in home production, increasing the demand for time-saving
durable goods and maid services. However, the presence of teenagers or other relatives that
can offer time in home production reduces wives’ time in home production, decreasing the
demand for time-saving durable goods and maid services. The empirical specification allows
for testing these hypotheses and also verifying if there are parental preferences for sons or
daughters.
Even when there is no difference in parental preferences for sons and daughters, the choice
of the optimal allocation of maid services and production durable goods can be affected by
the gender composition of the children living in the household. This occurs because daughters
and sons have different roles in home production. Parents may want their daughters to get
some training to be able to perform their future role as wives. However, this comes at a
cost.
A special survey conducted through PNAD in 2004 estimated that 60,167 girls aged 13
to 16 years missed at least one school day 60 days before the interview due to housekeeping
responsibilities. This number accounts for 2.5 percent of the 13 to 16-year-old girls in
the population. Moreover, it is estimated that 17,156 of the 13 to 16 year-old girls (0.3
percent of the 13 to 16 year-old girls in the population) are not enrolled in school due to
housekeeping responsibilities. Of the girls from lower and low middle households who missed
at least one school day, the most common reason given for missing school was housekeeping
responsibilities, with 62 percent of these girls giving this reason. Of those girls aged 13 to
16 from lower and low middle households who are not enrolled in school, 78 percent give
housekeeping responsibilities as the reason.
Although the majority of the girls do not report missing school days due to housekeeping
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responsibilities, housekeeping reduces their after-school study time. With less study time
and more training in housekeeping, these girls are trapped into choosing careers that make
use of their housekeeping training, for example, maids. That is shown by Alexopoulos and
de V. Cavalcanti (2006), where parents with lower income invest in lower quality education
for their children and as a result, they end up working in low education jobs such as house
work. Therefore, this paper also investigate if daughters contribute more than sons to home
production.
3.2 The Home-Production Model
The theoretical model is based on Becker (1965)’s theory of time allocation in a Nash bargain-
ing equilibrium, equation (3.1). Spouses, s, choose market goods, X, and home-produced
commodities, Z, to maximize the product of the differences between the utility level of each
spouse, Us , and the threat point or reservation utility level that each spouse could achieve
outside the household, V s0 , where s = W,H indicates whether s is the wife or the husband,
X and Z are vectors of market goods and home-produced commodities in which some of
them are “public goods” inside the households. The threat point is influenced by a vector
of prices, p, which contains the price of time of each spouse, ws, and is also influenced by
spouses’ unearned income that can be carried out of marriage, Is, and situations, which
are not easily monetized, that an individual would face outside the market, As, such as the
marriage market.
Husbands’ and wives’ preferences for market goods and home-produced commodities may
differ because husbands do not engage in home production as much as wives do. House-
hold welfare is maximized subject to the full-time budget constraint (3.2) and the home-
production function (3.3). The full income in the full-time budget constraint depends on the
total time of the household members, Tm, the price of time of each household member, wm,
and the unearned income of each household member. Home-produced commodities are pro-
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duced using household members’ time, tm, maid services, S, and market goods and services,
X, which include production durable goods4. Therefore, household members other than
spouses contribute to full income by bringing earnings to the household or by offering time
in home production, but their consumption enters the problem through the utility function
of the husband and the wife.
max
∏
s=H,W
[U s(X,S, Z)− V s0 (p, Is, As)] (3.1)
pX =
∑
m
wmTm + Im (3.2)
Z = f(X, tm, S) (3.3)
Home-produced commodities can be substituted by market goods or services, such as the
following: meals away from home, daycare, frozen food, and dry cleaners. Alternatively, a
good can still be home produced by insourcing household members’ time for maid services.
In this case, maid services and household members’ time are substitute inputs in home
production that can be combined with production durable goods in the home-production
function. The choice of insourcing time on home production will depend on the husband’s
and wife’s preferences, the shadow price of the household members’ time and the price of
maid services.
There are production durable goods that cannot be directly replaced with the household
members’ time or maid services, such as refrigerators, oven stoves, and freezers. These
4Production durable goods include oven stoves, refrigerators, washing machines, microwave ovens, freez-
ers, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers and dryers.
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three home-production durable goods are complements to maid services and from this point
they are called maid service complements durable goods. There are production durable
goods for which the services can be replaced with the household members’ time or maid
services. These home-production durable goods are substitutes for maid services and from
this point they are called maid’s substitute durable goods. Maid’s substitute durable goods
include durable goods that can be replaced with time in home production, such as washing
machines, microwave ovens, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers and dryers. Indeed, 5 percent of
the households5 in the sample do not have maid’s substitute durable goods, but they have
expenditures on maid services instead.
The wife’s decision of how many hours to offer in home production depends on her shadow
price of time. That is how much she would earn by doing market work. In that case, the
higher the wife’s shadow price of time, the more likely the wife will look for more time-efficient
home production or will try to outsource home production, thus increasing the demand for
market goods, maid’s substitute durable goods, and maid services. The effect on the demand
for each of them will depend on husbands’ and wives’ preferences and the bargaining power
of both. If the households have strong preference for home-produced goods and services or
perceives that market goods are of lower quality, the demand for market goods would not
increase at the same rate as that for maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services.
The same argument holds if households perceive maid services as close substitutes for the
household members’ time. If services of maid’s substitute durable goods are perceived to
be of lower quality than maid services, an increase in the wife’s shadow price will boost the
demand for maid services.
5They are 928 out of 19, 662 households.
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3.3 The Empirical Specification
The choice between maid’s substitute durable goods, X, and maid services, S, is represented
by their first-order conditions. The first-order conditions are expressed in terms of random
marginal utility as specified by equations 3.4 below. These first-order conditions are jointly
estimated by a bivariate probit regression. The choice will depend on a set of spouses’
bargaining power measures, BP , a set of households’ demographic variables, D, a vector
of prices, P , the household per capita income, M , and two measures of States’ economic
performances, C, i.e., the State’s average income and its proportion of working women in a
given cohort.
UX = αXBP + βXD + γXP + δXM + θXC + X
US = αSBP + βSD + γSP + δSM + θSC + S
(3.4)
The spouses’ bargaining power measures are the sex ratio in a given cohort and State,
which captures the marriage market, indicators of households in which only the wife and
households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions, and indicators of whether
the husband and the wife have unearned income. The demographic variables are the wife’s
age, the difference between the husband’s and the wife’s age, a set of dummy variables for
wife’s education6, an indicator of whether the wife has more schooling than the husband, an
indicator of whether the husband has more schooling than the wife7, and a set of indicators
showing family composition, such as the following: the number of daughters and sons aged
three years or younger, four to six years, seven to twelve years, thirteen to sixteen years,
6The omitted category is at least some college education.
7Differences between the husband’s and the wife’s variables, such as age and education, are also used
as measures of bargaining power to identify the sharing rule, such as Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori,
and Lechene (1994). However, in cross-sections the identification of the sharing rule requires an exclusive
or assigned good as discussed in Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori (2006). That is not the case of
maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services, these services are in most part a “public good” to the
household. Moreover, husband’s education is omitted from the empirical specification to avoid collinearity
problems.
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and seventeen to nineteen years, as well as the number of other relatives by gender aged 51
to 60 years, 61 to 70 years and 75 years or older8.
The vector of prices contains the price of maid’s substitute durable goods, the price of
an hour of maid services, and the prices of complement and substitute goods, such as maid
service complements durable goods, entertainment durable goods9, and electricity. Because
the marriage market variable is the sex ratio across cohorts and States, its variation may
be correlated with the characteristics of cohorts and States. Therefore, the two measures of
States’ economic performance, i.e., the State’s average income and its proportion of working
women in a given cohort, are added to the regression as control variables to guarantee the
identification of the marriage market effect.
The error terms, X and S, contain unobserved household characteristics, specifically,
the wife’s decision to offer time in market work. Whether the woman works in the market or
not is not available in the data set that contains the expenditure on durable goods and maid
services. By omitting this decision from the set of estimating equations, the coefficients of
the indicators of the wife’s educational level are also capturing the shadow price of her time
in home production. In that case, the higher is the wife’s educational level and the higher
her shadow price of time, the more likely she will look to save time in household production.
She will then increase demand for maid’s substitute durable goods, for outsourced home
production, and for maid services. Women can choose different combinations of these inputs
to produce home production10.
The differences in the impact of bargaining power and the presence of sons and daughters
on the probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitutes durable goods and maid
services are tested following Thomas (1997)’s post-estimation test. To perform this test,
8The omitted category is households that are composed only of husband and wife.
9Entertainment durable goods include the following: color TV, black and white TV, radio, sound system,
VCR, CD player, DVD, computer, and satellite dish.
10In reality, the demand for maid services would also increase for goods and services that are available in the
market if households have strong preference for home-produced goods and services or perceive that market
goods are of lower quality. In both cases, market goods would not be perfect substitutes for home-produced
goods.
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the equations in 3.4 are jointly estimated, and the difference between sons’ and daughters’
coefficients is tested to determine whether they are statistically different across the equations.
Thomas (1997) uses this test to avoid measurement errors. If the variables that capture
bargaining power or the presence of sons and daughters have measurement errors, then their
impact will bias the coefficients in the same direction. For that reason, the test of the
equality of the relative coefficients is performed to offset measurement errors.
In the case of the impact of sons and daughters on the probability of having maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services, it is possible to test whether the difference in
the impact of sons and daughters is due to parental preferences for sons over daughters or if
it is due to social roles assigned to teenage daughters. The test is performed by estimating
the impact of sons and daughters on the expenditures, broken down by age groups. Babies
and toddlers (children three years old and younger) cannot contribute to home production,
but their presence increases the demand for home production goods and services.
If the presence of male babies and toddlers increases the demand for maid’s substitute
durable goods and maid services more than does the presence of female babies and toddlers,
then mothers will have more time away from home production to spend in child care11. How-
ever, if the gender of babies and toddlers does not matter in the choice of home-production
inputs, then parents have no differences in preferences for sons or daughters with respect to
home production. But if the presence of teenage daughters decreases the demand for maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services more than the presence of teenage sons, then
this is evidence that households are more willing to allocate daughters’ time to housework
and possibly away from school.
11There is no way to tell from the data set whether maids are net complements to or net substitutes
for mothers’ time in child care. At the same time that maids provide childcare for children while mothers
are away from home, for example, working or doing the grocery shopping, maids also do housekeeping,
decreasing mothers’ time in home production and making it possible to mothers to spend time with their
children after market work.
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3.4 Data
Data Set and Construction of Variables
The main data set, Pesquisa de Orc¸amentos Familiares (POF), provides information about
household expenditure on maid services, the ownership of durable goods, the year of last
purchase, the price paid if the household bought the durable good during the survey year,
the household composition and state of residence, household members’ income, age and
educational level. The POF 2002/2003 survey is the most recent and nationally represen-
tative consumer expenditure survey available. The dependent variables are indicators of
first, whether the household owns at least one maid’s substitute durable goods, and second,
whether the household reports any expenditure on maid services.
From the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD), state- and region-level
information, such as the sex ratio in each State by cohort, the average income in a State, the
proportion of working women in a State by cohort, and the price of an hour of maid services
is generated. The PNAD data set is annual household survey that offers detailed information
on labor force participation and earnings and it is representative of the population at the state
level These variables are merged into the main data set by State or region of residence. The
sex ratio, i.e., the female-to-male ratio, is used to capture the marriage market conditions.
In the data sets used in this paper (POF and PNAD), State is the smallest region that can
be identified and therefore these are the geographic units used to construct this variable12.
In the construction of the marriage market variable, it is assumed that a wife and a
husband can leave the current marriage and remarry. Therefore, the marriage market vari-
able is constructed as the female-to-male ratio across cohorts and States of residence13 in
12See Fossett and Kiecolt (1991) for a complete discussion of the considerations that must be taken to
guarantee that the sex ratio is capturing the marriage market conditions. They recommend using the smallest
relevant geographic unit for the analysis, but not so small that marrying people from another region becomes
easy.
13See marital status statistics in Fava and Arends-Kuenning (2008) that justify this choice, which is based
on a normal distribution in which about 60% of the wives’ ages range 5.5 years around the husbands’ ages.
73
2001. This variable is used in the regressions as a measure of women’s bargaining power.
According to the literature on marriage markets, the more scarce women are, the more likely
they are to find a better match and to establish a higher bargaining power. Therefore, the
definition of marriage market variable implies that the higher the marriage market variable,
the lower the women’s bargaining power.
The average income in a State and the proportion of working women in a given cohort in a
State are used in the regressions to capture other factors that differ across States and affect
expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services, as well as the wife’s
market working decision. Because the marriage market variable is a state-level variable and
States in Brazil differ regarding their development stage and wealth, the regression must
have these control variables to capture these differences. Otherwise, the marriage market
variable would be capturing these differences as well. Finally, the price of electricity comes
from the Brazilian National Electric Power Agency, ANEEL, and it is the average price for
2002 and 2003.
Descriptive Statistics
Overall, the cost of production durable goods14 is a high share of household monthly expen-
ditures. Take, for example, the cost of a refrigerator. To acquire a refrigerator a family must
give up two and a half months of expenditures if they belong to a lower income household,
one and a half months of expenditures if they belong to a low middle income household,
almost one month (0.9 of a month) of expenditures if they belong to a middle income house-
hold and one fifth of a month if they belong to an upper income household. Similar forgone
expenditures must be given up in order to acquire a freezer. The costs of a washing machine,
a dishwasher and a microwave oven come next on forgone expenditures. Acquiring one of
14The cost of production durable goods is calculated as the mean value of purchase of the durable good
by the income groups. Because the purchases of durable goods are infrequent, the POF survey follows
household’s purchases of durable goods for one year. Moreover, the POF survey follows households at a
different starting time taking two years to finish the whole survey. Therefore, the price is deflated at the
baseline time of the survey to be compared across households.
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them takes up to one and a half months of expenditures. The forgone monthly expendi-
tures needed to acquire stove/oven and dryers for households belonging to a lower income
group correspond to almost a month (0.9 of a month) and acquiring a vacuum cleaner takes
up to half a month of household monthly expenditures. On the other hand, maid service
expenses15 are lower than the cost of a vacuum cleaner for lower, low middle and middle
income households, while upper middle and upper income households spend, monthly, as
much as the cost of their vacuum cleaner as percentage of their monthly expenditures.
The sample is composed of 19, 662 households in which both husband and wife are present;
one of the spouses is the head of the family; they report their family as an independent
consumption unit16; and both spouses are 20 to 50 years old. The sample is restricted to
this age group for two main reasons. The first and most important is the different life
expectancies between men and women. Because men’s life expectancy is lower than women,
the ratio of women to men is higher than what should be if men and women have the same
life expectancy, misrepresenting the wife’s bargaining power. The second reason is due to
the interest in the impact of children and elderly relatives on the probability of having these
home-production inputs, and the 20 to 50 year-old age group is more likely to live with
children and elderly relatives.
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.3. Among all households in the sample,
38 percent own at least one maid’s substitute durable good and 14 percent report expenditure
on maid services. The average household per capita monthly income is R$418.0017. Most of
the households are composed of only one family, but there are a few households with two or
three families sharing the same house. The average household size is about four members.
15The maid service expenditure is the average monthly expenditure on maid service by the income groups.
The monthly expenditures decrease as percentage of income because the income increases faster than the
expenditures of the higher income groups increases. The POF data set do not include the quantity of maid
services purchased, only the household expenditure on maid services. Therefore, it is not possible to identify
whether the expenditure on maid services increases with income because richer households are buying more
hours of maid services or because they are buying more expensive maid services.
16This information is relevant when there are more than one family living in the same house, but these
families make independent consumption decisions and do not share income.
17This value is about U$138.64 using the average exchange rate for 2002 and 2003.
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Husbands are on average three years older than wives. In 30 percent of the households, the
wife has a higher educational level than the husband and, in 20 percent of the households,
the husband has a higher educational level than the wife, so 50 percent of the households
in the sample are composed of spouses who have the same educational level. The dummies
for educational level indicate that there are no strong differences between the distribution
of men’s and women’s education. The majority of wives and husbands, about 60 percent
have some elementary or middle school, 25 percent of the wives and 21 percent of husbands
have some high school; 7 percent of them have some college education; and 10 percent of
husbands and 7 percent of wives do not have formal education.
Unearned income includes income from government welfare programs that are not related
to previous work behavior18; transfers from other households, such as child support, parental
transfer and inheritance; returns from savings and other financial assets; and exogenous
income, such as money from gambling. About 16 percent of the husbands and wives in
the sample report receiving some unearned income, and 12 percent of the wives and 6
percent of the husbands in the sample report receiving some transfers from other households.
The husband’s unearned income, R$664.00, is more than twice the wife’s unearned income,
R$289.00.
At the time of interview, all adults living in the household were asked if they make
expenditure decisions in order to determine their eligibility for the personal expenditure
survey. This information is used to construct an indicator of households in which only
the wife makes expenditure decisions and an indicator of households in which only the
husband does so. In about 82 percent of the households, both spouses make expenditure
decisions. The households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions account
for 16 percent of the total, and in only 2 percent of the households only the wife makes
expenditure decisions. These numbers indicate that it is common for both spouses to report
18The government welfare programs included in unearned income are programs such as bolsa-escola and
renda-mı´nima.
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making decisions about personal expenditure.
Table 3.4 shows the sample distribution among the covariates and the percentage of
households that have some expenditure and their average expenditure on home-production
and maid’s substitutes durable goods, as well as on maid services. The majority of the sam-
ple, 37 percent, resides in the northeast region. The remainder of the sample is distributed
about equally among the other regions. Household members that reside in the south re-
gion are more likely to have home-production durable goods, especially maid’s substitutes
durable goods, at 78 percent, than in any other region. Although the likelihood of hav-
ing home-production durable goods is similar between the north and northeast regions (95
percent) the percentage of households in the northeast region that have maid’s substitute
durable goods is less than half the percentage of such households in the north region, 13 and
34 percent, respectively. The percentage of households in the southeast region that have
maid’s substitute durable goods is more than three times higher, 46 percent, than the per-
centage of households in the northeast region that own such goods. However, the percentage
of households that have expenditure on maid services is similar across regions: 16 percent
in the southeast, 15 percent in the north and south, 14 percent in the central west and 13
percent in the northeast.
As income increases, the percentage of households that have expenditure on home-
production inputs also increases. Expenditure on maid services occurs in 45 percent of
the richest 20 percent of households in the sample. Maid’s substitute durable goods are
more common among the upper middle and richest households in the sample. Among all
households in the sample, 70 percent report no unearned income. Only in two and a half
percent of households in the sample do both husbands and wives report having unearned
income. The remainder of the households are evenly split among the categories only the wife
reports having unearned income (13 percent) and only the husband reports having unearned
income (13 percent). Expenditure on maid’s substitutes durable goods occurs in 25 percent
of households in which only the wife has unearned income. However, expenditure on maid’s
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substitutes durable goods occurs in 47 percent of households in which only the husband has
unearned income. Maid services are more common among households in which husbands
and wives have unearned income. Expenditures on maid’s substitutes durable goods and
maid services are less common in households in which only the husband makes expenditure
decisions (30 percent).
For those households in which the wife has a higher shadow price of time, i.e., the wife
has some college education, the expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid
services are more frequent, 78 and 64 percent report some spending, respectively, and higher
than those households in which the wife has some high school education. As the wife’s
shadow price of time decreases, the households are less likely to have expenditure on maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services, their expenditure is also lower. Households in
which the wife has a higher educational level than the husband are slightly less likely to
have maid’s substitute durable goods than households in which the husband has a higher
than or equal educational level to the wife. However, households in which husband and wife
have the same educational level have higher and slightly more frequent expenditure on maid
services than households in which spouses have different educational levels. Moreover, if the
wife is older than the husband, the household is slightly less likely to have expenditures and
spends slightly less on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services.
In only 18 percent of the households does the wife belong to a cohort and a state in
which there are fewer women than men (i.e. the female-to-male ratio is less than one). The
percentages of households that have expenditures on home-production durable goods and on
maid services do not differ much comparing households with sex ratios that are greater than
one with those whose sex ratios are lower than one. If the sex ratio is favorable to women,
the percentage of households that have expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods is
slightly bigger than the percentage of households that face a sex ratio greater than or equal
to one, 42 and 37 percent, respectively.
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3.5 What Determines the Choice of
Home-Production Inputs?
The results in Table 3.5 identify the elements that influence whether or not households make
use of maid’s substitute durable goods or maid services in home production. The quintiles
of household income are used instead of household income because there is not sufficient
variation in the dependent variables for households belonging to the lower income quintile.
The Wald test t-statistic 9323.56, which is distributed as a chi-square with the probability
of not rejecting the null hypothesis of 0.01 percent, implies that the model as a whole is
statistically significant. Moreover, there is a positive statistically significant covariation19
of the error terms of the probability of having maid’s substitute durable goods and maid
services. This positive covariation implies that the decision about expenditures on these two
home-production inputs is affected by unobserved factors in the same way and, therefore,
must be analyzed using a bivariate probit regression.
In summary, husbands and wives have different preferences over maid’s substitute durable
goods and maid services. Households in which the husband has higher educational level than
the wife are more likely to have expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid
services. Moreover, the other household members that offer time in home production besides
the couple of reference are teenaged daughters. When they are present in the household, the
probability of hiring maid services is lower.
Households are more likely to have expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods if
the wife belongs to a cohort and State that have fewer women than men. That is, an
improvement in the marriage market for women of 10%, that is, going from a ratio of women
to men of 1.07 to 0.96, increases the probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute
durable good by 24% the impact of moving a household up one income quintile. However,
19The statistical significance test of the covariation of the error terms, ρ, has a χ2(1) statistic equals to 65.2
and a 1% probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis.
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there is no difference in the household’s probability of having expenditure on maid services
whether the wife belongs to a cohort and State that have more women than men or faces
a higher bargaining power. That is, the marriage market has no significant effect on the
household’s probability of having maid services.
Households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions have a higher prob-
ability of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good than households in which both
spouses make expenditure decisions. The difference is equivalent to 24% of the impact on
the probability of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good of moving a household
up one income quintile. Nevertheless, households in which only the husband makes expendi-
ture decisions have a lower probability of reporting some expenditure on maid services than
households in which both spouses make expenditure decision. The difference is equivalent
to 44% of the impact on the probability of reporting some expenditure on maid services of
moving a household down one income quintile.
If the wife has unearned income the household is less likely to have at least one maid’s
substitute durable good than household in which wives do not have unearned income. The
difference is equivalent to 41% of the impact on the probability of having at least one maid’s
substitute durable good of moving a household down one income quintile. If the husband has
unearned income the household is more likely to have at least one maid’s substitute durable
good and to report expenditure on maid services than households in which husbands do not
have unearned income. The difference is equivalent to 26% of the impact on the probability
of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good of moving a household up one income
quintile and 22% of the impact on the probability of reporting expenditure on maid services
of moving a household up one income quintile. The older the wife the more likely is the
household to spend on these two home-production inputs. In addition, households have
higher probability of having expenditures on any of these two home-production inputs for
each additional year the husband is older than the wife.
The higher the wife’s educational level, the higher the probability of having these two
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home-production inputs. However, for households in which the wife has a higher educational
level than the husband, the household’s probability of having at least one maid’s substitute
durable good and having expenditures on maid services is lower than in households in which
the wife has the same educational level as the husband. The difference is equivalent to
83% of the impact on the probability of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good
and 34% of the impact on the probability of reporting some expenditures on maid services
of moving a household down one income quintile. Besides, the household’s probability of
having expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services is higher if the
husband has a higher educational level than the wife. The difference is equivalent to 23% of
the impact on the probability of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good and 17%
of the impact on the probability of reporting some expenditures on maid services of moving
a household up one income quintile.
The result described above supports the common preference model rather than a bar-
gaining model. In fact, the result is consistent with the complementarity between husband’s
and wives’ leisure time or differences in their wage rates. In the first case, husbands’ and
wives’ leisure time are complements, so that husbands who have higher education relative to
their wives buy maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services so that they can spend
more time with their wives. While, in the second case, the impact is through the budget
constraint. If wives’ wages are lower than husbands’ wages even if wives have higher edu-
cational levels than husbands, the household in which wives have higher educational levels
than the husband will have less earnings to be spent on maid’s substitute durable goods and
maid services than households in which husbands and wives have equal education.
That result could also exist if husbands and wives do not have common preferences, but
instead they behave as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993) separate spheres. In the separate
spheres, husbands specialize in market work and wives specialize in home production. When
this specialization occurs, husbands reward their wives by increasing expenditures on maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services. Given that husbands and wives have similar
81
distribution across educational levels, husbands having lower educational levels than their
wives also have lower educational levels than other husbands. Therefore, households in which
the husband has less education than the wife are likely to have low expenditures on both
home production inputs because these husbands have low earnings compared to husbands
who have higher educational levels than their wives.
Family composition affects the probability of having expenditure on these two home-
production inputs. If younger children are present in the household, expenditures on maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services are more likely. This is true for sons and daugh-
ters 12 years older and younger, indicating that young children increase the demand for
home production. Nonetheless, households that have daughters 13 to 16 years old are as
likely as childless households to have expenditure on maid services, but more likely to have
expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods. As daughters get older, 17 to 19 years
old, households are less likely to have expenditure on maid services, but equally likely as a
childless household to have expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods. The presence
of sons aged 17 to 19 years increases the household’s probability of having expenditure on
both home-production inputs, but the presence of sons aged 17 to 19 years has no signif-
icant effect on the expenditure on maid services. These results show that daughters’ time
substitutes for maid services in home production, but sons’ time does not.
If other female relatives, such as grandmothers, are present in the household, the house-
hold’s probability of having maid services is lower as long as they are in their productive
age, 51 to 60 years old, and the household’s probability of having maid services is higher
in case of age ranges from 61 to 70 years. However, the presence of other female relatives
older than 70 years does not affect the probability of having expenditure on maid substitute
durable goods. Furthermore, the presence of other male relatives does not have any effect
on the household’s probability of having expenditure on any of these two home-production
inputs. These results indicate that other female relatives’ time, such as grandmothers’ time,
substitutes for maid services in home production, but other male relatives’ time does not.
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If the wife belongs to a cohort in a State that has a higher proportion of working women,
the household is less likely to have maid’s substitute durable goods, but equally likely to have
expenditure on maid services. This result vanishes away in regressions separated by income
groups (section 3.8) where it is controlled by per capita income. Thus, it is possible that the
significant impact of the proportion of working women on the probability of having maid’s
substitute durable goods in table 3.5 occurs because of inadequate controls for household
per capita income.
Households that face higher prices for maid services are more likely to have maid’s sub-
stitute durable goods and less likely to report expenditure on maid services. The higher the
price of maid’s substitute durable goods, the less likely it will be for the household to have
maid’s substitute durable goods, but the probability of reporting some expenditure on maid
services is not sensitive to the price of maid’s substitute durable goods. The prices of maid
service complements durable goods and entertainment durable goods have no effect on the
household’s probability of having maid services. But, the price of maid service complements
durable goods increases the household’s probability of having expenditure on maid’s substi-
tute durable goods, while the price of entertainment durable goods decreases the probability
of having maid’s substitute durable goods. The price of electricity increases the household’s
probability of having maid’s substitute durable goods20, but does not have an impact on the
household’s probability of hiring maid services. Households that belong to a higher income
quintile are more likely to have expenditure on both home-production inputs.
3.6 Results for the Bargaining Power Variables
This section discusses the post-estimation tests, such as Thomas (1997), which verify the
difference in the impact of bargaining power variables on the probability of having expen-
20This data were collected after the national blackout of 2001, which had a higher effect on the south and
southeast regions, the regions with higher percentage of households that have some durable goods. After
the first blackouts the price of electricity increased in regions where there was excess demand.
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diture on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services. The results are reported in
Table 3.6. The test of the bargaining power variables rejects the equality of the coefficients
between genders, that is, it does not reject that the decision over home-production inputs is
the outcome of a bargaining process. Nevertheless, they differ regarding wives’ preferences
for maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services, contradicting one another. The test
of the equality of the marriage market variable on the probability of having maid’s substi-
tute durable goods and maid services implies that wives prefer maid’s substitute durable
goods to maid services. Recall that the lower the female-to-male ratio, the higher women’s
bargaining power.
The test of the equality of the indicator of households in which only the wife and the
indicator of households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions on the prob-
ability of having maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services implies that relative
to their husbands, wives prefer maid services. There is no evidence of wives’ preferences
for maid’s substitute durable goods or maid services from the indicator of households in
which only the wife makes expenditure decisions. Nonetheless, the indicator of households
in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions shows that husbands prefer time
saving durable goods to maids. Indeed, if only the husband makes expenditure decisions,
the probability of having maid services decreases. Moreover, households in which only the
husband makes expenditure decisions are less likely to have maid services than households
in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions. But, the probability of having maid’s
substitute durable goods is equal between these households.
The test of the equality of husbands’ and wives’ unearned income on the probability of
having maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services implies that wives prefer maid
services. Because the estimation uses as a control the household per capita income in which
unearned income is included, the interpretation of the impact of having unearned income
is relative to the impact of having earnings. Since total income increases the probability of
having expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services, the results imply
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that wives’ unearned income is more likely to be spent on maid services than on maid’s
substitute durable goods. But, husbands’ unearned income is equally likely to be spent
on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services. The test of equality of husbands’
and wives’ unearned income on the probability of having maid’s substitute durable goods
is rejected. Indeed, wives’ unearned income is less likely to be spent on maid’s substitute
durable goods than husbands’s unearned income. However, wives’ and husbands’ unearned
income are equally likely to be spent on maid services.
In households in which the wife has better schooling than the husband, the relative
probability of having maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services is lower than in
households in which the wife and the husband have the same educational level. However,
the negative impact of wives’ better education is lower on the probability of having maid
services, as shown by the test of the equality of the indicator of households in which the wife
has better educational level than the husband on the probability of having maid’s substitute
durable goods and on the probability of having maid services. The test of the equality of
the coefficients of the indicator of households in which the wife has more schooling than the
husband and the indicator of households in which the husband is better educated than the
wife is rejected in both probabilities. Indeed, if the husband has better education than the
wife, the household is more likely to have maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services.
3.7 Differences Between Sons And Daughters
This section discusses the test for differences in the impact of sons and daughters on the
probability of having expenditures on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services.
The results are reported in Table 3.7. The test follows Thomas (1997), where the equations
are jointly estimated and post-estimation tests are performed to verify the equality of the
coefficients between equations, between genders, and the difference of the two previous dif-
ferences. The results for the equality of parameters between equations and the results of the
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equality of parameters between genders, such as in Thomas (1997), are also presented and
discussed.
The only age group for which the test rejects the equality of daughters’ and sons’ impact
on the probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid ser-
vices is 13 to 16 year-old one. Daughters decrease the relative probability of having maid
services while sons have equal impact on the probability of having expenditure on maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services. Moreover, sons have a positive impact on the
probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services, and
daughters have a positive impact on the probability of having expenditure on maid’s substi-
tute durable goods and a negative impact on the probability of having expenditure on maid
services. This provides evidence that sons’ impact on the probability of having expenditure
on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services is due to the increase in the demand
for home production, while daughters’ impact on the probability of having expenditure on
maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services shows that daughters are substitutes for
maid services in home production. It is also important to point out that this age group is
not of legal working age, but is at the same time able to perform home-production tasks.
For the age groups that are not of schooling age and demand more time-intensive home
production, 3 years old and younger and 4 to 6 years old, the test does not reject the equality
of sons’ and daughters’ impact on the probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitute
durable goods and maid services. In addition, there is evidence that children of both genders
aged 6 years or younger increase the probability of having maid services. The hypothesis
is that any difference between genders in this age group is due to parental son or daughter
preference. Because there is no significant difference between genders, it is concluded that
there is no evidence of parental preferences in favor of sons or daughters in this age group
in terms of demand for home production.
Sons and daughters aged 7 to 12 years have no differential impact on the probability
of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services. Sons and
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daughters increase the probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods
and maid services equally. As before, there is no evidence of difference in parental preferences
for sons or daughters in this age group. For older children, 17 to 19 years, the test of the
equality of sons’ and daughters’ impact on the relative probability of having expenditure
on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services is not rejected. However, daughters
decrease the relative probability of having expenditure on maid services, while there is no
difference in the impact of sons and daughters on the probability of having expenditure on
maid’s substitute durable goods. This provides evidence that daughters are substitutes for
maid services in home production.
3.8 Differences in the Determinants of
Home-Production Inputs Across Income Groups
The results in Table 3.8 are the estimates of the bivariate probit for each income group. The
bivariate probit for the lower income group is not estimated because there is not sufficient
variation in the dependent variables in this income group. For the same reason, quintiles
of household income are used in the previous regressions instead of household per capita
income. By excluding the lower income quintile group, it is possible to use household per
capita income in the bivariate probit estimation for the other income quintile groups. For
all the income groups, the likelihood ratio implies that the model as a whole is statistically
significant, as compared to a model with no predictors.
Nevertheless, the covariation of the error terms of the probability of having maid’s substi-
tute durable goods and maid services, ρ, is significant only for the middle and upper income
groups. Therefore, the decisions about expenditure on these two home-production inputs
for the middle and upper income groups are jointly determined and must be analyzed using
a bivariate probit regression, but estimating a separate probit for the low middle and upper
middle income groups does not generate biased estimates. In the case of the middle and
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upper income groups, the ρ is positive and significant, implying that unobserved character-
istics21 that increase the household’s probability of having maid’s substitute durable goods
also increase their probability of having maid services for the middle and upper income
groups, but do not increase it for the low middle and upper middle income groups.
The direction of the impact of the marriage market variable is equal to the previous
results. However, the effect is stronger; in terms of magnitude, for groups with the middle
income group, and not significant for the group with the highest income. Recall that the
marriage market is measured as the female-to-male ratio and, therefore, a reduction in
the marriage market measure by one unity increases women’s bargaining power a lot. An
improvement in the marriage market for women by one unit increases the probability of
owning at least one maid’s substitute durable goods by the same amount as a R$280.00
increase in monthly per capita income for the low middle income households. The probability
of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable goods increases by the same amount as a
R$1076.00 increase in monthly per capita income for the middle income households if the
marriage market reduces by one unit. And the probability of owning at least one maid’s
substitute durable goods increases by the same amount as a R$394.00 increase in monthly
per capita income for the upper middle income households if there is an improvement in the
marriage market for women by one unit.
The indicator of households in which only the wife makes expenditure decisions has
a significant impact only on the probability of having expenditures on maid’s substitute
durable goods in the low middle income group. In this income group, households in which
only the wife makes expenditure decisions, the probability of owning at least one maid’s
substitute durable goods increases by the same amount as a R$75.00 increase in monthly
per capita income compared to households in which both spouses make expenditure decisions.
If only the husband makes expenditure decisions, households in the low middle and middle
21The unobserved characteristics are likely to be related to the wife’s decision to offer time in the labor
market since this information is not available in this sample.
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income groups have a higher probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable
goods than households in which both spouses make expenditure decisions. The increment
is equivalent to increasing the monthly per capita income by R$42.00 for the low middle
income group and by R$286.00 for the middle income group.
In any income group, households in which only the husband makes expenditure deci-
sions are less likely to report some expenditure on maid services than households in which
both spouses make expenditure decisions. The reduction in the probability of reporting
some expenditure on maid services for households in which only the husband makes expen-
diture decisions compared to household in which both spouses make expenditure decisions
is equivalent to decreasing the monthly per capita income by R$29.00 for the low middle
income households, by R$137.00 for the middle, by R$109.00 for upper middle income, and
by R$798.00 for the upper income households.
If wives have unearned income, the probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute
durable goods is lower in the middle and high income groups. If wives have unearned income,
the probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable goods decreases by the same
amount as a R$196.00 decrease in monthly per capita income for the middle income group
and a R$869.00 decrease in monthly per capita income for the high income group. Wives’
unearned income has no statistically significant effect on the probability of reporting some
expenditure on maid services.
In the results using the full sample, husbands’ unearned income increases the probability
of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good and reporting some expenditure on
maid services, but in the results by income groups and using household per capita income,
the effect of husbands’ unearned income is positive and significant only on the probability
of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good for the high income group. In fact,
if husbands have unearned income, the probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute
durable good increases by the same amount as a R$415.00 increase in monthly per capita
income for the high income group.
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As in the full sample regression, the the indicator of households in which the wife has
better educational level than the husband has a negative and significant impact on the prob-
ability of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good. When compared to households
in which spouses have the same educational level, households in which the wife has higher
educational level than the husband have a reduction in the probability of owning at least
one maid’s substitute durable good that is equivalent to decreasing the monthly per capita
income by R$1256.00 for the high income group, by R$167.00 for the upper middle income
group, by R$242.00 for the middle income group and by R$46.00 for the lower middle in-
come group. However, its impact on the probability of reporting some expenditure on maid
services is significant only for the high income group. Households in which the wife has
higher educational level than the husband have a reduction in the probability of reporting
some expenditure on maid services that is equivalent to decreasing the monthly per capita
income by R$1089.00 for the high income group.
Differently from the full sample regression, the indicator of households in which the
husband is better educated than the wife does not have a statistically significant effect on the
probability of reporting some expenditure on maid services. The impact on the probability
of having at least one maid’s substitute durable good is statistically significant only in the
low middle and high income groups. The probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute
durable good increases by the same amount as a R$542.00 increase in monthly per capita
income for the high income households and a R$43.00 increase in monthly per capita income
for the lower middle income households.
The results of the impact of children’s presence on the household decisions are similar to
the results for the full sample regression, daughters aged 13 to 16 years substitute for maid
services in home production. The χ2 test of the difference in impact of sons’ and daughters’
presence on maid’s substitute and maid services in the results by income, Table 3.9, demon-
strates that this difference is characteristic of middle and upper middle income households.
For the low middle and upper income households the difference in the sons’ and daughters’
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time is not statistically significant.
Differently from the results for the full sample regression, the presence of older relatives
has no significant effect on the probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable
goods. These variables could possibly be capturing the income effect in the full-sample
results. Also, in contrast with the full-sample results, the proportion of working women has
no significant impact on the probability of having at least one maid’s substitute durable
goods. The average State’s income, however, has a positive and significant effect on the
probability of having at least one maid’s substitute durable goods for the low middle income
group.
The results for prices hold as before in terms of the direction of their effects and signifi-
cance. There is some evidence that the probability of having expenditure on maid services in
the high income group is less sensitive to increases in the price of maid services than in the
low middle group. The high income group is more likely to replace maid services with maid’s
substitute durable goods when the price of maid services increases. Moreover, the higher
the monthly per capita income, the higher is the probability of the household owning at lest
one maid’s substitute durable goods and reporting some expenditure on maid services.
For all income groups, the probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable
good is higher than the probability of reporting some expenditure on maid services. The
estimated marginal probability on the median values of the explanatory variables of owning
at least one maid’s substitute durable good is 18% for the lower middle income group, 47%
the middle income group, 78% the upper middle income group, and 91% for the high income
group. While, the estimated marginal probability on the median values of the explanatory
variables of reporting some expenditure on maid services is 7% for the lower middle income
group, 23% the middle income group, 21% the upper middle income group, and 60% for the
high income group.
A ten percent increase in monthly per capita income promotes a higher increase in per-
cent change in the probability of reporting some expenditure on maid services than on the
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probability of owning at lest one maid’s substitute durable good for all income groups. This
result indicates that home production is more time intensive than good intensive. One of the
reasons for home production to be more time intensive than good intensive is that house-
holds perceive maid services as close substitutes for wives’ time. Whereas, maid’s substitute
durable goods may not be perceived as close substitutes for wives’ time.
If households do not perceive maid’s substitute durable goods as close substitutes for
wives’ time, but teenage daughters’ time is perceived as a close substitute for wives’ time
in home production, then the presence of teenage daughters increases the probability of
owning at least one maid’s substitute durable good relative to the probability of reporting
some expenditure on maid services. Teenage daughters’ time can be used together with
maid’s substitute durable goods in home production, thereby replacing wives’ time in home
production.
3.9 Conclusion
In studying the relationship between maid services and maid’s substitute durable goods and
their determinants, this paper found that the expenditure on home-production inputs is
an outcome of a bargaining process. The impact of the marriage market variable provides
evidence of wives’ preference for maid’s substitute durable goods. The test of the equality
of husbands’ and wives’ unearned income implies that wives prefer maid services relative
to husbands. If the marriage market is favorable to women, that is if the ratio of women
to men goes from 1.07 to 0.96 (a ten percent decrease in the ratio of women to men), the
increment in the household’s probability of owning at least one maid’s substitute durable
good is equivalent to 24% of the impact of moving a household up one income quintile.
Wives with higher value of time are more likely to replace their time in home production
with maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services at all educational levels, unlike U.S.
households, in which only wives with a graduate degree are more likely to have expendi-
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tures on maid services (Cortes and Tessada (2007)). The results for the difference between
husbands’ and wives’ education does not exclude the common preferences in favor of a bar-
gaining decision process. In fact, the result is consistent with the complementarity between
husbands and the wives leisure time or differences in prices (different wage rates faced by
husbands and wives). In the first case, husbands’ and wives’ leisure time are complements,
so that husbands who have higher education relative to their wives buy maid’s substitute
durable goods and maid services so that they can spend more time with their wives. While,
in the second case, the impact is through the budget constraint. If wives’ wages are lower
than husbands’ wages even if wives have higher educational levels than husbands, the house-
hold in which wives have higher educational levels than the husband will have less earnings
to spend on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services.
The presence of children that are not of school age, and therefore demand more time-
intensive home production, 6 years or younger, increases the probability of having maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services equally for sons and daughters. With maid’s
substitute durable goods and maid services, mothers will have more time away from home
production to spend in child care. This result is surprising when compared to recent findings
for U.S. on the different effect of sons and daughters on mothers’ and father’s time allocation
to market and home-production hours. Lundberg and Rose (2002) found a greater increase
in men’s labor supply and wage rates in response to the births of sons than to the births
of daughters. They interpret this as evidence of fathers’ preferences for sons. Furthermore,
Lundberg (2005) found that children’s genders have different impact on the labor supply of
men and women and their intrahousehold division of labor, where highly educated parents
devote more childcare time to young sons. However, it is still possible that maid services are
used in child care or to free up time for market work.
Notwithstanding, sons and daughters aged 13 to 16 years have different impacts on the
probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services.
Daughters decrease the relative probability of having maid services and sons increase the
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probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods and maid services.
For older children, aged 17 to 19 years, daughters decrease the relative probability of having
expenditure on maid services, while there is no difference in the impact of sons and daughters
on the probability of having expenditure on maid’s substitute durable goods. This indicates
that daughters’ time substitutes for wives’ time and maid services in home production.
The result described in the previous paragraph indicates that daughters are being trained
in home production to be able to perform their future role as wives. However, this training
comes at a cost to daughters’ investment in formal education, narrowing their future career
options. Even though home-production training does not prohibit daughters from attending
school, it does take them away from their after-school study time. With less study time and
more training in home production, these girls are trapped into choosing careers that make
use of their home-production training, for example, maids, corroborating the result found
by Alexopoulos and de V. Cavalcanti (2006) or into getting married and being a housewife.
Moreover, public policies based on cash transfers aim to keep children in school and away
from market work. Nevertheless, there is no public policy designed to regulate or prevent
children’s home production. Because daughters are more likely than sons to work in home
production, and sons are more likely than daughters to perform market work, neglecting
children’s home-production work may lead to an increase in gender inequality in the labor
market.
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Table 3.2. Durable Goods and Maids Costs as Proportion of Households Monthly Expendi-
tures Brazil, 2002-2003.
lower lower middle middle upper middle higher
stove-oven 96.03% 54.24% 36.5% 22.7% 7.49%
refrigerator 255.51% 138.55% 90.62% 55.45% 18.11%
freezer 281.86% 144.79% 91.06% 54.51% 17.48%
washing machine 148.59% 77.68% 50.37% 30.81% 10.04%
dish washer 146.89% 88.14% 60.88% 37.21% 12.15%
vacuum clearer 52.2% 29.36% 19.5% 11.9% 3.89%
dryer 90.67% 53.85% 36.99% 22.75% 7.53%
microwave 138.32% 75.16% 48.98% 29.99% 9.78%
maid services 45.28% 26.75% 18.52% 11.91% 4.02%
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics Brazil, 2002-2003.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
Owns at Least One Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods 0.38 (0.49)
Reported Some Expenditure on Maid Services 0.14 (0.35)
Bargaining Power Variables
Marriage Market, same cohort 1.07 (0.10)
Marriage Market, wife in younger cohort 1.21 (0.13)
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.29 (4.38)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.66 (6.33)
Percentage of Wives with Non-zero Unearned Income (0.162) (0.368)
Percentage of Husbands with Non-zero Unearned Income (0.157) (0.364)
Both make expenditure decisions 0.82 (0.39)
Only wife makes expenditure decisions 0.02 (0.14)
Only husband makes expenditure decisions 0.16 (0.37)
Wife is better educated 0.42 (0.49)
Husband is better educated 0.31 (0.46)
Wife’s and Husband’s Variables:
Wife’s Age 33.45 (7.59)
Wife has no schooling 0.07 (0.26)
Wife has primary education 0.32 (0.47)
Wife has secondary education 0.29 (0.45)
Wife has high school educ 0.25 (0.43)
Wife has college educ or more 0.07 (0.26)
Husband’s Age 36.53 (7.55)
Husband has no schooling 0.10 (0.31)
Husband has primary education 0.35 (0.48)
Husband has secondary education 0.27 (0.44)
Husband has high school educ 0.21 (0.41)
Husband has college educ or more 0.07 (0.25)
Household Variables
Number of Families in HH 1.00 (0.06)
Number of People in Household 4.23 (1.56)
Per capita total monthly income 418.01 (781.53)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Average State Income (in 1000) 0.89 (0.28)
Prices
Rental Value of Entertainment Durable Goods 9.31 (1.02)
Rental Value of Production Durable Goods 4.59 (0.42)
Price of an hour of maid services 0.93 (0.25)
Price of electricity (kwatts) 0.21 (0.02)
Number of Observations 19662
Source: POF and PNAD.
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Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics and Average Expenditures Brazil, 2002-2003.
Region North Northeast Southeast South Central West
Percent of Sample 14.68 36.79 17.49 13.48 17.57
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 95.18 95.02 98.95 99.92 99.33
Average Expenditure 164.96 124.37 222.72 297.56 215.41
Standard Deviation (101.94) (89.35) (124.68) (140.84) (118.31)
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 33.75 12.87 45.96 77.74 56.28
Average Expenditure 61.19 84.41 111.44 115.12 76.41
Standard Deviation (31.78) (39.06) (56.72) (68.05) (48.42)
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 14.73 13.06 16.11 14.91 13.98
Average Expenditure 1419.14 1142.22 1728.63 1764.06 1529.66
Standard Deviation (2872.31) (1816.69) (1784.84) (2855.16) (2578.22)
Per Capita Income 20 % poorest 20 % low middle 20 % middle 20 % upper middle 20 % richest
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 89.32 97.51 99.36 99.72 99.85
Average Expenditure 86.36 133.93 177.71 222.98 307.45
Standard Deviation (70.51) (83.59) (93.05) (106.12) (136.94)
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 9.15 20.73 35.11 50.08 75.38
Average Expenditure 58.72 63.63 71.99 86.91 120.25
Standard Deviation (25.30) (22.95) (33.44) (45.53) (69.75)
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 1.14 3.28 7.04 15.28 44.51
Average Expenditure 738.93 384.09 656.83 982.34 1840.40
Standard Deviation (2107.32) (560.78) (957.70) (2186.52) (2492.64)
Who has unearned income none wife husband both
Percent of Sample 70.62 13.67 13.23 2.48
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 97.32 95.42 98.00 97.34
Average Expenditure 188.43 150.86 218.28 217.01
Standard Deviation 121.66 114.24 143.59 160.96
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 38.90 24.60 46.83 43.44
Average Expenditure 89.64 90.29 106.63 123.36
Standard Deviation 52.50 56.87 70.46 74.99
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 13.32 11.80 19.45 26.43
Average Expenditure 1389.84 1386.57 1632.98 1851.08
Standard Deviation 2356.58 1607.86 2581.64 1914.83
Who makes expenditure decisions both wife husband
Percent of Sample 81.95 2.12 15.93
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 97.77 98.32 93.84
Average Expenditure 195.43 181.19 149.64
Standard Deviation 127.40 110.96 114.68
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 39.79 39.09 29.31
Average Expenditure 96.01 83.29 77.06
Standard Deviation 58.71 48.20 46.18
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4:Descriptive Statistics and Average Expenditures Brazil, 2002-2003. – continued from previous page
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 15.98 10.79 5.81
Average Expenditure 1457.20 1867.43 1315.99
Standard Deviation 2329.44 3398.54 1627.34
Wife’s Educational Level No Schooling Primary School Middle School High School College or More
Percent of Sample 7.21 32.01 28.53 24.77 7.48
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 88.43 94.79 98.88 99.90 100.00
Average Expenditure 109.56 142.71 183.50 226.28 329.89
Standard Deviation (84.92) (107.31) (110.99) (118.65) (150.34)
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 14.68 23.57 38.20 51.59 77.63
Average Expenditure 68.08 74.16 82.21 96.24 138.17
Standard Deviation (32.13) (36.00) (44.57) (55.19) (80.54)
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 1.91 3.34 8.56 23.47 64.04
Average Expenditure 741.37 752.08 890.81 1258.81 2156.55
Standard Deviation (849.53) (1643.22) (1377.64) (2337.82) (2618.98)
Who has higher educational level? wife same husband
Percent of Sample 29.82 50.29 19.89
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 97.44 96.62 98.06
Average Expenditure 176.59 193.05 192.83
Standard Deviation (116.04) (133.25) (121.86)
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 33.85 39.41 41.20
Average Expenditure 86.66 97.56 91.72
Standard Deviation (49.54) (62.64) (52.40)
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 13.83 15.06 12.84
Average Expenditure 1220.06 1657.96 1230.38
Standard Deviation (1693.46) (2777.68) (1434.50)
Who belongs to a older cohort? wife same husband
Percent of Sample 12.67 33.92 53.41
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 96.63 97.48 97.07
Average Expenditure 179.79 192.27 187.37
Standard Deviation (120.15) (129.86) (125.26)
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 36.29 38.95 38.01
Average Expenditure 89.42 97.61 91.59
Standard Deviation (52.43) (59.75) (56.88)
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 13.69 14.78 14.05
Average Expenditure 1375.42 1499.02 1443.24
Standard Deviation (2685.18) (2032.71) (2392.94)
Marriage Market sex ratio ≥ 1 sex ratio < 1
Percent of Sample 82.13 17.87
Production Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 97.13 97.24
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4:Descriptive Statistics and Average Expenditures Brazil, 2002-2003. – continued from previous page
Average Expenditure 187.76 189.55
Standard Deviation (127.15) (122.14)
Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
Percentage of Households 37.30 41.83
Average Expenditure 96.46 80.94
Standard Deviation (59.20) (47.74)
Maid Services
Percentage of Households 14.32 13.94
Average Expenditure 1462.46 1417.59
Standard Deviation (2242.28) (2615.77)
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Table 3.5. Bivariate Probit Estimates for Owning at Least One Maid’s Substitute Durable
Goods and Reporting Some Expenditure on Maid Services Brazil, 2002-2003.
Maid’s Substitute Production Goods Maid Services
Bargaining Power Variables
Marriage Market -0.7733 0.0035
(0.1128)*** (0.1401)
Only the wife makes expenditure decisions 0.0715 0.0745
(0.0759) (0.1001)
Only the husband makes expenditure decisions 0.0759 -0.2157
(0.0326)** (0.0480)***
Wife Has Unearned Income -0.1332 0.0365
(0.0334)*** (0.0388)
Husband Has Unearned Income 0.0843 0.1062
(0.0303)*** (0.0348)***
Wife’s and Husband’s Variables:
Wife’s Age 0.0223 0.0144
(0.0019)*** (0.0024)***
Husband’s age - wife’s age 0.0101 0.0089
(0.0022)*** (0.0028)***
Wife has no formal education -1.4471 -1.8418
(0.0715)*** (0.1021)***
Wife has primary education -1.2052 -1.5679
(0.0527)*** (0.0557)***
Wife has middle school -0.8254 -1.2456
(0.0493)*** (0.0476)***
Wife has high school -0.4938 -0.8399
(0.0474)*** (0.0427)***
Wife has higher educational level than husband -0.2671 -0.1629
(0.0282)*** (0.0344)***
Husband has higher educational level than wife 0.0733 0.0817
(0.0292)** (0.0362)**
Household Variables
Number of daughters 0-3 years old in HH 0.1028 0.312
(0.0270)*** (0.0333)***
Number of daughters 4-6 years old in HH 0.0829 0.2109
(0.0292)*** (0.0374)***
Number of daughters 7-12 years old in HH 0.1312 0.097
(0.0201)*** (0.0264)***
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page
Maid’s Substitute Production Goods Maid Services
Number of daughters 13-16 years old in HH 0.0875 -0.0527
(0.0261)*** (0.0354)
Number of daughters 17-19 years old in HH 0.0528 -0.1486
(0.0380) (0.0493)***
Number of women 51-60 years old in HH 0.115 -0.3511
(0.1467) (0.1995)*
Number of women 61-70 years old in HH 0.0308 0.3073
(0.1219) (0.1396)**
Number of women older than 70 years in HH 0.0927 0.0327
(0.1052) (0.1327)
Number of sons 0-3 years old in HH 0.0686 0.2737
(0.0271)** (0.0342)***
Number of sons 4-6 years old in HH 0.1034 0.1906
(0.0285)*** (0.0364)***
Number of sons 7-12 years old in HH 0.1129 0.1374
(0.0194)*** (0.0251)***
Number of sons 13-16 years old in HH 0.0921 0.1403
(0.0253)*** (0.0319)***
Number of sons 17-19 years old in HH 0.1031 0.0222
(0.0332)*** (0.0433)
Number of men 51-60 years old in HH -0.0792 -0.1263
(0.2226) (0.3086)
Number of men 61-70 years old in HH 0.0341 0.0077
(0.1789) (0.2197)
Number of men older than 70 years in HH 0.1109 -0.1196
(0.1465) (0.1891)
Quintiles of Per Capita Income 0.3232 0.4861
(0.0111)*** (0.0155)***
State Level Variables
Proportion of Working Women by State and Cohort -0.3798 0.3069
(0.1602)** (0.2037)
Average State Income (in 1000) 0.0706 0.0758
(0.0943) (0.1165)
Price of an hour of maid services 0.8617 -0.8888
(0.1116)*** (0.1398)***
Region Level Variables
Price of maid service complements production goods 0.286 -0.0152
(0.0134)*** (0.0165)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page
Maid’s Substitute Production Goods Maid Services
Price of -maid’s substitute durable goods -0.0611 0.002
(0.0056)*** (0.0070)
Price of entertainment goods -0.3631 0.057
(0.0286)*** (0.0355)
Price of electricity (per kwatts) 26.2991 -1.5343
(1.5033)*** (1.8227)
Constant -29.6199 -0.6682
(1.2249)*** (1.4955)
Observations 19662 19662
Log likelihood -14001.23
rho 0.159 (0.019)***
t-statistic Probability
LR test (rho=0) 65.1978 0.1%
Wald χ2(74) 9323.56 0.1%
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.6. Testing Bargaining Power Brazil, 2002-2003.
Maid’s Substitute DG Maid Services Difference
Marriage Market -0.7733 0.0035 -0.777
19.87
0.0010
Only the wife makes expenditure decisions 0.0715 0.0745 -0.003
0.0001
0.9808
Only the husband makes expenditure decisions 0.0759 -0.2157 0.2916
26.47
0.0001
wife− husband -0.004 0.2902 -0.2945
χ2(1) 0.001 7.1 4.98
Prob > χ2 0.9569 0.0077 0.0256
Wife Has Unearned Income -0.1332 0.0365 -0.1696
11.6
0.0006
Husband Has Unearned Income 0.0843 0.1062 -0.0219
0.24
0.6243
wife− husband -0.2175 -0.0697 -0.1478
χ2(1) 23.1900 1.7200 4.79
Prob > χ2 0.0001 0.1891 0.0287
Wife has higher educational level husband -0.2671 -0.1629 -0.1042
5.84
0.0156
Husband has higher educational level than wife 0.0733 0.0817 -0.0083
0.03
0.8531
wife− husband -0.3404 -0.2446 -0.0958
χ2(1) 148.3900 49.5000 4.9
Prob > χ2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0268
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Bellow the difference of the coefficients is the χ2 t-statistic and its probability.
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Table 3.7. Testing Differences Among Sons And Daughters Brazil, 2002-2003.
Maid’s Substitute DG Maid Services Difference
Three years old and younger
girls 0.1028 0.312 -0.2092
(0.0270)*** (0.0333)*** 25.29
0.0001
boys 0.0686 0.2737 -0.2051
(0.0271)** (0.0342)*** 23.49
0.0001
girls− boys 0.0342 0.0383 -0.0046
χ2(1) 0.92 0.75 0.01
Prob > χ2 0.3365 0.3856 0.9417
Four to six years old
girls 0.0829 0.2109 -0.128
(0.0292)*** (0.0374)*** 7.72
0.0055
boys 0.1034 0.1906 -0.0872
(0.0285)*** (0.0364)*** 3.77
0.0523
girls− boys -0.0205 0.0203 -0.0407
χ2(1) 0.28 0.16 0.44
Prob > χ2 0.599 0.6856 0.5086
Seven to twelve years old
girls 0.1312 0.097 0.0342
(0.0201)*** (0.0264)*** 1.12
0.2893
boys 0.1129 0.1374 -0.0245
(0.0194)*** (0.0251)*** 0.63
0.4268
girls− boys 0.0182 -0.0404 0.0586
χ2(1) 0.46 1.3 1.83
Prob > χ2 0.4998 0.2546 0.1762
Thirteen to sixteen years old
girls 0.0875 -0.0527 0.140
(0.0261)*** (0.0354) 10.7
0.0011
boys 0.0921 0.1403 -0.0482
(0.0253)*** (0.0319)*** 1.48
0.2233
girls− boys -0.005 -0.193 0.188
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7 – continued from previous page
Maid’s Substitute DG Maid Services Difference
χ2(1) 0.02 17.28 11.05
Prob > χ2 0.895 0.0001 0.0009
Seventeen to Nineteen years old
girls 0.0528 -0.1486 0.2014
(0.0380) (0.0493)*** 11.09
0.0009
boys 0.1031 0.0222 0.0808
(0.0332)*** (0.0433) 2.33
0.1272
girls− boys -0.0503 -0.1709 0.1206
χ2(1) 1.02 7.09 2.33
Prob > χ2 0.3127 0.0078 0.1268
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Bellow the difference of the coefficients is the χ2 t-statistic and its probability.
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Table 3.9. Testing Differences Among Sons And Daughters Thirteen to Sixteen Years Old
Brazil, 2002-2003.
Maid’s Substitute DG Maid Services Difference
Lower Middle Income
girls 0.0991 -0.1478 0.247
(0.0565)* (0.1166) (-0.1290)*
boys 0.1812 0.1048 0.076
(0.0548)*** (0.0932) (0.1074)
girls− boys -0.082 -0.253 0.171
χ2(1) 1.20 3.10 1.12
Prob > χ2 0.273 0.078 0.2892
Middle Income
girls 0.1265 -0.1735 0.3
(0.0526)** (0.0939)* (0.1049)***
boys 0.1288 0.1834 -0.055
(0.0510)** (0.0731)** (0.0860)
girls− boys -0.002 -0.357 0.355
χ2(1) 0.00 9.53 7.33
Prob > χ2 0.984 0.002 0.0068
Upper Middle Income
girls 0.1254 0.0891 0.0360
(0.0565)* (0.0658) (0.0868)
boys 0.0060 0.2617 -0.256
(0.0553) (0.0634)*** (0.0836)***
girls− boys 0.119 -0.173 0.292
χ2(1) 2.32 3.7300 6.11
Prob > χ2 0.128 0.053 0.013
High Income
girls 0.1669 0.0483 0.1187
(0.0732)** (0.0619) (0.0918)
boys 0.164 0.1521 0.012
(0.0679)** (0.0585)*** (0.0856)
girls− boys 0.003 -0.104 0.107
χ2(1) 0.00 1.5700 0.76
Prob > χ2 0.976 0.209 0.3822
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.10. Marginal Probability at the Median Price of an Hour of Maid Services and After
a 10% Increase by Income Groups in Brazil, 2002-2003.
before after difference (%) change
Maid’s Substitute Durable Good
lower middle 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.03
middle 0.47 0.51 0.04 0.07
upper middle 0.78 0.81 0.03 0.03
high 0.91 0.92 0.02 0.02
Maid Services
lower middle 0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.17
middle 0.23 0.19 -0.04 -0.16
upper middle 0.21 0.19 -0.02 -0.09
high 0.60 0.57 -0.03 -0.05
Table 3.11. Marginal Probability at the Median Price of Maid’s Substitute Durable Goods
and After a 10% Increase by Income Groups in Brazil, 2002-2003.
before after difference (%) change
Maid’s Substitute Durable Good
lower middle 0,18 0,13 -0,05 -0,28
middle 0,47 0,39 -0,08 -0,17
upper middle 0,78 0,70 -0,08 -0,10
high 0,91 0,86 -0,05 -0,06
Maid Services
lower middle 0,07 0,08 0,01 0,20
middle 0,23 0,24 0,01 0,04
upper middle 0,21 0,21 0,00 -0,01
high 0,60 0,61 0,01 0,01
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Table 3.12. Marginal Probability at the Median Per Capita Income and After a 10% Increase
by Income Groups in Brazil, 2002-2003.
before after difference (%) change
Maid’s Substitute Durable Good
lower middle 0,18 0,19 0,01 0,08
middle 0,47 0,48 0,01 0,01
upper middle 0,78 0,80 0,02 0,02
high 0,91 0,91 0,00 0,00
maid services
Maid Services
lower middle 0,07 0,09 0,02 0,25
middle 0,23 0,24 0,01 0,05
upper middle 0,21 0,23 0,02 0,11
high 0,60 0,61 0,01 0,01
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Chapter 4
Gender Roles and Earnings in Brazil:
Were There Any Changes between
1981 and 2001?
4.1 Introduction
Brazilian women’s labor force participation increased from 31% in 1981 to 52% in 2001. However,
female workers still are concentrated in few occupations. In fact, in 1981, 72% of the female workers
were employed in female-dominated occupations, and this number decreased only two percentage
points in 2001 (Table 4.1). Moreover, female-dominated occupations are less than one third of all
occupations (Table 4.3). This degree of segregation becomes a problem because female-dominated
occupations are less desirable in terms of wage rate (Table 4.4).
Comparing men and women conditional on their characteristics, gender roles still have a great
influence in the intrahousehold allocation of time of Brazilian couples (Madalozzo (2009)). Wives
with young children are the group of women that have higher participation in housework even if
they also work in the labor market (Soares and Saboia (2007)). This paper investigates whether
gender roles drive female workers to choose to enter into these female-dominated occupations.
Between 1981 and 2001, Brazil had undergone several changes. After 21 years of military
dictatorship, 1964 to 1985, the country engaged in a process of democratization. At the same
time, external pressure from international institutions forced Brazil to recognize human rights and
comply with them. The CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women) was ratified in 1984. Other relevant international treaties on the protection of
human rights were ratified, as well, during the 1980’s endorsing the obligation to ensure equity and
to forbid discrimination.
These international pressures for improvement of human rights, combined with domestic de-
mands from oppressed groups and the newly established democratic government led to a call for a
113
new constitution. The Constitution of 1988 is considered to be the legal landmark of democratic
transition and institutionalization of human rights in Brazil. A significant majority of the claims
made by women were incorporated into the constitutional text of 1988, such as equal rights and
specifically within the family, prohibitions of discrimination in the labor market and the right to
maternity-leave without the loss of job and salary (CEDAW (2002)).
In the same year that the new Constitution was finished, there was a reduction in tariff rates
that was followed by the reduction or removal of nontariff barriers in 1990 during the Collor
government1. In 1992, exchange rate appreciation was used as a strategy for price stabilization
that culminated in the Plano Real of 1994. This plan ended years of hyperinflation in Brazil. By
1991, the privatization of the publicly owned enterprises began. Other reforms, such as deregulation
of international investment and banking, also, took place in the last part of 1990’s.
There is evidence that gender discrimination in the labor market in terms of wage difference has
decreased. Barros, Ramos, and Santos (1995) used household data sets from 1981 to 1989 to identify
a gender wage gap of over 50%. By using the Oaxaca Decomposition, they concluded that 90% of
this difference was not explained by gender differences in the variables that measure productivity
such as schooling, experience, and industry and, therefore, was due to gender discrimination. Leme
and Wajnman (2000) estimates that by 1997 the gender wage gap was 25%, a 50% reduction
compared to Barros, Ramos, and Santos (1995) estimates; and a 82% reduction when comparing
with the baseline year used in Leme and Wajnman (2000), 1977. Indeed, the gender wage gap for
the 30 to 40 years old Brazilians went from 30% in 1981 to 13% in 20012. This change, however, is
less due to improvements in women’s wage rates and more due to a reduction in men’s wage rates.
Indeed, men’s wage rates dropped by 29% between 1981 and 2001 (Table 4.4).
Green, Dickerson, and Arbache (2001) argue that trade liberalization was the most important
factor driving wage inequality in Brazil during this period. They found that there was a rise in
returns to college education due to rising demand for skilled labor. Regarding the gender wage
gap, they found that trade liberalization did not accelerate or decelerate the convergence of wages.
Therefore, the results to be found later in this paper are probably not driven by changes in trade.
1These changes are well documented in Green, Dickerson, and Arbache (2001).
2These percentages are calculated as the difference of the logarithm of men’s to women’s wage rates
(Table 4.1 and 24.2) minus ones.
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Arabsheibani, Carneiro, and Henley (2003) found that the gender wage gap was reduced over this
period and that, after elimination of high inflation, women’s human capital has increased and the
gender differential in the returns to human capital has decreased.
Soares and Oliveira (2004) analyze the earnings of male and female workers in female-dominated
occupations using the PNAD 2001 data set, and relate the female wage gap to the fact that females
are crowded in occupations that pay lower wages. For them, female-dominated occupations are
the ones in which women’s participation is over than 50%. In this paper, the female-dominated
occupations are the ones in which the women’s participation is well above women’s participation
in the labor force (section 4.4).
In this paper, a version of the Roy (1951)’s model in which individuals choose their occupation
that best matches their gender roles considering possible discrimination and wage rates is adopted.
To capture gender roles, variables are used that are related to intrahousehold division of labor,
such as marital status, children’s presence by age group and spouses’ hourly wage. By doing that,
it is possible to verify whether women are selecting themselves into female-dominated occupations
due to their roles as wives and mothers.
Investigating whether gender roles lead women to choose occupations that pay lower wages is
important in terms of public policy. Take, for example, the case of childcare. Children stay in
school or daycare in Brazil about five hours. Therefore, either mothers need to work fewer hours or
have to find somebody to take care of their children while they work. This issue is worse for those
parents that are not able to pay for childcare. An alternative to mitigate this issue is to extend
hours children stay in public school.
It would be easier to know whether women would be better off in terms of wage rates in
occupations that are not female dominated, if it were possible to observe their wage rates in ev-
ery occupation. However, the only observed wage rate is for the selected occupation. Therefore,
selection correction terms are constructed from the occupational choice and added to the wage
regression. By doing that, it is possible to estimate the difference among wage rates across oc-
cupations controlling for observed and unobserved individuals’ characteristics. The institutional
changes that occurred between these two years introduced wage rate variation across occupations.
This wage rate variation is a key element in the Roy (1951) model, making possible the identifica-
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tion of the parameters without exclusion restriction variables, as argued in Heckman and Honore
(1990).
The paper follows by describing the Roy (1951) model, its assumptions and implications for
gender occupational segregation. It continues by defining job classification among the gender
defined occupations and analyzing its changes, followed by the discussion of the results and the
conclusions.
4.2 The Econometric Model
The econometric model used is a version of the Roy (1951) model that explains occupational choice
and its impacts on the distribution of earnings given that individuals differ in their occupation-
specific skills. There are many different applications of the Roy (1951) model, the most famous
application is the seminal insight of Heckman (1974, 1979), which modeled women’s returns to labor
force participation decisions considering the bias caused by neglecting the nonmarket work decision.
Also, other important applications of the Roy framework are the research on the differential impact
of unionism and nonunionism on wages (Lee (1978)) and the wage differential of college and high
school graduates (Willis and Rosen (1979)). One of the key assumptions of the papers cited above
is the joint normality of the error terms, from which the selectivity-correction term is derived. If the
normal distribution is not the true generating stochastic process of the log wage data, the sample
selection bias correction produces biased estimates. Heckman and Honore (1990) proved that the
implications of Roy (1951) model regarding skill distribution fail if the normality assumption does
not hold, unless variables exist that affect the distribution of skills among occupations to be used
as exclusion restrictions or there exists enough price variation such as in repeated cross-sectional
data.
Lee (1982) was the first work in this area to reject the normality assumption of log wages in U.S.
data and to propose a selectivity-correction term that does not rely on the joint normality of the
error terms. The rejection of the normality assumption of log wages in U.S. data was also observed
by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 1990), which also proposed improvements in the hypothesis of
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the Roy framework, such as the introduction of more than two sectors3, allowing workers to select
their occupation based on utility maximization instead of income maximization, and relaxing the
normality assumption of the error terms. When the selection into occupations is modeled as a
utility maximization problem, selection is not based only on wage rates and occupational specific-
skills, but also on options that accrue to workers in that occupation, such as employment benefits
and flexible hours of work. This feature is indeed important since it increases the availability of
exclusion restrictions variables, and the presence of these variables guarantee model identification.
Paralleled to the evolution of the Roy framework in the wage differential literature, Durbin and
McFadden (1984) developed a selection bias correction model for the estimation of the demand
for electricity. In their model, selection is based on utility maximization. They recognize the
importance of estimating the full set of selection choices on the identification of the estimates,
which is modeled as a Multinomial Logit regression, and the selectivity-correction term is not
based on the normality assumption but on a linearization of the error term in the wage and the
selection distribution. The estimation of the selection regression as a Multinomial Logit has been
used in research that measures the impact of female participation in the formal and informal
sectors4 on their wage differential, such as Tiefenthaler (1992, 1994), and Hill (1989), and wage
differences in public, private and public owned enterprises, Tansel (2005). Bourguignon, Fournier,
and Gurgand (2004) proved that the Durbin and McFadden (1984) method is preferable to other
selectivity-correction methods based on the Multinomial Logit and that the estimated parameters
are unbiased even when the independence of the irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is violated.
In this paper, the Durbin and McFadden (1984) selection bias correction model is used, where
the exclusion restriction variables discussed in the next subsection permit the identification of
the parameters of the model. However, there were changes in the country, such as reformulation
of the laws, trade liberalization and privatization, that caused price skill variation, allowing for
model identification even without the exclusion restriction. This section continues presenting the
occupational choice model and the wage regression, discussing the effect of the selection into an
occupation on the hourly wage rate, as well as the procedure used to construct the selectivity-
3Heckman and Sedlacek (1990) found that accounting for nonmarket participation improves the fit of the
model.
4In which nonmarket participation is one of the females’ choices.
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correction term. The first step is estimated using a Multinomial Logit, and then the selectivity-
correction terms are calculated for each occupation. The second step is an OLS estimation where
the selectivity-correction terms are added to the set of covariates in the wage regression. The
section is finalized with a comment on the model testable implications and the expected results.
The Occupational Choice
In the gender segregation occupation model, individuals choose among four different states: to
work in an integrated occupation, to work in a male-dominated occupation, to work in a female-
dominated occupation, or not to work. The chosen or observed state, Oi = j, is assumed to be the
one that offers the individual the highest utility given his or her characteristics, and Oi = 0 for all
occupations other than j. Therefore, the choice can be expressed as a random utility model such as
(4.1) below, where Uij is the utility of the individual i facing the choice j, and zij are the observed
characteristics of individual i who chooses occupation j. These observed characteristics include
geographic location, age, education, number of children by age group, marital status, unearned
income and spouse’s income (split into earned and unearned income).
Uij = zijβ + ij (4.1)
The errors are assumed to follow an independent and identically distributed type I extreme
value distribution, thus the probability that individual i will choose an occupation j follows a
Multinomial Logit Model. There are four possible outcomes in the case studied in this paper,
therefore, the Multinomial Logit estimates four equations that provide a set of probabilities. Given
that the probabilities must sum to one, the model is normalized so that the coefficients for the
probability equation of the gender-integrated occupation are all equal to zero. Consequently, there
are three probability equations estimated by (4.2) below, for j equal to working in a male dominated
occupation, working in a female dominated occupation, or non-workers.
Prob(Oi = j) =
ez
′
ijβj
1 +
∑J
j=1 e
z′ijβj
(4.2)
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After estimating the Multinomial Logit, a selectivity correction term can be estimated and
incorporated in the wage regression to correct for the fact that wages are only observed for the
occupation in which the individual is actually working. The approach followed is given by Durbin
and McFadden (1984), which is a traditional approach that has flexible specification and performs
well in Monte-Carlo experiments when the sample size is similar to the household survey used in
this paper5. There are three selectivity-correction terms added to the wage regression, one for
each type of occupation: gender-integrated occupations, male-dominated occupations, and female-
dominated occupations. The selectivity correction term for working in occupation j depends on
the logarithm of the probability of working in j, and on the weighted sum of the logarithm of the
probability of the other choices. Each term is calculated by (4.3).
λj =
∑
j 6=k
√
6σ2
pi
ρk
(
PklnPk
1− Pj + lnPj
)
(4.3)
The exclusion restrictions are the variables that capture the intrahousehold division of labor,
as well as the role that is culturally assigned to each gender. They are marital status, number
of children by age group (younger than 3 years old, 3 to 5 years old, 6 to 10 years old, 11 to 15
years old, and 16 years and older), interaction of marital status and spouse’s hourly wage, and
variables that capture financial constraints, such as unearned income and interaction of marital
status and spouse’s unearned income. Married women are assumed to be less likely to work or
more likely to work in occupations that have more flexible working hours compared to occupations
that are inflexible. Married men, on the other hand, are more likely to work in occupations that
have higher working hours or to spend less time looking for a job6. The higher the earnings ability
of the husband, the more likely is the wife to specialize in household production (to not work or to
work fewer hours), and her husband to specialize in the job market (to work more hours and/or to
work in a higher earning occupation)7. On the other hand, the higher the earnings ability of the
5See Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2004) for the Monte-Carlo experiments and discussion of the
alternatives methods of selectivity correction term based on the Multinomial Logit Model.
6Becker (1991) makes a good case why specialization in market work and household work takes place
between husbands and wives. Even with equal comparative advantages, an efficient outcome rises when
husbands specialize in market work and wives specialize in household production or divide her time in
market work and household production.
7This is the case where differences in husbands’ and wives’ comparative advantages increase specialization
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wife, the less likely is the wife to specialize in household production and her husband to specialize
in the job market8.
The presence of children can have the same impact as marital status and husband’s earnings
on women’s choice. However, it can differ by children’s age group. Whereas younger children
demand mother’s time, older children can help in the household work and in taking care of the
younger ones. On the one hand, the decomposition of number of children into age groups helps to
understand the different impacts of each group; on the other hand, an additional complication in
interpreting the role of children in women’s occupational decision is introduced. Provided that the
sample is restricted to individuals 30 to 40 years old, the presence of young children may signal
career-driven women, at the same time the presence of older children may signal lower investments
in job-specific human capital. It is, therefore, difficult to determine a priori the estimated impact
of the number of children on the probability of choosing an occupation.
The higher the unearned income and the spouse’s unearned income, the higher is the ability of
the individual to wait for a better job. Additionally, part of the unearned income is related to the
individual’s access to financial markets and parental resources. Therefore, the unearned income
also captures ability to invest in human capital, and so, it will reflect the ability to enter in a higher
earning occupation.
The Wage Regression
The occupational choice and the wage regressions are estimated for women and men, and for
both years separately. Later the wage regression is estimated in a pooled sample with year and
gender dummies and the interactions of year and gender. The coefficients and standard errors are
bootstrapped to correct for efficiency loss due to the two-step estimation. The wage regression
is given by (4.4), where the dependent variable, yi, is the log of hourly wage. The covariates
are geographic location (dummy for country regions, and urban and metropolitan areas), human
capital (age, age squared, and four educational level dummies9), dummy for female- and male-
of wives in household production.
8This is the case where differences in husbands’ and wives’ comparative advantages decrease specialization
of wives in household production.
9The omitted category is primary education, first to fourth grade.
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dominated occupations, and the three selectivity correction terms, one for each type of occupation.
The omitted category in the first step (Multinomial Logit) is the gender-integrated occupation.
Moreover, the omitted occupational dummy is the gender-integrated occupation and, therefore,
the results of the dummies for male and female occupations are in comparison to the integrated
occupations.
yi = β0 +
6∑
g=1
βgdg + β7a7 + β8a28 +
4∑
s=1
β8+sds + β11dmale−occupation + (4.4)
β12dfemale−occupation + β13λmale + β14λfemale + β15λintegrated + i
In the above specification, the constant captures the part of the wage rate that does not depend
on the observed characteristics and the selection into occupations for gender-integrated occupations,
and β11 (β12) captures the premium or penalty for male-dominated occupations (female-dominated
occupations). That is, β11 (β12) captures the difference in wage rates between male-dominated
occupations (female-dominated occupations) and gender-integrated occupations that does not de-
pend on the observed characteristics and the selection into occupations. Therefore, the focus of
this paper is the test of significance of β11 and β12. A positive and significant β11 in a wage regres-
sion of only female workers is showing that females, on average, independently of their observed
characteristics and their selection into occupations, have a higher wage rate in male-dominated
occupations than in gender-integrated occupations. It is also possible to test whether there exists a
premium or penalty between male- and female-dominated occupations with a post-estimation test.
If female workers select themselves in female-dominated (male-dominated) occupations, then
the coefficient of the selectivity-correction terms, β14 (β13) will be significant. Moreover, if individu-
als pursue their comparative advantage, then selection of females in female-dominated occupations
and selection of males in male-dominated occupation will be positive. However, the model is also
consistent to the hierarchical interpretation of ability; in this case, higher ability individuals select
themselves into higher earning jobs, and selection into occupations that demand higher skill are
positive, while selection into other occupations is negative.
The indicators of geographic location capture differences across these locations in the part of the
121
wage rate that does not depend on the observed characteristics and the selection into occupations
for gender-integrated occupations. The indicators of school level, age and age squared capture
the returns to human capital. The model assumes that geographic location and human capital
variables influence the occupational choice through wage. The model also assumes that the other
variables present in the occupational choice regression but not in the wage regression, the exclusion
restriction variables discussed in the previous subsection, affect only the occupational choice. If
the last assumption holds, the parameters of the model are identifiable and it is possible to test
the model implications described above by estimating only the above estimating equation for one
type of occupation, gender and one year10.
However, the model identification could fail if the exclusion restriction variables influence wage
rates, that is, if marital status, children, unearned income individuals, and spouse’s income affect
individuals’ productivity. These variables are commonly used as exclusion restrictions in previous
research. Marital status and children are exclusion restrictions in Heckman (1974, 1979), unearned
income and spouse’s income are exclusion restrictions in Willis and Rosen (1979). Yet, the above
regression is also estimated including both gender and years. In addition, Heckman and Honore
(1990) show that if price variation exists, usually provided by the use of repeated cross-sections,
the Roy (1951) model is still identified even without exclusion restriction variables or independent
variables in the wage regression.
If the human capital variables influence occupational choice through other channels than the
wage, then their parameters capture more than returns to human capital. For example, if the clas-
sification into gender dominance is confounded with education differences, there is an unobserved
ability not captured by the selectivity-correction terms that select individuals into occupations,
schooling levels, and higher wage rates. Then, the coefficient of schooling captures returns to
schooling and ability. In this case, it is still possible to compare returns to schooling between
gender in a given occupation, since the bias of omitted unobserved ability will affect the returns to
schooling for males and females in the same direction.
10See Heckman and Honore (1990); Heckman and Sedlacek (1990, 1985).
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4.3 Data Set
The data used in this analysis come from a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Nacional Por
Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD). This survey is conducted almost every year, but is not a longitu-
dinal survey. As claimed before, the choice to compare these two years, 1981 and 2001, is justified
by economic, legal, and social changes that took place in Brazil during these two decades. The
sample was narrowed to individuals 30 to 40 years old, who were not self-employed, employers, or
military. The age range was chosen to avoid individuals - in 2001 - who made their occupational
choice before the changes occurred in 1980’s, as well as to avoid individuals who were still in school
and may have not made their occupational choice. Moreover, the comparison is restricted to in-
dividuals in the same stage of the income life cycle and for which their choice regarding family
can already be observed, allowing the determination of their role in occupational choice. Non-
participants in the labor force in the same age range were used to correct for selection into the
labor force. Table 4.1 in the appendix shows the descriptive characteristics of the women’s sample
for both years and Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the men’s sample for both years.
There are 28,074 women in the 1981 sample, where 9,322 are working, 21,773 are married or
cohabitating, and 10.5% of the women in the sample are single household heads. Therefore, 12%
of the women in the sample live with their parents or other relatives, or are housekeepers. In 2001
these numbers are, respectively, 25,431 for sample size, 13,366 for working women, and 17,839 for
married or cohabitating. While there is not much change in the percentage of women that live with
their parents or other relatives, or are housekeepers, there is an increase of 8.5 percentage points
of single women heads of households. From 1981 to 2001, the percentage of working women in the
sample increased from 31% to 52%; the percentage of women working in an integrated occupations
increased by about 3 percentage points; and the percentages of women working in male and female
occupations slightly decreased. The definition of gender integrated, male- and female-dominated
occupations is presented in the next section.
There are 20,943 men in the 1981 sample, where 19,225 are working, 17,484 are married or
cohabitating, and 5% of the men in the sample are single household heads. Therefore, 12% of the
men in the sample live with their parents or other relatives, or are housekeepers. In 2001 these
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numbers are, respectively, 19,731 for sample size, 16,735 for working men, and 14,785 for married
or cohabitating. The percentage of men that live with their parents or other relatives, or are
housekeepers increased by 6.5 percentage points, and there is an increase of 7.8 percentage points
of single men head of households. From 1981 to 2001, the percentage of working men decreased
from 92% to 85%. Among male workers the percentage working in an integrated occupations has
increased by about 4 percentage points, the percentages working in male occupations decreased by
6 percentage points, and the percentages working in female occupations increased by 1.6 percentage
points.
Most of the sample lives in urban areas, where Metropolitan regions are a special case of urban
areas. About 15% of the females left the rural area to urban areas from 1981 to 2001 as shown by
the percentages of the women residing in rural and urban areas, but the percentages in Metropolitan
areas remained the same between these two years. Males, however, left the rural areas and t he
Metropolitan regions. About half of the sample resides in the Southeast States, and about 20%
resides in the Northeast States. There was an increase in schooling for both genders, but females’
schooling increased more than males’, and females went from having a little less schooling to have
a little more schooling than males. Especially interesting is the drop of the proportion of females
with no formal education; the rates went from 22% to 8%, whereas the percentage of males with
no formal education went from 19% to 11%. Moreover, there were no changes in the percentage
of males with some college education, about 10%, but female participation in college education
doubled, from 7% to 14%. The number of children has decreased by one, so the average number
of children in a household is two in 2001. Individuals 30 to 40 years old are more likely to have
children that are 6 to 10 years old than other age groups.
In 1981, the gender wage gap was 30% and decreased to 13%11 in 2001. This change, however,
is less due to improvements in women’s wage rates and more due to a reduction in men’s wage rates.
Indeed, men’s wage rates dropped by 29% between 1981 and 2001. In terms of unearned income,
there was an inversion of the values between genders, while women’s unearned income increased
from 23 to 31 thousand 2001 Reais, the men’s unearned income decreased from 33 to 19.
11These percentages are calculated as the difference of the logarithm of men’s to women’s wage rates minus
one.
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On average men work more hours per week than women; however, the number of women’s
weekly hours worked and the percentage of married women indicates that a good proportion of
wives are, indeed, working full-time. Husband’s wage rate in 2001 is above the overall men’s wage
rates, while the wages rates of married and all men are very close in 1981. This is evidence that
single men accrued most of the losses in men’s wage rates between these two years. Husbands’
average unearned income is higher than the overall men’s average unearned income, while wives’
average unearned income is lower than the overall women’s unearned income.
4.4 Classifying Occupations by Gendered
Participation.
This paper follows Beller (1982) method of classifying occupations among male-dominated, gender-
integrated and female-dominated occupations, where a gender-integrated occupation is defined to
be the one where males’ participation is in an interval around their share in the labor force.
The classification cutoffs change to accommodate the changes in female participation in the labor
force between these years. While this definition may seem arbitrary, so is any other candidate
definition. Moreover, the definition used allows for accounting for the changes in female labor force
participation. This section continues by explaining further the classification and presenting facts
based on the data.
It is common to assume that the ideal share of females in the labor force or in a particular
occupation should be close to 50%. Under this assumption, gender equality in labor markets
would be achieved only when all women of working age participate in the labor force. Therefore,
women’s reasons and choices to not participate are not considered. However, Beller (1982) asserts
that under the assumption that males’ and females’ preferences are equal and there is no barrier
to the females to enter into any occupation, all occupations should have a female participation
rate that reflects the female participation rate in the labor force. Following this idea, a gender-
integrated occupation is defined to be the one where males’ participation is in an interval of sixteen
points around their share of the labor force. Consequently, a male-dominated (female-dominated)
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occupation is defined as one in which males’ (females’) participation is higher (lower) than the
gender-integrated occupations.
There are two challenges when working with these definitions. The first one is the choice of
the length of the interval that defines the occupations. The sixteen percentage points were chosen
because they are half of the standard deviation from the mean proportion of females in the labor
force. In that way, if the distribution were normal, then the sample would be divided in three parts
of about equal size. The second challenge is whether the cutoff points of occupation classifications
should change to accommodate increases in female participation in the labor force. Table 4.3
presents the number of occupations in each classification. For 2001, these numbers are presented
keeping fixed the cutoffs of 1981 and also correcting for changes in female participation in the labor
force.
In 1981, males made up 68.4% of the Brazilian labor force, with the same percentage of males
actually employed. By 2001, males lost about eleven percentage points in their share of the labor
force, falling to 57.5%, and ten percentage points in their share of actual employment, 58.6%.
Therefore, a male occupation, in 1981, is defined as one in which males hold more than 84.33%
of the jobs. In an integrated occupation, males’ share of jobs are in an interval from 52.48% to
84.33%, and as a result, a female occupation is defined as the ones in which the share of males’
jobs is lower than 52.48%. When changes in female participation in the labor force from 1981 to
2001 are accounted for, these cutoff points change to 73.47% and 41.62%.
Independently of the classification procedure used in 2001, most of the occupations have a
low participation of females, and female-dominated occupations are less than one third of the
occupations, see table 4.3. However, the number of integrated occupations increased from 1981 to
2001. The net changes were an increase of 19 occupations in the integrated category, 12 coming
from former male-dominated and 7 from former female-dominated, and three new occupations
have been created. When the 2001 occupations are classified using the 1981 cutoffs, most of the
changes were from male occupations to integrated occupations. As would be expected, as women’s
participation in the labor force increases, it gets easier for them to enter in any occupation. For
that reason, the 2001 cutoffs are used to classify the occupations in 2001 in the following sections
of this paper.
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Table 4.4 shows the total mean hourly wage by gender label occupations and the mean male’s
and female’s hourly wage by gender label occupations. In 1981, female-dominated occupations
paid 40% less than the gender-integrated occupations; and by 2001 this percentage differential was
reduced to 3%. However, for male workers the relationship is somewhat unexpected; they don’t
lose as much by working in female-dominated occupations comparing to if they were employed in
a male-dominated occupation, and, in 2001, they are even better off. Women, on the other hand,
receive a premium for working in male-dominated occupations compared to other working women,
as well as, compared to men working in male-dominated occupations. As shown in Table 4.1 in
the Appendix, in 1981, 72% of the female workers were employed in a female occupation, and this
number decreased only by two percentage points, in 2001. This degree of occupational segregation
becomes a problem because, as discussed above, female occupations are less desirable for women
in terms of wage rate compared to the other two categories.
Tables 4.5 to 4.10 show the number of workers and their mean education for the top 20 by num-
ber of workers in male-dominated, gender-integrated, female-dominated occupations in 1981 and
2001. Most of the occupations are low-skill occupations, especially among the male-dominated oc-
cupations. Gender-integrated occupations have a higher share of college-degree occupations, such as
physicians, lawyers, college/university professors, dentists and economists, than the other two types
of occupations. The occupations that changed categories from male-dominated to gender-integrated
are mostly higher paid and higher human capital required occupations, such as manager, accoun-
tant, and business person. Occupations that went from gender-integrated to male-dominated are
low skill, such as doorman. Occupations that changed from gender-integrated to female-dominated
are mainly in the services sector.
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4.5 The Determinants of Women’s Participation into
Gender Labeled Occupations
Women in 1981 (Table 4.11)
In short, the results discussed in this subsection indicates that not working is preferred by married
women in 1981, especially if they have children. That is, traditional women’s role as wife and mother
affect women’s participation in the labor market, more than the choice of the occupation. However,
if their husbands’ earnings fall short they are “pushed” into female-dominated occupations.
Married women are more likely to work in female occupations than in integrated occupations
when they work at all. Relative to working in an integrated occupation, married women are 4.7312
times more likely to not work than to work in integrated occupations and 1.14 times more likely
to work in female occupations than to work in integrated occupations. However, the odds ratio
of male occupations to integrated occupations for married women is 0.725, implying that married
women are 27.5% less likely to work in male occupations than to work in integrated occupations.
Having a child increases the probability that women will not work and the younger the child
the higher is the women’s probability of not working. Having a child younger than three years old,
three to five years old, six to ten years old and older than 16 years old increases the probability of
not working by 1.45, 1.28, 1.17 and 1.10, respectively. However, having a child 11 to 15 years old
decreases women’s probability of not working by 5.9%, the odds ratio is 0.941.
As their husbands’ earnings increase, married women are less likely to work in female occupa-
tions and equally likely to work in integrated or male occupations if women decide to work. For an
increase in $ 1,000 Reais in husband’s earned income, married women are 1.05 times more likely to
not work relative to work in integrated occupations. The odds ratio of female and integrated oc-
cupations is 0.98, implying that an increase of $ 1,000 Reais in husband’s earned income decreases
in 1.2% the probability of working in female occupations. Therefore, to not work is the preferred
option of married women whose husbands have higher earnings.
12The impact of the variables discussed are significant at either the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, unless the
contrary is noted.
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Women with higher unearned income are more likely to not work, but when they work they
are less likely to work in gender specific-occupations than in integrated occupations. As unearned
income increases by $ 1,000 Reais, and the probability of not working is 4.25 times higher than
the probability of working in integrated occupations. The odds ratio of working in male occupa-
tions and integrated occupations is 0.18 and the odds ratio of working in female occupations and
integrated occupations is 0.47. The husband’s unearned income does not influence the choice of
occupation. Women are equally likely to work in any occupation and to not work independently
of their husband’s unearned income.
As women’s education increases, the odds ratio of not working and work in integrated occupa-
tions decreases. Indeed, women with college degrees are 98% less likely to not work compared to
the likelihood of women with primary education working in gender-integrated occupations. The
odds ratio of working in female occupations and integrated occupations are similar across women’s
educational levels. Women of all degree levels are less likely to work in female-dominated occu-
pations than in gender-integrated occupations. As education increases, the odds ratio of working
in male-dominated occupations and integrated occupations increases. Still, women with college
degrees are 32% less likely to work in a male-dominated occupation compared to the likelihood
that women with primary education are working in gender-integrated occupations.
Women in 2001 (Table 4.12)
The results discussed in this subsection shows that the effects of the traditional women’s role in
women’s labor force participation haven’t changed. However, differently from 1981, married women
choose to participate in the labor market even when their husbands’ earnings is high, and the choice
of work sector is not very sensitive to husband’s earnings. In summary, women have established
their role as co-providers in their families. Therefore, the anticipation of this new role makes them
to prepare themselves to enter into other occupations than female occupations.
Relative to working in integrated occupations, married women are 2.48 times more likely to
not work. That is, the choice of not working becomes less likely in 2001 than in 1981. However,
the odds ratio of working in female and integrated occupations is still 1.14 for married women,
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i.e., married women are as likely as before to choose to work in female occupations over integrated
occupations. Relative to the probability of working in integrated occupations, married women are
more likely to work in male occupations in 2001 than in 1981. In fact, the odds ratio of working in
male and integrated occupations is statistically equal to one, i.e., married women are equally likely
to choose between integrated and male occupations.
Having a child ten years old and younger increases the probability that women do not work,
but having a child 11 years old and older increases the women’s probability of working in female
occupations. Having a child younger than three years old, three to five years old and six to ten
years old increases the probability of not working by 1.56, 1.22, and 1.21 times compared to the
probability of working in integrated occupations, respectively. However, having a child six to ten
years old, 11 to 15 years old and 16 years old and older increases women’s probability of choosing
to work in female occupations over integrated occupations by 1.09, 1.15 and 1.12, respectively.
The choice of work sector is not very sensitive to husband’s earnings. Married women whose
husbands have higher earnings are equally likely to choose working in male and integrated occu-
pations, given that the odds ratio of male and integrated occupations is statistically equal to one.
The odds ratio of married women whose husbands have higher earnings to choose to work in female
occupations over integrated occupations is 0.97. In other words, an increase in $ 1,000 Reais in
their husbands’ earned income makes married women 3% less likely to work in female occupations.
Even though the odds ratio of married women whose husbands have higher earnings to choose do
not work over to work in integrated occupations is not statistically equal to one, an increase in $
1,000 Reais in their husbands’ earned income makes married women only 0.75% more likely to not
work relative to work in integrated occupations.
In 1981, husbands’ unearned income does not have any impact on married women’s choice to not
work, or to work in female, male, or integrated occupations. However, in 2001, husbands’ unearned
income makes the odds ratio of married women to choose female over integrated occupations equal
to 0.72. In this case, an increase in $ 1,000 Reais in their husbands’ unearned income makes married
women 28% less likely to choose to work in female occupations compared to working in integrated
occupations.
As women’s unearned income increases by $ 1,000 Reais the probability of choosing not to work
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over to work in integrated occupations increases by 3.83. The odds ratio of choosing to work in
female occupations over working in integrated occupations is 0.45, that is, an increase in unearned
income by $ 1,000 Reais makes women 55 percent less likely to choose female over integrated
occupations. However, the odds ratio of choosing to work in male over integrated occupations is
statistically equal to one, meaning that to work in male and integrated occupations are equally
likely. Therefore, an increase in unearned income makes the option to not work the preferred one.
As women’s education increases, women are less likely to not work. However, for women with
no schooling the odds ratio to choose to not work over working in integrated occupations is 1.39,
meaning that to not work is preferable over to work in integrated occupations if women have no
schooling. For the other educational levels women are more likely to choose work in integrated
occupations than to not work. Likewise, women with more than primary education are more
likely to choose work in integrated occupations than work in female occupations. There is not
much difference in the probability of women working in male-dominated and gender-integrated
occupations across educational groups, except for women with college degrees, whose odds ratio to
choose work in male over integrated occupations is 0.65, meaning that women with college degrees
are more likely to work in integrated occupations. In fact, to work in an integrated occupation is
the preferred option for women with college degree.
4.6 The Determinants of Men’s Participation into
Gender Labeled Occupations
Men in 1981 (Table 4.13)
Married men are more likely to work in male occupations. Relative to working in integrated
occupations, married men are 1.31 times more likely to work in male occupations. While, the
odds ratios of choosing work in female over integrated occupations and choosing not working over
integrated occupations are 0.73 and 0.56, respectively. That is, to work in integrated occupations
is preferable to married men compared to working in female occupations or not working. However,
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to work in male occupations is preferable to married men compared to working in integrated
occupations.
As for women, increasing educational levels decreases men’s probability of not working. Men
with college degrees have a odds ratio of choosing not to work over work in integrated occupa-
tions of 0.03. That is, men with college degrees are 97% less likely to not work than to work in
integrated occupations. The odds ratio for men with college degree of choosing to work in male
over integrated occupations is 0.41, meaning that they are 59% more likely to choose to work in
integrated occupations than male occupations. The odds ratio of choosing female over integrated
occupations for men with college degree is statistically equal to one. Therefore, work in female and
integrated occupations is preferred by college educated men.
Men with higher unearned income are less likely to work in a gender specific-occupation than
in an integrated occupation. The odds ratio of working in male over integrated occupations is 0.61
and the odds ratio of working in female over integrated occupations is 0.56. As unearned income
increases by $ 1,000 Reais, the probability of not working is 8.6 times higher than the probability of
working in integrated occupations. Therefore, not working is the preferred option when unearned
income increases by $ 1,000 Reais.
Having a child younger than three years old does not impact men’s decisions about work and
occupations. But, having a child three to five years old decreases men’s probability of not working
by 15%; the odds ratio of choosing not working over working in integrated occupations is 0.85.
Having a child six to ten years old increases men’s probability of working in male occupations
relative to working in integrated occupations by 1.06 times.
As their wives’ earnings increase, married men are less likely to work in male occupations.
For a $ 1,000 Reais increase in wife’s earned income, the odds ratio of choosing work in male
occupations over integrated occupations is 0.98, that is, they are 2% less likely to work in a male
occupation than integrated occupations. The wife’s unearned income does not influence the choice
of occupation. Men are equally likely to work in any occupation and to not work independently of
their wives’ unearned income.
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Men in 2001 (Table 4.14)
Married men are still more likely to work in male occupations. Relative to working in integrated
occupations, married men are 1.24 times more likely to work in male occupations. The odds ratio
of married men choosing to work in female over integrated occupations is statistically equal to one.
Relative to work in integrated occupations, married men are 37% less likely to not work; the odds
ratio is 0.63. Therefore, work in male occupations is the preferable option for married men.
Having a child makes men less likely to not work and more likely to work in male occupations.
Having a child 3 years and younger increases men’s probability of working in male occupations
relative to working in integrated occupations by 1.09 times. The odds ratio of choosing to work in
male occupations over integrated occupations is 1.13 for men with children eleven to fifteen years
old and 1.14 for men with children sixteen years and older. The odds ratio of choosing work in
female occupations over integrated occupations is 1.11 for men with children eleven to fifteen years
old.
While in 1981 married men whose wives have higher earned income were more likely to work
in male occupations, in 2001 they are equally likely to work in the three types of gendered-labeled
occupations. The odds ratios of married men whose wives have higher earnings choosing to work in
male over integrated occupations and female over integrated occupations are statistically equally
to one. However, the odds ratio of married men whose wives have higher earnings choosing not
working over integrated occupations is 0.94, that is they are 5.6% less likely to not work.
Men with higher unearned income are equally likely to work in gender specific-occupations as
in integrated occupations. The odds ratios of men with unearned income choosing to work in
male over integrated occupations and female over integrated occupations are statistically equally
to one. However, the probability of not working is 39 times higher than the probability of working
in integrated occupations as unearned income increases by $ 1,000 Reais.
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4.7 The Impact of Participation into Gender Labeled
Occupations on Wages
In this section, the impact of working in a gendered occupation on wages is investigated. First,
the wage difference among occupations within a gender in a particular year is compared. The
results are presented in Table 4.15, column one to four for women in 1981, women in 2001, men
in 1981 and men in 2001, respectively. In general, female occupations pay men and women lower
earnings than male and integrated occupations, that is, working in female-dominated occupations
has a penalty in terms of wage. Also, the results are consistent with the hierarchical interpretation
of ability. Higher ability women select themselves in male-dominated occupations in 1981 and in
gender-integrated occupations in 200113.
The comparison between men’s and women’s wages and its evolution is based on the estimates
reported in Table 4.16, where all four groups are pooled. The interaction of the dummy for female
with the dummy for male-dominated, gender-integrated and female-dominated occupations capture
the difference between women’s and men’s wages for those working in one of these occupations in
1981. The selection of women into gender-integrated and male-dominated occupations has less
impact on hourly earnings in 2001 than in 1981, implying that women working in male-dominated
occupations increasingly came from the lower end of the ability distribution over time. In 1981,
only very high ability women worked in these professions. Now, they have opened up to lower
ability women.
Comparing Women’s Wage Among Occupations
There exists a negative difference (penalty) between the mean log of hourly wage of female-
dominated and gender-integrated occupations in both years after controlling for geographic lo-
cation, individuals’ characteristics and selection into gender-labeled occupations. In other words,
13Regressing the residuals of the wage regression on the exclusion restrictions was used as a test of the
validity of the exclusion restrictions. If the exclusion restrictions are valid, they should not enter into the
wage regression and therefore not be significant in explaining the wage. Indeed, their significance levels vary
between men and women and both years. However, there is always at least one exclusion restriction that
can be considered valid.
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β12 is negative and significant on Table 4.15, column 1 and 2. Regarding the mean log of hourly
wage of male-dominated occupations after controlling for geographic location, individuals’ char-
acteristics and selection into gender-labeled occupations, in 1981 (Table 4.15, column 1), it was
higher than the mean log of hourly wage of gender-integrated occupations (premium). However, in
2001 (Table 4.15, column 2), the difference was not statistically significant, indicating that there is
no premium for female workers in male occupations in comparison with female workers in gender-
integrated occupations. Post-estimation tests confirm a positive difference in the mean log of hourly
wage between male- and female-dominated occupations14, where male-dominated occupations pay
a premium to females that is not explained by geographic location, individuals’ characteristics and
selection into gender-labeled occupations.
In 1981 (Table 4.15, column 1), women who worked in male-dominated occupations had unob-
served characteristics that increased their earnings ability, that is, the coefficient of the selectivity-
correction term of male-dominated occupations is positive and significant. On the other hand,
women who worked in female-dominated occupations had unobserved characteristics that reduced
their earnings ability, that is, the coefficient of the selectivity-correction term of female-dominated
occupations is negative and significant. However, selection into gender-integrated occupations is
not significant, indicating that the distribution of unobserved characteristics in gender-integrated
occupations, in 1981, reflects the distribution of unobserved characteristics in the female sample.
The story reported by the 1981 data is that there is not a selection of females into gender-integrated
occupations, but there is a selection of females into male- and female-dominated occupations, where
females selected to male-dominated occupations have above average unobserved characteristics and
female with below average unobserved characteristics are crowded in female-dominated occupations.
In 2001 (Table 4.15, column 2), women who worked in female occupations still had unobserved
characteristics that reduced their earnings ability. However, there were changes in the distribution
of skills in the female population or across the female workers in gender-integrated and male-
integrated occupations. As is shown by the coefficient of the selectivity-correction term of male-
dominated occupations, there is no significant selection of females workers into male-dominated
14The test of equality of the coefficients, χ2(1) = 125.06 χ
2
(1) = 6.13 for 1981 and 2001 respectively, is
rejected in both years.
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occupations. However, the unobserved characteristics of females who enter into integrated occupa-
tions increases their earnings ability, as shown by the coefficient of the selectivity-correction term
of gender-integrated.
Comparing Men’s Wage Among Occupations
In 1981 (Table 4.15, column 3), there exists a penalty in terms of the mean log of hourly wage
for male workers in female-dominated occupations relative to males workers in gender-integrated
occupations after controlling for geographic location, individuals’ characteristics and selection into
gender-labeled occupations. The coefficient of the indicator of female-dominated occupations is
negative and significant. That is, men who worked in female-dominated occupations received less
than men who worked in integrated occupations. However, there is no significant difference between
male-dominated and gender-integrated occupations in terms of the mean log of hourly wage. The
coefficient of the indicator of male-dominated occupations is not significant. The post-estimation
test rejects, at 10% significance level, the equality of the mean log of hourly wage between female-
and male-dominated occupations, χ2(1) = 3.55. Therefore, men who work in female-dominated
occupations have a penalty in terms of wage compared to those who work in male-dominated and
integrated occupations.
Similar to men who worked in female-dominated occupations, men who worked in male-dominated
occupations have a distribution of ability that differed from the rest of the male population. In
particular, they have a negative selection, i.e., the coefficients for the selectivity-correction term
of female- and male-dominated occupations are negative and significant. In reality, the impacts
of unobserved earnings abilities of men working in male- and female-dominated occupations were
not significantly different15. However, men who worked in integrated occupations have a similar
skill distribution to the male population; that is, the selectivity-correction term is positive, but not
significant.
Differently from 1981, in 2001 (Table 4.15, column 4), men who worked in male-dominated oc-
cupations have higher mean log wages than men who worked in gender-integrated occupations, i.e.,
15The estimated difference in the log of hourly wage is −0.037 and the standard errors are 0.042.
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the coefficient of the indicator of male-dominated occupation is positive and significant. However,
as in 1981, the difference in the mean log wage between gender-integrated and female-dominated
occupations is negative, i.e., the coefficient of the indicator of female-dominated occupations is
negative and significant. The post-estimation test of equality of parameters for the indicators of
male- and female-dominated occupations is rejected at 1% significance level, χ2(1) = 42.31.
Men who work in male-dominated occupations have unobserved characteristics that are pos-
itively correlated with earnings ability. That is, the coefficient of the selectivity-correction term
of male-dominated occupations is positive and significant. However, men who worked in gender-
integrated and female-dominated occupations have negative selection, i.e. the coefficients of the
selectivity-correction terms of these two occupations are negative.
Comparing Women’s and Men’s Wages
The results reported here are based on the pooled regression, for which estimates are presented
in Table 4.16. In 1981, male-dominated occupations have a premium in terms of wage com-
pared to gender-integrated occupation. This premium is equal for male and female workers in
male-dominated occupations, as shown by the coefficients of male-dominated occupations and the
indicator of women in male-dominated occupations, respectively. In 2001, this premium for male-
dominated occupations decreased for men and women. In fact, it become a penalty in terms of
wage, -0.226 for men16 and -0.876 for women17, and the penalty for women in male occupations in
2001 is 0.65 higher than the penalty for men in male occupations.
Compared to male workers in gender-integrated occupations, male workers face no premium
or penalty in terms of wage working in female occupations in 1981, as shown by the coefficient on
female occupations. Moreover, there is no premium or penalty in terms of wage for female workers
working in female-dominated occupations compared to male workers working in female-dominated
occupations, as shown by the coefficient of the interaction of indicators of female occupation and
16The impact of male occupation in 2001 on men’s wage is the sum of the coefficient of male occupations
and the coefficient of the interaction of male occupation and the dummy for 2001.
17The impact of male occupation in 2001 on women’s wage is the sum of the impact of male occupation
in 2001 on men’s wage, the coefficient of the interaction of dummy for women and male occupations and the
coefficient of the interaction of male occupation and dummy for women and the dummy for 2001.
137
female. However, in 2001, there is a penalty in terms of wage for men and women working in female-
dominated occupations compared to workers in gender-integrated occupations. This penalty is 0.44
higher for female workers than for male workers in female-dominated occupations.
In 1981, there is no premium or penalty in terms of wage for female workers working in inte-
grated occupations compared to male workers in gender-integrated occupations, as shown by the
coefficient on the interaction of dummy for women and integrated occupation. But, in 2001, there
is a penalty in terms of wage for men and women working in integrated occupations. Indeed,
this penalty for women working in integrated occupations is 0.66 higher than the penalty for men
working in integrated occupations, as shown by the coefficients on the interaction of integrated
occupation and the dummy for 2001 and the interaction of integrated occupation, the dummy for
women, and the dummy for 2001, respectively.
In 1981, men who work in male-dominated occupations have unobserved characteristics that
reduce their wages, as shown by the coefficient of the selection into male-dominated occupation,
while women working in male-dominated occupations have unobserved characteristics that increase
their earnings ability, as shown the coefficient of selection into male-dominated occupation for
women. However, this selection of men and women into male-dominated occupations has changed
in 2001. It becomes easier for all skill type women to enter into male occupations, that is, the
distribution of women’s skill in male-dominated occupations is similar to the distribution of the
female population, as shown by the non-significance of the selectivity-correction term of women
into male-dominated occupation in 200118. Moreover, it becomes more difficult for men with lower
unobserved earnings ability to enter into male-dominated occupations, i.e., the distribution of men’s
skill in male-dominated occupations is more concentrated on higher skills than in 1981, as shown by
the interaction of year and the selectivity-correction term of men into male-dominated occupations.
The selection of men and women into female-dominated occupations is negative in 1981, as
shown by the coefficients of the selection into female-dominated occupations and the interaction of
selection into female-dominated occupations and dummy for women. There is no significant change
between 1981 and 2001, as shown by the non-significance of the coefficients of the interactions of
18The sum of the coefficients of selection of women into male occupations and the interaction of women
into male occupations and dummy for 2001 is -0.051 and the standard error is 0.048.
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dummy for 2001 and the selection of men into female occupations and the interactions of dummy for
2001 and the selection of women into female occupations. Therefore, in both years, the distribution
of skill in female-dominated occupations is more concentrated on low skill, and the distribution
of female workers in female-dominated occupations is more concentrated on low skill than the
distribution of male workers.
Whereas, in 1981, selection of men into gender-integrated occupations is negative, as shown
by the coefficient of selection into gender-integrated occupations, the selection of women into inte-
grated occupations was not significant19. The impact of women’s selection into gender-integrated
occupations is estimated by summing the coefficients of selection into integrated occupations and
the interaction of selection into gender-integrated occupations and dummy for women. However, in
2001, men with higher unobserved earnings ability relative to those who worked in integrated occu-
pations in 1981 have entered into integrated occupations as shown by the coefficient on the interac-
tion of selection into gender-integrated occupations and the dummy for 2001. On the other hand,
women with lower unobserved earnings ability than the women who worked in gender-integrated
occupations in 1981 have entered into integrated occupations in 2001, as shown by the coefficient
on the integration of selection into integrated occupations, dummy for women and dummy for
2001. That is, the distribution of skill in gender-integrated occupations becomes less concentrated
on high skill women.
Gender Differences in Returns to Schooling
Here, the gender difference in returns to schooling in a given occupational group is discussed. The
estimates are shown in table 4.17, they are the outcome of running separate regressions for each
type of occupation. Only the estimates of the returns to schooling are displayed since the other
parameters are roughly the same as before. The first column shows the males’ returns to schooling
and the second column shows the difference between males’ and females’ returns to schooling, which
is the coefficient of the interaction of female with the dummies for educational level.
Looking at the difference between male and female workers’ returns to schooling avoids the bias
19The estimated impact of selection into integrated occupations on women’s wage is 0.002 with a 0.02
standard error.
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in estimating returns to schooling due to omitted variables. Because omitted variables bias returns
to schooling of males and females in the same direction and magnitude, the difference is free from
this bias. For that reason, this section focuses on the difference of returns to schooling of female
and male workers.
In 1981, there is no difference in returns to schooling of male and female workers in female-
dominated occupations, except for high school. However, female workers with high school degree
have higher returns to schooling than male workers in male-dominated occupations. Except for
women with college degrees, women working in gender-integrated occupations have lower returns
to schooling than men working in gender-integrated occupations.
In 2001, women with no schooling or with high school degrees have lower returns to schooling
than men working in female-dominated occupations. However, women with college degrees working
in female-dominated occupations have a 0.27 higher return to schooling than men with college
degrees working in female-dominated occupations. In male-dominated occupations, there is no
statistically significant difference in returns to schooling of female and male workers. Except for
women with no schooling, women working in gender-integrated occupations have lower returns to
schooling than men working in gender-integrated occupations.
4.8 Conclusions
Even after the institutional changes that Brazil underwent from 1981to 2001 that favored women
in the labor market, 70% of the working women are still crowded into few occupations that are
less desired in terms of wage rates. To understand their reasons for crowding themselves into these
occupations, this paper uses a version of the Roy’s model to test whether gender roles contribute
to their career choice. It is also possible in this model to verify whether women suffer a penalty
in terms of wage by working in female-dominated occupations. That is, whether women working
in female-dominated occupations have lower wage rates than women working in other occupations,
independently of their schooling, age, place of residence and selection into occupations.
As shown by the results, gender roles have their share of responsibility for women being crowded
into female-dominated occupations. Married women are 1,14 times more likely to work in female-
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dominated occupations than to work in gender-integrated occupations in both years. Having a
child six years and older increases on average by 12% the probability of women working in female-
dominated occupations instead of gender-integrated occupations in 2001.
Indeed, being crowded into female-dominated occupations imposes a penalty in terms of wages
for women that does not depend on their schooling, age, place of residence, and selection into
occupations. If women could change from female-dominated occupations to gender-integrated
occupations, their log of hourly wages would increase by 0.81. However, it becomes easier for all
types of women to enter into male-dominated and gender-integrated occupations in 2001 compared
to 1981.
It becomes easier for all types of women to enter into gender-integrated and male-dominated
occupations. However, women are still being crowded into female-dominated occupations due to
their gender roles. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination laws, it is
crucial to combine measures that can lessen the impact of gender roles on women’s career choice.
Measures such as increasing children’s school time could help to freer women’s time enabling them
to choose occupations that are less flexible in hours and higher paying.
However, measures to relieve the impact of women’s gender roles will not be fully effective in
promoting their entry into gender-integrated occupations if women continue to have lower returns
to schooling than men in these occupations. For women with college degrees, female-dominated
occupations give them higher returns to schooling compared to men with college degrees in female-
dominated occupations. In male-dominated occupations men and women have equal returns to
schooling. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the reasons why women have lower returns to
schooling than men in gender-integrated occupations to be able to mitigate this difference and to
promote a more gender-integrated labor market.
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4.9 Tables
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics, Employees (Non-Military) and Non-Workers Women, Aged
30-40, Brazil 1981 and 2001.
1981 2001
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Percentage of workers 0.3076 (0.4615) 0.5213 (0.4995)
Percentage of Urban Residents 0.4189 (0.4934) 0.5661 (0.4956)
Percentage of Metropolitan Residents 0.3667 (0.4819) 0.3600 (0.4800)
Percentage of Residents in the North Region 0.0235 (0.1515) 0.0534 (0.2249)
Percentage of Residents in the Northeast Region 0.2608 (0.4391) 0.2412 (0.4278)
Percentage of Residents in the Southeast Region 0.4965 (0.5000) 0.4780 (0.4995)
Percentage of Residents in the South Region 0.1536 (0.3605) 0.1495 (0.3566)
Percentage of Residents in the Centralwest Region 0.0656 (0.2476) 0.0778 (0.2679)
Characteristics of Individual
Age 34.5887 (3.1790) 34.8373 (3.1458)
Percentage of Individuals by educational Level: 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
None 0.2190 (0.4136) 0.0822 (0.2747)
First to Fourth Grade 0.4416 (0.4966) 0.2413 (0.4279)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.1619 (0.3684) 0.2835 (0.4507)
High School 0.1058 (0.3076) 0.2570 (0.4370)
College 0.0716 (0.2579) 0.1361 (0.3429)
Unearned Income 22.8521 (169.1570) 31.1560 (230.9455)
Percentage Married 0.8496 (0.3574) 0.7616 (0.4261)
Number of Observations: N = 28074 N = 25431
Conditional on Work:
Hourly Earnings (in Reais of 2001) 3.6152 (4.6371) 3.2405 (5.3696)
Hours Working 40.4461 (13.2222) 38.9519 (12.2049)
Percentage of Workers in:
Male Occupations 0.0502 (0.2183) 0.0473 (0.2122)
Integrated Occupations 0.2292 (0.4203) 0.2529 (0.4347)
Female Occupations 0.7206 (0.4487) 0.6998 (0.4583)
Number of Observations: N = 9322 N = 13366
Characteristics of Household
Number of Children 3.2560 (2.1858) 2.0328 (1.3359)
Number of Children younger than 3 years old 0.4442 (0.6393) 0.1922 (0.4314)
Number of Children 3 to 5 years old 0.5332 (0.6872) 0.2709 (0.5029)
Number of Children 6 to 10 years old 1.0134 (0.9919) 0.6197 (0.7454)
Number of Children 11 to 15 years old 0.8695 (1.0274) 0.6376 (0.7812)
Number of Children older than 16 0.3957 (0.8069) 0.3124 (0.6492)
Number of Observations: N = 24699 N= 22446
Conditional on Being Married:
Spouse’s Hourly Earnings (in Reais of 2001) 4.8435 (7.7417) 4.0233 (10.6180)
Spouse’s Unearned Income (in 1,000 of Reais of 2001) 59.4700 (286.0027) 42.4290 (433.1935)
Number of Observations: N = 21773 N = 17839
Source: PNAD 1981 and 2001.
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics, Employees (Non-Military) and Non-Workers Men, Aged
30-40, Brazil 1981 and 2001.
1981 2001
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Percentage of workers 0.9207 (0.2702) 0.8522 (0.3549)
Percentage of Urban Residents 0.4075 (0.4914) 0.5478 (0.4977)
Percentage of Metropolitan Residents 0.4045 (0.4908) 0.3488 (0.4766)
Percentage of Residents in the North Region 0.0228 (0.1493) 0.0538 (0.2256)
Percentage of Residents in the Northeast Region 0.2248 (0.4174) 0.2371 (0.4253)
Percentage of Residents in the Southeast Region 0.5384 (0.4985) 0.4811 (0.4996)
Percentage of Residents in the South Region 0.1503 (0.3574) 0.1504 (0.3574)
Percentage of Residents in the Centralwest Region 0.0636 (0.2441) 0.0777 (0.2677)
Characteristics of Individual
Age 34.5261 (3.1747) 34.8164 (3.1608)
Percentage of Individuals by educational Level: 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
None 0.1895 (0.3919) 0.1113 (0.3145)
First to Fourth Grade 0.4269 (0.4946) 0.2499 (0.4330)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.1825 (0.3863) 0.2967 (0.4568)
High School 0.1019 (0.3025) 0.2401 (0.4271)
College 0.0992 (0.2990) 0.1020 (0.3026)
Unearned Income (in Reais of 2001) 32.9820 (202.6310) 18.8201 (162.7255)
Percentage Married 0.8977 (0.3031) 0.8386 (0.3679)
Number of Observations: N=20943 N = 19731
Conditional on Work:
Hourly Earnings 4.9347 (7.0014) 3.6902 (5.6700)
Hours Working 48.2802 (11.1780) 46.3107 (10.6549)
Percentage of Workers in:
Male Occupations 0.6150 (0.4866) 0.5515 (0.4973)
Integrated Occupations 0.3122 (0.4634) 0.3595 (0.4798)
Female Occupations 0.0728 (0.2598) 0.0890 (0.2848)
Number of Observations: N = 19225 N = 16735
Characteristics of Household
Number of Children 2.6246 (1.8692) 1.7735 (1.2928)
Number of Children younger than 3 years old 0.5590 (0.6758) 0.2641 (0.4949)
Number of Children 3 to 5 years old 0.6046 (0.7050) 0.3283 (0.5448)
Number of Children 6 to 10 years old 0.8825 (0.9685) 0.6169 (0.7551)
Number of Children 11 to 15 years old 0.4643 (0.8358) 0.4283 (0.6989)
Number of Children older than 16 0.1141 (0.4279) 0.1360 (0.4262)
Number of Observations: N = 18478 N = 16128
Conditional on Being Married:
Spouse’s Hourly Earnings (in Reais of 2001) 1.0558 (3.4497) 1.4326 (3.4306)
Spouse’s Unearned Income (in 1,000 of Reais of 2001) 5.7056 (64.4132) 13.1040 (98.0228)
Number of Observations: N = 17484 N = 14785
Source: PNAD 1981 and 2001.
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Table 4.3. Occupations by Gender Labels, Brazil 1981 - 2001.
1981 2001 2001 (1981 classification)
Occupations Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Male 203 57.83 191 53.95 154 43.5
Integrated 61 17.38 83 23.45 102 28.81
Female 87 24.79 80 22.6 98 27.68
Total 351 100 354 100 354 100
Source: PNAD 1981 and 2001.
Table 4.4. Mean Hourly Wages by Gender Labels, Brazil 1981 - 2001.
1981 2001
Occupations Total Men Women Total Men Women
Male 5.4265 5.4150 5.8289 3.4638 3.4457 3.7153
Integrated 5.9350 6.1486 5.2769 3.1036 3.3245 2.7962
Female 3.8529 5.2049 3.5398 2.9278 4.1729 2.7216
Total 5.6249 4.0067 3.4649 2.7921
Source: PNAD 1981 and 2001.
The wages are presented in value of 2001 Reais.
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Table 4.5. Top 20 Male-Dominated Occupations in 1981 Brazil, in descending order.
Occupation Education
Code Name Number of Workers Mean Std. Dev.
301 Meat farmer/producer 922581 1.66 2.02
751 Driver 478433 4.47 2.46
512 Stonemason /Building Contractor 373207 2.80 2.32
924 Manual Worker 248980 2.00 2.34
40 Foreman/person in charge in an office 138803 9.66 3.88
10 Small Store Owner (employer) 133199 7.21 4.10
513 Laborer Stonemason /Assistant Building Contractors 131401 2.59 2.30
482 Carpenter 107087 2.94 2.43
424 Automobile Mechanic 98090 4.76 2.74
425 Mechanic 94346 5.55 3.14
852 Soldier/Officers’ Mess 93088 7.52 3.04
843 Night Watchman/ Security Guard 79510 2.75 2.60
1 Retail Business/Store Owner 76035 3.23 3.31
8 Transformation Industry (Employer) 75244 7.48 4.36
514 Painter 69023 3.82 2.28
481 Cabinet-maker 62439 4.18 2.53
631 Travel Sellers 58957 8.54 3.40
33 Manager in transformation industry 55256 11.00 4.27
426 Welder 53475 4.33 2.40
182 Accountant 52400 12.65 2.57
Total number of workers working in male occupations 5092133
Share of workers in all male occupations in top 20 male occupations 66.80%
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Table 4.6. Top 20 Gender-Integrated Occupations in 1981 Brazil, in descending order.
Occupation Education
Code Name Number of Workers Mean Std. Dev.
601 store owner (self-employed) 311908 4.08 3.42
65 office assistant 247299 9.16 3.04
602 sellers 213065 6.06 3.08
35 retail manager 65964 8.57 3.64
151 physician/doctor 49719 16.73 0.83
611 market trader, stallholder 48474 3.24 2.83
53 clerk 39598 10.74 2.57
64 assistant managers 39409 10.06 3.33
233 lawyer 33815 15.61 0.74
920 garbage man 31429 2.00 2.12
212 college/university professor 28264 15.77 1.27
841 doorman 25476 4.32 2.83
152 dentist 21671 14.00 3.40
447 weaver 21395 4.22 2.06
58 typist / data analyst 20864 10.49 2.27
191 accountantstechnician 18568 11.33 1.81
613 sweet-seller 16048 2.47 2.20
752 conductor 15898 4.44 2.13
50 tax inspector/ customs officer 15009 9.50 4.62
181 economist 14300 14.40 1.65
Total number of workers working in gender-integrated occupations 2891689
Share of workers in all integrated occupations in top 20 integrated occupations 44.20%
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Table 4.7. Top 20 Female-Dominated Occupations in 1981 Brazil, in descending order.
Occupation Education
Code Name Number of Workers Mean Std. Dev.
805 Housekeeper 429823 3.02 2.36
470 Tailor/ Seamstress 268720 4.20 2.69
844 Laborer/ Servant 242930 3.03 2.45
215 Teacher in Primary School 147963 10.26 3.24
824 Manicure 132234 5.61 2.66
617 Street Seller 112326 4.43 3.35
162 Nurse (without degree) 99387 7.31 3.04
216 Teacher Primary and Middle School 97687 10.15 3.60
813 Cook 88596 3.28 2.45
59 Secretary 82036 10.49 2.76
21 Manager in Public Service 62392 11.90 3.84
815 Bartender 53425 4.50 2.62
214 Teacher in Middle School 51396 13.35 2.05
52 Assistant Manager 51327 10.77 3.15
336 Worker in Vegetable Extraction 50427 0.57 1.22
213 Teacher in High School 47850 14.18 1.67
474 Embroidery-maker 38581 4.08 2.94
584 Packing Worker 36239 4.31 2.46
821 Hair Stylist 34935 5.80 2.73
478 Worker in Shoe Factory 34061 4.38 2.33
Total number of workers working in female occupations 2573620
Share of workers in all female occupation in top 20 female occupations 84.02%
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Table 4.11. Multinomial Logit, Brazilian Women Aged 30 to 40 in 1981.
Male Female Non-workers
odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se
Geographic Location:
Urban Residents 1.3835 3.1178*** 1.2100*
(0.3280) (0.3090) (0.1026)
Metropolitan Residents 2.3727*** 3.7591*** 1.1249
(0.5350) (0.3651) (0.0933)
North Region 0.8205 0.8229 0.9219
(0.1747) (0.0842) (0.0926)
Northeast Region 0.6749** 0.9105 0.9571
(0.0978) (0.0608) (0.0619)
South 1.1392 1.0222 0.8285**
(0.1614) (0.0761) (0.0604)
Central West Region 0.6910 1.4104*** 1.3255***
Characteristics of Individual:
(0.1374) (0.1218) (0.1129)
Age 1.2904 1.2319 0.9777
(0.5503) (0.2516) (0.1941)
Age Squared 0.9963 0.9974 1.0006
(0.0061) (0.0029) (0.0029)
No Education 0.4728*** 0.5151*** 0.7064***
(0.0980) (0.0450) (0.0562)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.6264** 0.5645*** 0.4895***
(0.1033) (0.0464) (0.0380)
High School 0.6469** 0.5382*** 0.1128***
(0.1037) (0.0433) (0.0091)
College 0.6766* 0.5453*** 0.0237***
(0.1152) (0.0474) (0.0024)
Number of Children younger than 3 years old 1.0356 0.9540 1.4541***
(0.1155) (0.0504) (0.0716)
Number of Children 3 to 5 years old 0.9842 1.0189 1.2753***
(0.1042) (0.0493) (0.0577)
Number of Children 6 to 10 years old 0.8993 1.0543 1.1711***
(0.0680) (0.0350) (0.0365)
Number of Children 11 to 15 years old 0.9786 0.9785 0.9411*
(0.0714) (0.0321) (0.0291)
Number of Children older than 16 0.9242 1.0164 1.0985*
(0.0969) (0.0454) (0.0462)
Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.1852** 0.4734*** 4.2500***
(0.1064) (0.0836) (0.6986)
Married or Partnered 0.7247* 1.1428* 4.7271***
(0.0946) (0.0731) (0.3092)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.8495 0.9291 1.1295
(0.1993) (0.0838) (0.0947)
Husband’s Earnings 1.0068 0.9814*** 1.0499***
(0.0083) (0.0043) (0.0044)
Constant 0.0034 0.0272 3.3840
(0.0247) (0.0959) (11.5897)
Pseudo R-squared 0.1730
Model chi-square 8439.3372
Number of Observations: 28074
Hausman-MacFadden IIA Test (χ2(20)) 12.98
prob. 0.8782
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Omitted Categories: Rural Residents, Southeast Region, First to Fourth Grade, Childless and Single.
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Table 4.12. Multinomial Logit, Brazilian Women Aged 30 to 40 in 2001.
Male Female Non-workers
odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se
Geographic Location:
Urban Residents 1.3648 1.6288*** 1.5737***
(0.3158) (0.1539) (0.1445)
Metropolitan Residents 1.9282** 1.6651*** 1.6346***
(0.4460) (0.1593) (0.1521)
North Region 1.1668 1.0434 1.2314**
(0.1773) (0.0787) (0.0927)
Northeast Region 0.7972 1.1003 1.3157***
(0.0969) (0.0602) (0.0720)
South 0.9627 0.8255** 0.6457***
(0.1170) (0.0482) (0.0389)
Central West Region 1.2801 1.2474** 0.9726
(0.1795) (0.0867) (0.0695)
Characteristics of Individual:
Age 0.9126 0.9862 0.7812
(0.3150) (0.1616) (0.1295)
Age Squared 1.0013 1.0005 1.0038
(0.0050) (0.0024) (0.0024)
No Education 1.1665 0.8730 1.3925**
(0.2949) (0.1045) (0.1603)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.9838 0.7194*** 0.6616***
(0.1560) (0.0531) (0.0477)
High School 0.8666 0.3623*** 0.2271***
(0.1286) (0.0252) (0.0155)
College 0.6513* 0.3872*** 0.0605***
(0.1088) (0.0295) (0.0051)
Number of Children younger than 3 years old 0.8770 0.9254 1.5614***
(0.1130) (0.0538) (0.0866)
Number of Children 3 to 5 years old 1.0455 1.0100 1.2233***
(0.1060) (0.0488) (0.0576)
Number of Children 6 to 10 years old 1.0115 1.0853* 1.2050***
(0.0706) (0.0353) (0.0386)
Number of Children 11 to 15 years old 1.0430 1.1508*** 1.0429
(0.0699) (0.0363) (0.0328)
Number of Children older than 16 1.1121 1.1180** 1.0665
(0.0934) (0.0464) (0.0441)
Unearned Income (in 1000) 1.2018 0.4542*** 3.8249***
(0.3624) (0.0825) (0.5871)
Married or Partnered 0.9224 1.1362** 2.4844***
(0.0939) (0.0561) (0.1274)
Husband’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.5503 0.7153*** 1.0275
(0.1870) (0.0699) (0.0782)
Husband’s Earnings 0.9986 0.9661*** 1.0074**
(0.0063) (0.0037) (0.0028)
Constant 0.7352 2.6859 111.0646
(4.3958) (7.6253) (318.8440)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0843
Model chi-square 4633.3664
Number of Observations: 2.54e+04
Hausman-MacFadden IIA Test(χ2(20)) 8.56
prob. 0.9874
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Omitted Categories: Rural Residents, Southeast Region, First to Fourth Grade, Childless and Single.
152
Table 4.13. Multinomial Logit, Brazilian Men Aged 30 to 40 in 1981.
Male Female Non-workers
odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se
Geographic Location:
Urban Residents 4.9118*** 6.2264*** 9.3652***
(0.2790) (0.8857) (1.4203)
Metropolitan Residents 6.5680*** 9.9106*** 14.7897***
(0.3708) (1.3842) (2.2010)
North Region 1.0826 1.6960*** 0.8095
(0.0873) (0.2137) (0.1415)
Northeast Region 1.0834 1.4221*** 1.5243***
(0.0528) (0.1226) (0.1371)
South 1.2029*** 1.3584** 0.9597
(0.0658) (0.1283) (0.1065)
Central West Region 0.8064*** 1.6040*** 0.9638
(0.0452) (0.1444) (0.1060)
Characteristics of Individual:
Age 1.1243 0.8204 1.7077
(0.1631) (0.2022) (0.4852)
Age Squared 0.9984 1.0031 0.9930
(0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0040)
No Education 0.5827*** 0.5462*** 0.8008*
(0.0314) (0.0602) (0.0779)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.8393** 0.8439 0.6440***
(0.0456) (0.0772) (0.0617)
High School 0.4554*** 0.6751*** 0.2117***
(0.0278) (0.0685) (0.0294)
College 0.4056*** 0.9342 0.0316***
(0.0266) (0.0920) (0.0082)
Number of Children younger than 3 years old 1.0293 0.9217 0.9905
(0.0286) (0.0460) (0.0548)
Number of Children 3 to 5 years old 1.0205 0.9593 0.8520**
(0.0273) (0.0458) (0.0465)
Number of Children 6 to 10 years old 1.0572** 0.9855 1.0244
(0.0215) (0.0359) (0.0395)
Number of Children 11 to 15 years old 1.0013 0.9994 0.9923
(0.0255) (0.0449) (0.0453)
Number of Children older than 16 0.9582 0.9042 1.0773
(0.0445) (0.0766) (0.0802)
Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.6085*** 0.5626** 8.6365***
(0.0796) (0.1207) (1.3298)
Married or Partnered 1.3053** 0.7271* 0.5639***
(0.1120) (0.0915) (0.0768)
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.9998 0.9996 1.0010*
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Wife’s Earnings 0.9765*** 0.9988 0.9743
(0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0161)
Constant 0.0648 1.4726 0.0000*
(0.1627) (6.2851) (0.0000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0818
Model chi-square 3094.1039
Number of Observations: 1.85e+04
Hausman-MacFadden IIA Test (χ2(21)) 18.76
prob. 0.6006
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Omitted Categories: Rural Residents, Southeast Region, First to Fourth Grade, Childless and Single.
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Table 4.14. Multinomial Logit, Brazilian Men Aged 30 to 40 in 2001.
Male Female Non-workers
odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se odds-ratio/se
Geographic Location:
Urban Residents 4.0512*** 2.5660*** 4.7234***
(0.2558) (0.3169) (0.4500)
Metropolitan Residents 5.0063*** 3.7099*** 7.3661***
(0.3296) (0.4657) (0.7186)
North Region 0.9113 1.3287** 1.1428
(0.0567) (0.1315) (0.0953)
Northeast Region 1.0232 1.4305*** 1.3220***
(0.0468) (0.1057) (0.0791)
South 1.0655 0.7543** 0.6952***
(0.0554) (0.0722) (0.0552)
Central West Region 0.9303 1.1109 0.8119*
(0.0536) (0.1065) (0.0683)
Characteristics of Individual:
Age 0.9620 1.2364 1.0666
(0.1326) (0.2847) (0.2008)
Age Squared 1.0006 0.9969 0.9992
(0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0027)
No Education 0.5745*** 0.5988*** 1.1042
(0.0371) (0.0747) (0.0839)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 1.1531** 1.0797 0.8677*
(0.0572) (0.0975) (0.0564)
High School 0.7708*** 1.0974 0.4137***
(0.0393) (0.0977) (0.0294)
College 0.3167*** 1.6467*** 0.1007***
(0.0217) (0.1605) (0.0127)
Number of Children younger than 3 years old 1.0868* 0.9474 0.7517***
(0.0419) (0.0641) (0.0454)
Number of Children 3 to 5 years old 1.0498 0.9332 0.7997***
(0.0364) (0.0566) (0.0424)
Number of Children 6 to 10 years old 1.0327 0.9494 0.7597***
(0.0257) (0.0415) (0.0287)
Number of Children 11 to 15 years old 1.1288*** 1.1124* 0.8822**
(0.0326) (0.0547) (0.0374)
Number of Children older than 16 1.1389** 0.9285 0.8366*
(0.0531) (0.0804) (0.0582)
Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.7395 1.3376 39.2992***
(0.2165) (0.5228) (10.6468)
Married or Partnered 1.2360*** 0.9954 0.6330***
(0.0676) (0.0851) (0.0411)
Wife’s Unearned Income (in 1000) 0.9999 0.9990 1.0008**
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Wife’s Earnings 0.9900 0.9888 0.9448***
(0.0055) (0.0077) (0.0132)
Constant 0.7069 0.0023 0.0760
(1.6888) (0.0091) (0.2480)
Pseudo R-squared 0.065
Model chi-square 3122.99
Number of Observations: 19933
Hausman-MacFadden IIA Test (χ2(20)) 4.69
prob. 0.9998
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Omitted Categories: Rural Residents, Southeast Region, First to Fourth Grade, Childless and Single.
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Table 4.15. Wage Regression Brazilian Men and Women Aged 30 to 40, Dependent Variable:
Log of Hourly Wages in Reais of 2001.
Female 1981 Female 2001 Male 1981 Male 2001
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Dummies for Occupations
Male Occupations 0.1966* -0.0189 -0.0577 0.4728***
(0.0898) (0.2448) (0.0963) (0.0859)
Female Occupations -0.2117* -0.8067*** -0.5247*** -0.4252**
(0.0825) (0.0798) (0.1475) (0.1307)
Geographic Location
Urban Residents 0.6860*** 0.1396*** 0.4490*** 0.1880***
(0.0423) (0.0252) (0.0302) (0.0255)
Metropolitan Residents 0.8503*** 0.3331*** 0.6004*** 0.3285***
(0.0375) (0.0253) (0.0313) (0.0273)
North Region -0.2483*** -0.1429*** -0.2181*** -0.2890***
(0.0257) (0.0198) (0.0211) (0.0134)
Northeast Region -0.2770*** -0.3711*** -0.2642*** 0.0564***
(0.0192) (0.0128) (0.0116) (0.0125)
South Region 0.0692*** 0.0537*** -0.0597 -0.0481
(0.0176) (0.0134) (0.1029) (0.0281)
Central West Region 0.2558*** 0.0622*** -0.0643*** 0.0883***
(0.0260) (0.0175) (0.0147) (0.0176)
Individual’s Characteristics
Age 0.0909 0.0329 0.1064** 0.0871*
(0.0508) (0.0418) (0.0363) (0.0387)
Age Squared -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0014** -0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
No Education -0.3259*** -0.2288*** -0.3417*** -0.1864***
(0.0230) (0.0270) (0.0143) (0.0185)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.3763*** 0.1746*** 0.3580*** 0.2681***
(0.0204) (0.0145) (0.0131) (0.0132)
High School 1.1543*** 0.6243*** 1.0370*** 0.7666***
(0.0206) (0.0162) (0.0203) (0.0148)
College 1.8525*** 1.5722*** 1.8233*** 1.8157***
(0.0234) (0.0202) (0.0220) (0.0271)
Selection Correction Terms
Selection into Integrated Occupations -0.0035 0.0590** 0.0303 -0.0755**
(0.0222) (0.0218) (0.0230) (0.0238)
Selection into Male Occupations 0.2546*** 0.0133 -0.1253*** 0.0944***
(0.0225) (0.0467) (0.0345) (0.0236)
Selection into Female Occupations -0.4023*** -0.2575*** -0.0882* -0.1378***
(0.0279) (0.0294) (0.0350) (0.0311)
Constant -1.9241* -0.6061 -1.6717** -1.9322**
(0.8922) (0.7282) (0.6279) (0.6720)
Adjusted R-squared 0.6490 0.5207 0.6182 .5021
Model chi-square 18820.22 13763.89 30097.42 14432.4
N 9322 13364 17381 16774
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Omitted Categories: Integrated Occupations, Rural Residents, Southeast Region and First to Fourth Grade.
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Table 4.16. Pooled Wage Regression Brazilian Men and Women Aged 30 to 40 in 1981 and
2001, Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Wages in Reais of 2001.
Coefficient (S.E.)
Dummies for Occupations
Female * Integrated Occupations 0.1178 (0.0810)
Year=2001 * Integrated Occupations -0.1105* (0.0449)
Female * Year=2001 * Integrated Occupations -0.6627*** (0.1004)
Male Occupations 0.1970*** (0.0474)
Female * Male Occupations 0.1071 (0.0614)
Year=2001 * Male Occupations -0.4228*** (0.0391)
Female * Year=2001 * Male Occupations -0.7568** (0.2337)
Female Occupations -0.2281 (0.1264)
Female * Female Occupations 0.1158 (0.1306)
Year=2001 * Female Occupations -0.5212*** (0.1583)
Female * Year=2001 * Female Occupations -0.5546** (0.1699)
Geographic Location
Urban Residents 0.3374*** (0.0130)
Metropolitan Residents 0.5041*** (0.0131)
North Region -0.1658*** (0.0099)
Northeast Region -0.3201*** (0.0066)
South Region 0.0812*** (0.0089)
Centralwest Region 0.0344*** (0.0084)
Individual’s Characteristics
Age 0.0757*** (0.0208)
Age Squared -0.0008** (0.0003)
No Education -0.2919*** (0.0100)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.3139*** (0.0076)
High School 0.8593*** (0.0082)
College 1.7552*** (0.0100)
Selection Correction Terms
Integrated Occupations -0.0471*** (0.0140)
Female * Integrated Occupations 0.0490* (0.0237)
Year=2001 * Integrated Occupations 0.1196*** (0.0193)
Female * Year=2001 * Integrated Occupations -0.1451*** (0.0318)
Male Occupations -0.0807*** (0.0196)
Female * Male Occupations 0.2163*** (0.0239)
Year=2001 * Male Occupations 0.0527* (0.0251)
Female * Year=2001 *Male Occupations -0.2672*** (0.0524)
Female Occupations -0.0646* (0.0313)
Female * Female Occupations -0.1109** (0.0348)
Year=2001 * Female Occupations -0.0354 (0.0408)
Female * Year=2001 * Female Occupations -0.0559 (0.0468)
Constant -1.3083*** (0.3614)
R-squared Adjusted 0.577
N 56841
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.17. Returns to Schooling Among Occupations for Brazilian Men and Women Aged
30 to 40 in 1981 and 2001.
1981 2001
Male-Dominated Occupations
male female - male male female - male
No Education -0.4143 0.0475 -0.1196 -0.0052
(0.0203)*** (0.1214) (0.0291)*** (0.1448)
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.3093 0.162 0.2195 0.0144
(0.0153)*** (0.0910)* (0.0174)*** (0.0971)
High School 0.9773 0.2137 0.6761 0.1171
(0.0222)*** (0.0926)** (0.0184)*** (0.1122)
College 1.7508 0.1879 1.764 -0.064
(0.0254)*** (0.1051)* (0.0360)*** (0.1295)
Gender-Integrated Occupations
male female - male male female - male
No Education -0.287 -0.1567 -0.2626 0.2054
(0.0293)*** (0.0685)** (0.0319)*** (0.0805)**
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.4588 -0.1568 0.3779 -0.2119
(0.0290)*** (0.0600)*** (0.0265)*** (0.0558)***
High School 1.027 -0.1479 0.8097 -0.4359
(0.0403)*** (0.0672)** (0.0279)*** (0.0684)***
College 1.797 -0.116 1.6757 -0.4277
(0.0445)*** (0.0748) (0.0444)*** (0.0851)***
Female-Dominated Occupations
male female - male male female - male
No Education -0.3334 -0.0043 -0.0813 -0.1803
(0.0600)*** (0.0653) (0.0708) (0.0765)**
Fifth to Eighth Grade 0.4275 -0.0608 0.2025 -0.0551
(0.0454)*** (0.0505) (0.0470)*** (0.0502)
High School 1.0775 0.0995 0.7463 -0.1349
(0.0528)*** (0.0574)* (0.0525)*** (0.0556)**
College 1.8604 -0.0401 1.2949 0.2729
(0.0590)*** (0.0644) (0.1011)*** (0.1033)***
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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